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 i 
Abstract 
 
This research develops a distinctive theory of climate justice that addresses important 
gaps in the existing literature, and provides an account of China’s ethical 
responsibilities in the context of climate change. China is the world’s largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases and a key actor in international climate negotiations. The Chinese 
Government has offered various arguments to justify its current climate policy, which 
includes a commitment to reduce the energy intensity of the Chinese economy while 
rejecting an absolute limit on Chinese emissions. This research critically examines five 
key aspects of the Chinese position: (1) the bearers of climate responsibilities are states; 
(2) the right to development should excuse developing states from binding emissions 
limits; (3) consumers should be held responsible for the embedded emissions in the 
goods that they consume; (4) developed states bear more responsibility for tackling 
climate change because of their greater historic emissions; and (5) China can fulfil its 
climate responsibilities by reducing the energy intensity of its economy. Cumulatively, 
this analysis produces a distinctive theory of climate justice and an accompanying 
account of China’s climate responsibilities. More specifically, this thesis defends a 
Revised Beneficiary Pays Principle, which takes into account: (1) distinctions between 
subsistence, development and luxury benefits; (2) the degree to which benefits have 
been voluntarily accepted; and (3) the degree of influence that beneficiaries might have 
had over the quantity of emissions generated. Based upon the proposed theory of 
climate justice, the thesis offers a qualified defence of China’s commitment to reduce 
emissions intensity in the context of a fair global climate agreement.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Climate Change, Justice and China 
Climate change justice is a relatively new but rapidly developing field. However, to date, 
much work is general and can not easily be applied to the actual political situation or 
individual country-specific issues. This work will make an original contribution to the 
literature by critically reviewing the position taken by China, of one of the key actors in 
the climate change debate, on several key issues of climate justice. It will, therefore, 
provide an important bridge between policy and political philosophy. The focus on 
China will offer a distinctive lens through which to examine existing theories of global 
climate justice. Through detailed analysis of key questions in the climate justice 
literature, I will develop a distinctive account of climate justice. In turn, this will enable 
a better understanding of the responsibilities of the world’s largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases.  
In this introduction, I will first present the political context of international climate 
negotiations, in which agreement on climate action has been fraught with arguments 
about “fairness” from all sides. I will then give a brief overview of the scientific basis of 
climate change and its predicted impacts, in which to situate the urgency of the need for 
action, given the likelihood of harmful effects if climate change is not mitigated. I will 
then discuss China’s position within the global sphere of climate change politics and 
explain why the focus on China is of key importance. Following this, I will show that 
climate change must be addressed as a problem of justice, highlighting the need for 
robust, philosophical analysis. This is particularly important since we are beginning to 
see greater recognition of the ethical issues at stake, highlighting the political 
importance of thorough and rigorous treatment of the moral issues. I will provide an 
overview of some of the work that has been done so far within the field of political 
philosophy, before locating the cosmopolitan approach I will take within the wider 
debates around global justice and their relevance to climate change. I will then present 
my general assumptions and methodology, as well as the limits of the research. Finally, 
I will discuss my five key research questions and lay out the structure of the thesis. 
 2 
1.1 The Political and Scientific Context 
In the last twenty-five years, international negotiators have attempted to develop a 
response to the collective action problem of global climate change. In the late 1980s, the 
world began to acknowledge the serious threats posed by climate change and began to 
develop specialised bodies through which international collaboration could be grounded. 
In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up through a 
joint partnership between the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), with the aim of ‘provid[ing] the world 
with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its 
potential environmental and socio-economic impacts’.1 The IPCC has produced five 
‘assessment reports’ since 1990, analysing global research on climate change and 
models of the climate alongside possible policy responses. These reports represent the 
‘gold standard’ in climate science research, giving detailed, up-to-date reviews of the 
scientific consensus on climate change as well as potential actions the global 
community might take and their impact.2 Recognising the political nature of the need to 
work together globally to respond to climate change, a new treaty was also agreed at the 
1992 ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio-de-Janeiro.3 It was here that the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) came into being, a convention which today 
is made up of 195 parties which meet at a high-level once a year during the ‘Conference 
of the Parties’ (COP) meetings. Through the creation of these new specialised 
institutions, the mainstream narrative of climate change has been dominated by 
scientific and economic analyses.  
As a result, global action to date has been decided through multilateral agreements 
between states following periods of negotiations. The political nature of these 
international negotiations often appear to descend into a power struggle in which each 
party is trying to balance national interests with the requirements of a changing climate. 
Unsurprisingly, this has led to few meaningful actions regarding climate change, with 
global emissions increasing by 35% between 1990, around which time the potentially 
serious risks became widely recognised with the first IPCC assessment report, and 
                                                
1 IPCC, ‘Organization’ (n.d.) [Online] (http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml). [Accessed 
2 Nature, ‘Wanted: an IPCC for biodiversity’ (3 June 2010): 525; Joss Garman, ‘Climate scientists are 
losing ground against deniers' disinformation.’, The Guardian (15th February 2010) [Online] 
(http://www.theguardian.com/environment/cif-green/2010/feb/15/climate-science-ipcc-sceptics). 
[Accessed 4th June 2014]. 
3 UNFCCC, ‘Background on the UNFCCC: The international response to climate change’, (n.d.) [Online] 
(http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php). [Accessed 12 August 2014]. 
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2010.4 Whilst climate change has become a major issue, the politicisation of decisions 
relating to what to do about it has led to a distinct lack of progress.  
The most significant outcome of the UNFCCC process to date is the creation of the 
Kyoto Protocol which came out of the third meeting of the COP in 1997 in Kyoto, 
Japan. As part of the agreements, the ‘Annex I’ countries, the developed states, were to 
limit their emissions, ‘with a view to reducing their overall emissions of [greenhouse] 
gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012’.5 
Notably, however, the United States was a signatory to the Protocol but did not ratify it, 
and therefore was not subject to any binding emission reduction target. This was due to 
a resolution passed in the Senate which states: 
‘(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement 
regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at 
negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would – 
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for 
the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new 
specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for 
Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period’.6 
The United States took the view that the emerging economies would have an unfair 
advantage for growth if they were allowed to increase emissions whilst developed states 
were required to reduce their emissions. The Kyoto Protocol aimed to fairly balance the 
development needs of some states with the global requirement of reducing emissions by 
requiring ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR): 
‘The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof.’7 
As a developing country, China was not required to commit to any greenhouse gas 
emission limitations. At the same time, developed countries agreed to ‘acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in 
                                                
4 United States Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Climate Change Indicators in the United States’ (May 
2014) [Online] (http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/indicators/ghg/global-ghg-emissions.html). 
[Accessed 30 June 2014].  
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view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command.’8 As such, the language of the 
UNFCCC ‘demands’ consideration of fairness between states.9   
Whilst this idea of equity is embedded in the documentation of the UNFCCC, the 
negotiations themselves and discussions around climate change have tended to focus on 
economic analysis of action or inaction.10 But as Soltau argues, ‘decisions on combating 
climate change cannot be determined by the costs of action alone because the 
understanding of costs is informed by assumptions about what we value, and those 
assumptions relate to ethical and moral values that stand outside economics.’11 Whilst 
engagement with the economics of climate change action is important, it cannot be the 
sole basis upon which we decide what actions we can ‘afford’ to take. The ethical issues 
surrounding climate action have not been adequately addressed, with the principle of 
CBDR the only significant principle of fairness to regularly feature in international texts. 
However, the ambiguity of the principle of CBDR means that different actors are able to 
make their own interpretation of the principle and thus justify their own negotiating 
position. The impasse surrounding this principle has led to a strong division between 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, with only the former group being required to 
commit to binding climate measures.  
This division was engendered by the original categorisation of states into Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries. As we saw previously, the idea behind the principle is the need 
to balance a reduction in global emissions with development needs, as well as unequal 
causal responsibilities due to differing historic emissions. However, the binary division, 
whereby parties are considered either developed and eligible for full climate duties, or 
developing and exempted from any binding commitments, cannot be said to be an 
adequate representation of the ethical issues at stake. This would require a much higher 
degree of differentiation, given the highly globalised system of global trade, as well as 
the vast inequalities within states.  
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The effect of having only two categories means that the group of developing countries 
includes very poor countries such as Bangladesh and Mali as well as much more 
affluent countries such as South Africa, South Korea and, most relevant to our 
discussions, China.12 As Bortscheller argues, ‘the principle of C[B]DR, as currently 
applied, does not distinguish among developing nations in a way that  recognizes the 
critical importance of emerging economies like China.’13 State-level analyses do 
recognise the higher average cumulative emissions of developed states, compared to 
developing states, as well as their greater financial capacities. However, there is 
dramatic variation in both responsibility and capacity in both categories, the result of 
which is an extreme oversimplification of the issues of fairness at stake. The political 
division is reflected in the literature on climate change, which regularly defines the 
difficulties in sharing the global burden of climate change as an issue of developed 
versus developing countries. Whilst this differentiation may be a useful shorthand for 
the issues of equity at play, highlighting the differentiation between different climate 
stakeholders, a thorough analysis of climate change must go deeper than the 
developing-developed division if issues of fairness are to be taken seriously. 
In order to present the context in which the importance of the need to develop a just 
global response to climate change is grounded, it may be useful to consider an overview 
of the scientific basis of climate change and the predicted impacts. A brief point to note 
is that climate science is based upon climatic models, which ‘cannot be an exact 
science’.14 The IPCC has therefore created a ‘calibrated language for describing 
quantified uncertainty’ along a scale of likelihood, in which the probability of an event 
determines the language used to refer to the statistical confidence in the predicted 
outcomes given by climate models.15 For example, an event that is ‘virtually certain’ to 
happen must have a likelihood of at least ninety nine per cent, ‘extremely likely’ 
requires at least a ninety five per cent statistical likelihood, and on the other end of the 
scale ‘very unlikely’ is the term used for events with less than ten per cent likelihood of 
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happening.16 So, though there is uncertainty about what exact effects will happen where 
at exactly what time, scientists using climate models are able to estimate the risk or 
probability of many of the effects of rising greenhouse gas emissions. There is broad 
scientific consensus that the climate is changing, with the IPCC stating that this is 
‘unequivocal’.17 Furthermore, it is ‘extremely likely’ that the main cause of the 
warming is anthropogenic: 
‘It is extremely unlikely (less than 5%) that the global pattern of warming during the 
past half century can be explained without external forcing, and very unlikely that it is 
due to known natural external causes alone. The warming occurred in both the ocean 
and the atmosphere and took place at a time when natural external forcing factors 
would likely have produced cooling.’18 
Climate change is taking place, and an ‘extremely unlikely’ alternative cause 
notwithstanding, it is being caused by the cumulative emissions of humanity which 
have built up in the atmosphere since the industrial revolution. Climate science tells us 
that the atmosphere has a finite capacity to absorb greenhouse gases. These gases 
therefore accumulate in the atmosphere, taking in some of the energy that originally 
comes from the sun but that in normal circumstances would be ‘re-radiated’ back into 
space.19 As such, this heat remains trapped around the Earth, much like a blanket, 
causing what is known as the ‘greenhouse effect’ leading to an unnatural warming of 
the Earth which in turn affects the temperature of the oceans and the Earth’s surface.20 
The climate system is highly sensitive, and if ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system’ occurs, meaning that global temperatures rise above certain 
‘tipping points’, which are ‘thresholds for abrupt and irreversible change’, the impacts 
on the world’s ecosystems and human health will be severe.21 Increasingly severe and 
widespread impacts are positively correlated with greater increases of global surface 
temperature, though there is ‘high confidence’ that climate change is already posing a 
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‘moderate’ risk for increased ‘extreme events, such as heat waves, extreme precipitation, 
and coastal flooding’.22  
In the future, impacts of climate change are likely to be wide reaching and in some 
cases extremely severe, causing loss of life and habitat. These impacts will include 
(with very high confidence) ‘greater likelihood of injury, disease, and death due to more 
intense heat waves and fires’, as well as ‘increased risks from food and waterborne 
diseases’.23 In low lying islands, there is an increased risk of displacement as well as 
‘risk of death, injury, ill-health, or disrupted livelihoods … due to storm surges, coastal 
flooding, and sea-level rise.’24 The expected distribution of the severe impacts of 
climate change is likely to be extremely variable from country to country, though many 
of those with the lowest capacity to adapt happen to be situated in the parts of the world 
which will receive the most severe impacts. The IPCC states, ‘many key risks constitute 
particular challenges for the least developed countries and vulnerable communities, 
given their limited ability to cope.’25  
The most recent significant response from the international community was the 2009 
Copenhagen Accord of the COP 15. Parties pledged to limit warming to two degrees, 
based upon the IPCC’s AR4 report, which modelled several potential emissions 
pathways the world could take. It defined the lowest temperature increase, above which 
‘risks to unique and threatened systems’ and ‘risks of extreme events’ become 
substantial, as 1.5-2.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures.26 Several 
commentators have criticised this figure as too high, stating that ‘2 °C warming would 
have major deleterious consequences’. 27 Others have questioned the feasibility of 
limiting warming to only two degrees, stating that we are ‘increasingly likely to 
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experience warming well in excess of 2 °C this century’.28 The world is therefore in the 
predicament of coping with both the mitigation burden of reducing global emissions in 
order to reduce the risks of dangerous climate change, and the adaptation burden of 
coping with the impacts of climate change which are already occurring or will occur in 
the future. Together, these two problems form what I will term the ‘burden of climate 
change’ that must be shared globally.  
1.2 The Importance of China 
The research presented in this thesis will develop an account of global climate justice 
and the implications for China. The choice of China in this context comes from China’s 
unique position on the global stage of climate change negotiations and global politics 
more broadly.29 There are several key factors that lead to China’s position being unique. 
China is considered to be a developing country, yet is a key economic competitor for 
the United States due to its high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and rapidly growing 
economy. As such, China’s energy policies and position on global climate agreements 
are both extremely important in any global approach to mitigate climate change. As we 
saw earlier, the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol as a result of the lack of 
commitments from developing countries, of which China, as the world’s second largest 
economy and biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, accounting for 21% of total global 
carbon emissions, and with an annual growth rate of 8% over the past decade, is the 
most prominent.30 The result of this stalemate between these two key players in 
international climate politics and global economics has been a failure to develop an 
acceptable global agreement on climate change. But there are further issues that 
complicate the situation. Whilst China’s GDP and emissions are high on a state level, 
China is still a developing country and has comparatively low levels of per capita GDP 
and emissions. In comparison with the United States, China emits 6.2 metric tons of 
CO2 per capita compared with 17.6 metric tons per US inhabitant.31 GDP per capita 
shows similar differences, with China’s GDP per capita at $10, 924 compared with the 
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United States at $51, 689.32 As a large developing country, China has argued that the 
right to development entitles it to increasing emissions, particularly due to China’s low 
historic emissions. Furthermore, China has a very large manufacturing industry which 
produces goods to be consumed around the world, and has therefore claimed that a 
share of the responsibility for its emissions should be borne by the developed states 
where those goods are consumed.  
Global action on climate change will require cooperation from many different actors. 
Determining how to address the issues raised by China in a theory of global climate 
justice is essential for two reasons. First, it enables us to improve our understanding of 
global climate justice by addressing issues that so far have not been adequately 
addressed in the literature. Second, it is important practically since China views these 
issues to be of great importance. Fair consideration of these issues within any approach 
to climate change is therefore essential in ensuring China’s participation in a global 
agreement. 
1.3 Climate Change - A Question of Justice  
Whilst I have discussed the fact that the dominant narratives surrounding climate 
change are scientific and economic in nature, climate change is unavoidably an issue of 
justice. In general terms, the vast majority of historic greenhouse gas emissions have 
come from the developed states through processes of industrialisation spanning the 
previous two centuries. The predicted distribution of the impacts is likely to cause the 
poorest, and those who have received the least benefit from greenhouse gas emissions, 
to suffer the most from climate change. This unfairness is further compounded in 
considering that those predicted to suffer the most are also least able to cope with the 
impacts due to existing issues of international distributive justice in which much of the 
world is living in poverty while a small percentage live in luxury.33 As Vanderheiden 
explains, ‘the net effect of [this] is a shifting of ecological costs of the high 
consumption rates of the world’s affluent to those who can least afford to bear them and 
are also least responsible for the phenomenon that generates them … [This] present[s] a 
unique case of global injustice, where the ongoing failure to adequately address the 
                                                
32 OECD, ‘GDP per head, US $, current prices, current PPPs’, (n.d.) [Online] 
(http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=558) [Accessed 15 September 2014]. 
33 Henry Shue, ‘The Unavoidability of Justice’, in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., The 
international politics of the environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 373–97. 
 10 
problem exacerbates the global inequality that is part and parcel of the problem itself.’34 
Climate change thus poses questions of global distributive justice – how to share the 
cost of the burden between current people, and intergenerational justice – how to 
balance current and future needs.  
Civil society organisations have produced some work on this issue, recognising the 
issues of social and environmental justice. Oxfam has suggested that we should view 
the issues at stake via the metaphor of a doughnut shape, and that we should aim to 
‘liv[e] within the doughnut’, meaning within a ‘safe and just space’ that all of humanity 
can inhabit.35 Within the figurative doughnut, environmental resources are sustainably 
used so that current needs are fulfilled according to the criteria of eleven ‘social 
priorities’ (these fill the space inside the hole of the doughnut) and in which the 
‘planetary boundaries’ (which set the limits around the outside of the donut) are not 
crossed.36 If we respect the limits placed upon us from both sides, we ‘creat[e] a closed 
system that is bounded by both human rights and environmental sustainability. The 
resulting space – the doughnut – is where inclusive and sustainable economic 
development takes place. It implies no limit to human well-being: indeed, within this 
space is humanity’s best chance to thrive.’37 The doughnut model provides us with a 
metaphorical image of the requirements of current and intergenerational climate justice 
within a broader theory of global distributive justice more generally. The finite nature of 
the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases means that there must be a limit 
on how much can be emitted globally. Within this climate-safe defined emissions limit, 
different actors may be allowed to emit different amounts:  
‘The planet’s atmosphere is a common good that provides vital climatic services to all 
the world’s persons, with its absorptive capacity allowing for a finite quantity of GHG 
emissions before heat-trapping gases begin to accumulate in the atmosphere, 
destabilising those climatic services and causing harm to persons and peoples. When 
viewed this way, several problems for cosmopolitan justice are revealed, and a 
powerful claim for recognising the terms of justice applied among the world’s nations 
and persons becomes more apparent.’38  
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Climate justice is a relatively recent but quickly developing field of study in the broader 
field of global political theory. Theorists are recognising the essential need for thorough 
engagement with the moral issues raised by climate change. Without a rigorous ethical 
basis, the decisions made on a political level may be unjust and are unlikely to be 
accepted on a global scale. Most political work outside of the field of political 
philosophy relies upon economic and scientific analysis, though there is evidence that 
there is growing realisation of the importance of defining a fair set of moral guiding 
principles.  
Since the research on this thesis began, the United Nations Education, Science and 
Culture Organisation (UNESCO) has produced a document entitled ‘The Ethical 
Implications of Global Climate Change’, with a longer term view to developing a 
‘framework of ethical principles and responsibilities for climate change policies’.39 As 
such, UNESCO, a main body of the United Nations, has recognised the ‘vital role’ of 
ethics ‘not just in analyzing climate change, but also in shaping responses’, since, 
‘climate change cannot be dealt with adequately and properly if [its] ethical dimensions 
… are not highlighted, well understood, and taken into account in decisions about 
responses’.40  
Within the IPCC’s assessment reports, progress has been made. Indeed, in the most 
recently released report, the AR5, there is an extended chapter focused specifically on 
issues of ‘equity’, which recognises the fact that it is ‘morally proper to allocate burdens 
associated with our common global climate challenge according to ethical principles.’41 
The relevance of justice-based approaches to climate change is garnering increasing 
attention amongst international institutional bodies. This makes careful attention to the 
moral issues and rigorous theoretical analysis more politically salient. As Miller argues, 
‘we need political philosophers to think and talk about climate change, not as an 
alternative to the work of [others] but as an essential complement to it – indeed as a 
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bridge between the empirical researches of climate scientists and economists and the 
practical work of politicians.’42  
1.4 Climate Justice within Political Theory 
Within the field of global justice more broadly, several theorists have begun to 
recognise the relevance of global justice to the issue of climate change, and the field of 
political philosophers working on climate justice is growing.43 As Gardiner argues, 
‘climate change is fundamentally an ethical issue. As such, it should be of serious 
concern to both moral philosophers and humanity at large.’44 In a very general overview 
of some of the main debates that have animated the literature to date, two key themes 
stand out: (1) Many of the main debates focus on the moral principles that should guide 
a fair distribution of the costs of climate change; (2) Most discussions take a simplistic 
view to the approach of who the duty bearers are, assuming that states are the only 
candidates.  
On the first theme, there has been much discussion about the merits of ‘fault-based’ 
principles such as the ‘polluter pays principle’ (PPP), as opposed to ‘no-fault’ principles, 
such as the ‘ability to pay principle’ (APP).45 As one of the first philosophers to take an 
interest in applying moral principles to climate change, Henry Shue’s work is especially 
significant.46 As Shue explains, fault-based principles such as the PPP make the claim 
that ‘the moral responsibility for contributing to the solution of the problem is 
proportional to the causal responsibility for creating the problem’.47 Neumayer has also 
supported this principle, since it ‘ensures that the payment is indeed undertaken by the 
polluter and not by the victims of pollution.’48 Alternatively, approaches based upon an 
ability to pay, claim that ‘alleged fault [is] completely irrelevant to the assignment of 
the responsibility to pay’, since, all that is relevant is that ‘those with the most should 
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pay at the highest rate.’49 Simon Caney’s ‘particularly noteworthy’ work has also 
discussed these principles at great length.50 Caney has supported a ‘hybrid view’, in 
developing a two-stage process for distributing climate duties. First, this is according to 
the ‘Poverty-Sensitive Polluter Pays Principle’, with responsibility that cannot be 
allocated by the first principle (for past emissions, for example) being allocated 
according to the ‘History-Sensitive Ability to Pay Principle’.51 But such principles have 
not responded to the growing issue caused by the development of global trade and the 
global class of affluent citizens. My account will aim to fill this gap, and I will shortly 
present my key research questions. 
Caney has also made an observation about the second key theme I wish to highlight in 
the existing literature, which is the limited nature of the discussions around who should 
bear climate duties. As Caney states, ‘many of those who adopt a PPP approach to 
climate change appear to treat countries as the relevant unit.’52 Indeed, this is not only 
relevant to proponents of a PPP. Many theorists do not consider the possibility that 
there may be other actors who might bear climate duties. Shue, for example, concludes 
that his principles ‘all converge upon the same practical conclusion: whatever needs to 
be done by wealthy industrialised states or by poor non-industrialised states about 
global environmental problems like ozone destruction and global warming, the costs 
should initially be borne by the wealthy industrialised states.’53 Often, the assumption 
that duties must be state-level converges with the dominant developed-developing 
country discourse I previously mentioned, here referred to as ‘wealthy industrialised’ 
and ‘poor non-industrialised’ by Shue. In contrast to the many statist accounts, Paul 
Harris stands out in the literature. He has explicitly argued that climate duties should 
fall ‘on the shoulders not only of governments but also of individuals.’54 Harris argues 
that the dominant focus on the rights and responsibilities of states is both unfair and 
unlikely to lead to an adequate global response to climate change, and that instead we 
should focus on the duties of individuals. There is very little debate, however, between 
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these two positions, with most simply assuming the statist position. My research will 
take on this debate, and consider whether the focus on states alone is justified. 
In doing so, I will take a human rights based cosmopolitan approach to questions of 
global justice. Before sketching out the basis of my theoretical approach, it is worth 
briefly considering two other main theoretical approaches. In this way, we can situate 
the cosmopolitan approach in the broader range of debates surrounding global political 
theory.  
One approach to global political theory is ‘realism’. As Caney notes, ‘characterising 
realism is a highly controversial matter’, so my brief discussion of it here will aim to 
highlight some of the key features that differentiate realism from other approaches to 
global justice.55 The philosophical origins of realism go back many centuries, with one 
of the earliest realist thinkers considered to be Thomas Hobbes. As Williams explains, 
‘the name of Thomas Hobbes and the tradition of realism have become virtually 
synonymous.’56 Hobbes, of course, famously described his view of the ‘state of nature’ 
as one in which ‘if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; 
every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all 
other men.’57 Accordingly, Gilpin argues that the ‘assumption [… that] characterizes 
realist thinking is the primacy in all political life of power and security in human 
motivation.’58 As sovereign powers, states are the key political actors in realist 
approaches, and realism claims that it is a normative requirement of states to ‘pursue 
their national interest’.59 In the state of nature, other states will pursue their own 
national interests, and so the normative requirement is justified since a state bears 
responsibility for the good of its citizens; if it does not also pursue its own national 
interests it will place its citizens at risk.60 Acting in any other way would be irrational, 
since it is claimed that ‘there is no place for morality in international relations’.61 
Realists thus deny principles of global justice, since ‘in a self-help system, with conflict 
                                                
55 Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 7. 
56 Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005): 19. 
57 Alexander Moseley, ‘Political Realism’, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (n.d.) [Online] 
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/polreal/) [Accessed 20 July 2014]. 
58 Robert G. Gilpin, ‘The richness of the tradition of political realism’, International Organization, 38:02 
(1984): 290. 
59 Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 7. 
60 Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 7. 
61 WJ Korab-Karpowicz, ‘Political Realism in International Relations’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, (2 April 2013), [Online] (http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/entries/realism-intl-relations/) 
[Accessed 30 July 2014]. 
 15 
to be expected, states have to be concerned with the means required to sustain and 
protect themselves.’62 The ‘dominance of the realist paradigm in the study of 
international relations’ partly explains the lack of ethical considerations in mainstream 
approaches to climate change.63 Two key thinkers who have taken a realist approach to 
‘climate change justice’ are Posner and Weisbach, who ‘reject the claim that certain 
intuitive ideas about justice should play a major role in the design of a climate 
agreement’.64 The realist underpinning of their argument is evident in their claim that an 
acceptable climate change treaty ‘must satisfy’ their principle of ‘International 
Paretianism’, in which, ‘all states must believe themselves better off by their lights as a 
result of the climate treaty … [since] states only enter treaties that serve their 
interests.’65 I will come back to discussion of Posner and Weisbach’s approach in 
Chapter Two, but for now, suffice to say that I reject realist approaches to climate 
change at the normative level of the claim that global relations must be amoral, with 
each state mercilessly pursuing self-interest. The idea that all states must believe that 
their cooperation in a climate agreement will further their own self-interests is likely to 
be very difficult to achieve, given the need for a global agreement, and such an 
agreement is likely to involve only very weak climate pledges. As Soltau argues, ‘an 
agreement with shallow commitments may secure broad participation and full 
compliance but could fall short with respect to effective mitigation.’66 Climate change 
provides us with a context in which engagement with principles of justice is essential, 
both practically, due to the diverse stakeholders and interests at stake, since a fair treaty 
is more likely to be accepted, and morally due to the risk of severe violations of human 
rights.  
Nationalism is another key approach in global political theory. As O’Leary explains, 
nationalism ‘holds that the nation should be collectively and freely institutionally 
expressed, and ruled by its co-nationals.’67 Key theorists include David Miller, Yael 
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Tamir and Ernest Gellner.68 Nations are important since they are ‘ethical communities’ 
which are ‘powerful source[s] of personal identity’.69 With regards to global justice, 
nationalism claims that there are ‘special national responsibilities … [that] present a 
limiting principle against the principle of global egalitarianism’.70 So nationalism does 
not deny moral relations beyond national borders, but the duties we owe to fellow 
nationals are greater than those owed to non-compatriots. With regards to climate 
change, ‘principles [of climate justice] apply, in the first place, to nation-states as the 
collective agents capable of coordinating individual behaviour on a scale that can meet 
the challenge of climate change.’71 Nationalist approaches to climate change therefore 
also treat nation-states as the relevant focus of duties. As Miller argues, a key 
implication of the nationalist approach for climate change is that ‘climate-change 
policies [should] encroach as little as possible on national self-determination.’72 
Nationalist approaches would therefore be unlikely to support global individual climate 
duties, since according to nationalism an individual’s key duties are towards fellow 
nationals. It follows, therefore, that the costs individuals should bear should be decided 
by each nation-state separately, since ‘such questions will be answered differently in 
different societies, according to [the] prevailing conceptions of social justice’.73 
Nationalism also has implications for the extent of a nation-state’s participation in an 
international climate agreement. If nation states should prioritise their citizens over non-
nationals then they might be reluctant to contribute to mitigation strategies that will 
protect the interests of non-nationals, instead preferring to prioritise local adaptation 
measures.  
Finally, ‘cosmopolitan’ approaches to global justice treat individuals as the relevant 
focus of moral consideration, and most importantly, cosmopolitanism claims that 
principles of justice apply globally, and not just within the nation or state. Indeed, some 
‘radical’ forms of cosmopolitanism would claim that there are no duties of distributive 
justice within the state, and only global duties.74 But here we shall be primarily 
concerned with ‘mild’ cosmopolitanism which ‘simply affirms the positive claim’ that 
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there are global duties of justice.75 The ‘central claim’ of cosmopolitanism is that ‘every 
human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern’.76 As Beitz 
explains: 
‘The force of moral cosmopolitanism is clearest when we consider what it rules out: 
cosmopolitanism stands opposed to any view that limits the scope of justification to the 
members of particular types of groups, whether identified by shared political values, 
communal histories, or ethnic characteristics.’77  
Cosmopolitans all endorse this central moral claim, but their interpretation of the action 
required by this moral claim is likely to differ depending on their specific theoretical 
approach. Some approaches require positive duties of distributive justice, whilst others 
entail negative duties based upon the moral importance of the non-violation of human 
rights. For example, Peter Singer, a prominent scholar of utilitarian cosmopolitanism, 
has famously argued that affluent individuals have positive duties to alleviate poverty in 
other parts of the world by donating money to charity unless doing so would cost them 
something ‘of comparable moral importance’.78 Utilitarianism judges actions based 
upon the ‘balance’ of the outcome, in which the aim is to maximise ‘utility’, which can 
be defined in terms of ‘happiness’.79 As such, utilitarian approaches to cosmopolitanism 
aim to maximise global utility. The morally correct balance is found in requiring those 
with more to share with those that have less, where donating does not decrease overall 
utility since it does not require the sacrifice of anything of ‘comparable moral 
importance.’80  
In contrast to utilitarian approaches, we might refer to forms of cosmopolitanism that 
take a deontological approach, in which the emphasis is on ‘the rights and […] 
obligations we have under the moral law’, rather than the aim to maximise overall 
utility.81 One such proponent of this approach is Thomas Pogge, who has notably 
argued for institutionally bound negative duties to alleviate ‘severe poverty’, which is a 
‘human rights violation’.82  
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Cosmopolitan approaches that prioritise human rights can also be applied to climate 
change. Bell and Caney have both defended such an approach, arguing that there is a 
human right not to suffer from dangerous climate change. According to Caney, ‘even 
using […] minimal conceptions of human rights, anthropogenic climate change violates 
human rights.’83 Similarly, Bell has argued: 
‘If we accept the argument for human rights to life, physical security, subsistence and 
health, it also seems a relatively straightforward step to the claim that anthropogenic 
climate change violates – or threatens to violate – these human rights.’84  
In the context of climate change, the weight of the urgency of avoiding human rights 
violations warrants the imposition of climate duties upon those that can influence 
greenhouse gas emissions. An approach based on human rights can therefore ‘justify 
urgent action on climate change.’85 
1.5 The Approach of the Research 
My approach to climate justice will be underpinned by a commitment to human rights 
within the scope of a cosmopolitan approach to global justice. The serious impacts of 
climate change are liable to violate the human rights of near and distant future 
individuals. Whilst recognising that there may be some practical constraints on actions 
of individuals in the current state-oriented system of global politics, the moral basis of 
my approach is formed by a commitment to cosmopolitan principles of global justice 
and human rights.  
The research presented will be applied normative and analytical political philosophy. 
This research will embody two key methodological commitments, supported by two 
general assumptions. First, it will employ the method of ‘wide reflective equilibrium’.86 
This approach ‘constitutes an attempt to get our moral views in order, so that our 
judgements are supported by theories, and these theories are in turn supported by our 
judgements.’87 This approach demands coherence between general moral and political 
principles, and particular moral judgements, considered in the light of relevant facts 
generated by the natural and social sciences. The research questions were developed 
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from my initial research on climate justice and China’s position. Each forms the basis of 
a key issue of relevance to China, which must be resolved by any plausible theory of 
climate justice, and has not adequately been done so in the existing literature. As 
Kymlicka explains, ‘the ultimate test of a theory of justice is that it cohere with, and 
help illuminate, our considered convictions of justice.’88 Therefore, in ‘wide reflective 
equilibrium’, particular judgements on China must cohere with the principles of global 
climate justice, which the thesis will develop. These principles will in turn provide 
moral judgements about implications for China’s climate responsibilities.  
Second, the research will adopt a ‘realistic utopian’ approach.89 As Rawls explains, 
‘political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily thought 
of as the limits of practical political possibility.’90 The methodology embodied within 
the research will accept that certain issues of practicality and feasibility may play a role 
in what is possible, without accepting that the status quo is unchangeable. The 
possibility of theory engendering practical change is a worthwhile agenda, following the 
powerful words of Kant: 
‘I therefore cannot and will not see it as so deeply immersed in evil that practical moral 
reason will not triumph in the end, after many unsuccessful attempts, thereby showing 
that it is worthy of admiration after all. On the cosmopolitan level too, it thus remains 
true to say that whatever reason shows to be valid in theory, is also valid in practice.’91  
The methodological concepts will be supported by a general assumption about the 
universal nature of human rights. I will assume the deontological importance of human 
rights, as inviolable, universal rights owed to each individual simply ‘by virtue of being 
a person’, regardless of nationality, religion or cultural beliefs. 92  
In developing a theory of global climate justice and the implications for China, I will 
engage with China’s position, but I accept the limitations of applied political philosophy 
to direct specific action plans or exact policy measures. I will develop normative 
arguments for principles that are coherent with the theory of climate justice, but it is not 
within the scope of this research to provide exact answers to questions of how exactly 
the implications of the principles can be applied practically.  
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The focus on China is due to China’s unique situation within the global sphere. 
Although I will engage with China’s position within this context, this will not require 
expert knowledge of domestic Chinese politics. I will rely upon English language 
documents from the Chinese government and international bodies for my empirical data 
on China’s position within the domain of international climate politics.  
In assessing and developing the applied aspects of the theory, I will engage with areas 
of economic theory and thought. An example of this is the assumption about the actions 
of individuals as consumers as well as behaviour of corporations, in which I will 
assume that ‘remunerative incentives’ can explain the behaviour of individuals and 
corporations when making choices.93 Although the research does not sit within the field 
of economics, basic economic presumptions such as this will be present. I will engage 
with these presumptions where the applied nature of the normative arguments will be 
strengthened by such engagement. 
1.6 Five Substantive Chapters for Five Key Research Questions 
During my initial research on the subject, I highlighted five key interconnected research 
questions that a theory of climate justice must respond to, each of which is provoked by 
the position that China has taken in global climate negotiations.  
The first research question, and the focus for Chapter Two, asks: ‘Who are the relevant 
actors to bear climate duties?’ Within the existing literature, most theorists focus on the 
duties of states. My investigation of other potential duty-bearers provides a distinctive 
contribution to the literature and defends a multi-actor approach, which subsequently 
can inform the argument of the rest of the thesis. This issue is important in the context 
of our examination of China’s climate responsibilities because China is a developing 
country with a very large population and very large inequalities between its richest and 
poorest citizens. Uneven economic growth in China has led to a dramatic rise in the 
number of ‘new consumers’ that are affluent and generate large quantities of emissions, 
but due to the statist focus of climate change politics, these individuals are not required 
to mitigate climate change since developing states face no binding emissions 
limitations.94 Harris has argued that ‘as long as the new consumers hide behind their 
states’ poverty, practical and politically viable solutions to climate change will be very 
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difficult to realise.’95 The corporation is another potential candidate for climate duties. 
Corporations are responsible for releasing high amounts of greenhouse gases and have 
growing amounts of legal and influential power. Chapter Two will provide a thorough 
investigation of these issues and argue that the dominant focus on the rights and 
responsibilities of states is both unfair and unlikely to lead to an adequate global 
response to climate change. I will argue that the interconnected nature of the behaviour 
of states, individuals and corporations means that it is important that they are all 
considered as potential climate duty bearers. This will form the basis of a general 
assumption for the rest of the thesis, which will take a multi-actor approach to climate 
duties. 
The second research question, and focus of Chapter Three, is based upon China’s claim 
that the right to development allows it to prioritise development needs and not cap 
emissions. Politically, such arguments from developing countries and emerging 
economies are a key issue at the heart of the current impasse in UNFCCC negotiations. 
So, the third chapter addresses the question: ‘Does the right to development justify 
increasing emissions?’  
The first part of this chapter will argue that the right to development should be 
understood as an individual right. The primary bearers of the duty to fulfil the right are 
states, but the rights-bearers are individuals. I will develop Henry Shue’s definition of 
emissions as falling within two distinct categories of ‘subsistence’ and ‘luxury’ by 
proposing a third class of morally important ‘development emissions’.96 The idea of 
‘development emissions’ is a novel concept within a literature that tends to focus on a 
binary division of subsistence and luxury emissions. Using this new terminology, I will 
argue that an overall state-level increase of emissions is justified if this is as a result of 
the need for subsistence and development emissions, and not of an increase of luxury 
emissions of affluent citizens. I will defend this claim against two objections: (1) 
development should be sustainable; (2) in order for the state to be justified as a fit duty 
bearer for the right to development, it must be operating a wider context of rights 
fulfilment. In response, first, I will emphasise the importance of sustainability on a 
global scale, in which the costs of sustainable development should be largely borne by 
affluent actors including developed states and corporations. Second, I will consider the 
implications when a state is not considered to be a fit actor to fulfil its role as key duty 
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bearer of the right to development of its citizens, before suggesting that we must adopt a 
non-ideal approach. The state should be required to take measures to move towards 
wider rights-fulfilment, but emissions increases should be allowed where the alternative 
will lead to a lesser fulfilment of the right to development. 
The fourth chapter begins with China’s claim that developed states should bear 
responsibility for the emissions that are embedded in the goods they consume even 
when those goods are produced in China. China is a leading global manufacturer, 
producing 19% of the world’s goods.97 This chapter therefore considers the question: 
‘How should we allocate responsibility for emissions?’  
The first part of this chapter investigates the relative merits of consumption-based 
accounting for emissions and the current system of territorial accounting. I argue that 
consumption accounting would be preferable to territorial accounting, but develop this 
conclusion by defending benefit as the relevant moral link between an actor and 
emissions processes. I then develop an account of responsibility based upon a revised 
version of the beneficiary pays principle, which is consistent with the multi-actor 
approach and the right to development. I term this the ‘revised beneficiary pays 
principle’, or RBPP. Within my approach, the RBPP considers the receipt of benefit 
above the level of subsistence as the necessary condition for responsibility. The level of 
responsibility an actor bears is then adjusted according to three modulating factors: (1) 
level of development to which the benefits contribute; (2) ability to exert influence over 
the emissions from which the benefit is gained; (3) degree of voluntariness with which 
benefits are accepted. This approach to accounting for emissions makes a distinctive 
original contribution to the discussion of principles of climate justice in the existing 
literature. I defend the principle against two objections: (1) it is counterintuitive in 
comparison to the PPP; (2) it is simply a reworking of the PPP. Finally I consider 
potential implications for the application of the principle. 
Chapter Five investigates the issue of historic responsibility. The relevance of this 
question is based upon China’s claims that developed states should bear the greatest 
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responsibility due to their historic emissions. It responds to the question: ‘Do historic 
emissions matter?’  
The chapter first considers existing approaches to historic responsibility, primarily the 
‘fair shares’ argument. I reject arguments of this kind that rely on egalitarian principles 
in order to distribute emissions rights. Instead, I develop a distinctive version of the fair 
shares approach, which considers historic emissions to be morally relevant when an 
actor has taken more than their fair share of benefits. An unfair share of benefits is 
considered to be a share that exceeds that required for subsistence and development. I 
defend this approach against the excusable ignorance objection, concluding that full 
moral responsibility for historic emissions in not justifiable. I will defend limited 
liability, considering the specific implications of the RBPP for the different climate 
actors, recognising the particular relevance of the question to state-level responsibilities. 
I then defend my argument against the objection of non-identity, showing that: (1) the 
objection does not undermine liability of actors with long historical existences; (2) the 
threshold definition of benefit is not subject to the criticisms raised by the non-identity 
objection.  
Chapter Six investigates the implications of the account of climate justice developed in 
the preceding chapters for China’s political commitment, focusing on China’s pledge to 
cut emissions intensity by 40-45% by 2020 (relative to 2005 levels). 98 This chapter 
responds to the question: ‘Is China’s emissions intensity reduction target consistent with 
principles of climate justice?’  
In this chapter, I offer a prima facie defence of China’s position, before responding to 
five objections: (1) the metric of emissions relative to gross domestic product (GDP) is 
not a reliable method of measuring emissions intensity changes; (2) fulfilment of the 
target will not require any discernable effort from China; (3) China’s emission intensity 
target is consistent with an unfair absolute increase in emissions; (4) Chinese cities 
should be required to cap their emissions; (5) China’s target is not consistent with 
intergenerational justice and protecting the rights of future people. I defend the Chinese 
state’s target against these objections, whilst suggesting that China would be expected 
to commit to a more demanding target if contributions towards the means to develop 
using sustainable technology were forthcoming from developed states and corporations.  
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Finally, I present my conclusions in Chapter Seven. This brings together the ideas 
developed and defended in the five substantive chapters, and defends a multi-actor 
approach to climate change, in which benefit above the level of subsistence is the 
necessary condition for generation of responsibility for emissions. The extent of the 
climate duties an actor is expected to bear is adjusted according to the fulfilment of the 
three modulating factors of the RBPP. Importantly, the RBPP provides an account in 
which the right to development is respected and which can also respond to the 
requirements of the multi-actor approach. I consider the implications of the account in 
terms of global climate justice and the implications for China. Finally, I suggest 
important avenues of further research that would strengthen the defence of the account 
proposed in the thesis and further develop its practical applicability.  
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Chapter 2 
Which are the Relevant Actors to Bear Climate Duties? 
This chapter will do the important job of setting the boundaries from which to develop 
my theory of climate justice by determining the scope of the account. To do this, I will 
answer the question: ‘Which are the relevant actors to bear climate duties?’ This 
question is motivated by key issues relating to China’s position. China is not required to 
commit to the same level of climate change action as developed countries. However, 
closer inspection reveals that China has a large and quickly developing affluent class of 
‘new consumers’.99 Whilst China as a state may be ‘developing’, these individuals in 
the new, middle class of consumers within China have high living standards. As Harris 
has argued, there are ‘hundreds of millions of affluent [individuals … that] have the 
power to consume as much as, and sometimes more than, people in developed 
countries.’100 Harris argues that it is therefore a matter of climate necessity, as well as a 
requirement of fairness that we ‘direct more attention to the obligations of affluent 
people everywhere’, rather than focusing solely on state level responsibilities that 
ignore individual responsibility.101 Chinese politics have long been dominated by the 
importance of the state, and although this may not be explicitly specified in their 
statements relating to climate change, it would be reasonable to assume that China’s 
view is that a statist position is the correct one.102  
The importance of this question comes from the need for global action on climate 
change, which has the potential to cause serious harms that will violate the human rights 
of future people. Determining which are the relevant actors that should bear duties for 
the protection of these rights is of key importance. This chapter will engage with 
different standpoints in order to develop an argument to defend the extent of the scope 
necessary for a theory of climate justice.  
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Most current approaches to climate change justice treat states as the relevant actors to 
bear climate duties. This is generally just assumed, as there is little philosophical 
discussion about whether states are the only relevant duty-bearers. Several theorists 
have argued elsewhere, outside of the field of climate justice and more generally in 
political theory, that the statist system should be overturned entirely, and a new system 
entailing only global governance should be introduced.103 I will not engage with these 
arguments since the need to reduce global emissions is urgent. The time that would be 
needed to change from the current status quo in which states decide about how to share 
the climate burden between themselves to a system with a global system of networked 
and dispersed sovereignty would be too long given the complex nature of such a change. 
So, for the purposes of the current research, I am not questioning the need to assign 
some duties to states, which are powerful actors with organised discussion and decision-
making structures that are able to implement the kind of measures that must play a big 
part in any attempt to reduce global emissions. However, this chapter will challenge the 
idea that the current literature’s almost exclusive focus on the duties of states is justified 
in a fully worked out theory of global climate justice.  
In this chapter, I will consider four accounts of which ‘actors’ should bear climate 
duties. I will defend a distinctive multi-actor approach to the type of agents that can 
bear moral responsibility for tackling climate change. States, individuals and 
corporations can all be bearers of climate responsibilities. I begin by considering two 
existing statist approaches, both of which discuss the possibility of individual duties. 
The first considers and then rules-out individual duties entirely, and the second accepts 
limited individual duties which are delegated to citizens by states, and thus are 
secondary to the duties of states. I will then consider two further approaches that do 
consider other actors to be suitable bearers of climate duties. The first of these two 
approaches argues for the main focus to be individual duties, and the second argues for 
a multi-actor approach. I will devote a separate section of the chapter to each account. I 
will then defend a multi-actor approach through consideration of five separate 
‘problems’ informed by the arguments of the different accounts considered.  
This chapter has important implications in the context of the thesis as a whole, since 
focusing on different actors is likely to have different implications for the duties that we 
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expect not only the Chinese state to bear, but also for other relevant actors such as 
Chinese individuals or corporations. An important outcome of this chapter is to 
determine the scope of my account of global climate justice. Expanding the scope 
beyond state actors, means that the answers to the four other research questions will 
consider not only states, but what the implications might be for all relevant climate 
actors. As such, this will enable me to develop a distinctive and more robust approach to 
climate justice. Thorough engagement with issues of justice will create the foundations 
for an approach that will be fairer and therefore more acceptable to the different parties 
concerned. 
2.1 Four Approaches 
2.1.1 Posner and Weisbach’s Statist Approach 
The first approach that I will look at is one taken by Eric Posner and David Weisbach in 
their 2010 book Climate Change Justice. Some background about their general 
approach to the subject and general claims made in the book may be useful in order to 
set the context for their discussion of the relevant agents to bear climate duties. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, Posner and Weisbach’s approach is realist in the 
sense that it treats states as the relevant moral actors, claiming that states will only act in 
their own interests. Therefore, any climate treaty ‘must fulfil’ the principle of 
‘International Paretianism’ in which each state believes that its interests are being 
furthered by the treaty.104 Posner and Weisbach make both a practical and principled 
argument against individual duties. 
Although they claim that ‘the moral weight of individuals transcends spatial and 
temporal boundaries’, and that ‘wealthy people in rich nations have an obligation to 
help poor people, including poor people who live in developing countries’, they also 
state that ‘however plausible cosmopolitan arguments might be in principle, they must 
come to terms with the fact that the world is divided into nations [which] must be 
viewed as a basic constraint on ethical arguments.’105 This is the basis of their practical 
argument against individual climate duties. They claim that it would be impracticable to 
allocate global duties to individuals given the statist way in which the world operates. 
Posner and Weisbach also offer a principled argument in which they claim that 
individuals cannot be held morally responsible for climate change because each 
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individual act in itself cannot be linked to a specific climate harm. They claim that 
assigning duties to individuals would entail a necessity to ‘identify particular 
individuals who, through their activities (for example, driving), have caused damage to 
the climate that has harmed other individuals.’106 As this is not possible, Posner and 
Weisbach reject the idea of individual duties.  
So, Posner and Weisbach argue that practically, individual duties would be unworkable, 
and furthermore, individuals cannot bear moral responsibility for effects that cannot be 
directly linked to their specific acts. I will call these two challenges the problem of 
feasibility, and the problem of exactness, respectively, and I shall address them in 
section 2.2. 
2.1.2 Miller’s Statist Approach 
I shall now introduce a second statist approach. David Miller approaches climate duties 
from a nationalist perspective. Miller’s account is statist to the extent that states map 
onto nations. He does not deny that individuals are potentially relevant moral actors for 
climate responsibilities. However, for Miller, these can only ever be derivative duties 
that are distributed domestically by nation-states that bear the primary duties since 
nation-states are the only relevant actor on the international stage: 
‘We should see the problem of distributing responsibility as occurring in two stages. 
First, the costs of combating global warming are distributed to states in the form of 
required reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions or actions they must take to offset the 
effects of the warming that will nonetheless occur or both. Second, states distribute 
these costs among their citizens according to guidelines that are agreed internally (and 
that may be expected to vary somewhat from one state to the next). For example, they 
may decide to control emissions by taxing the industries that mainly produce them, or 
they may decide to give each individual citizen a carbon budget that limits their use of 
emission-generating resources to a total that they can exceed only by buying a slice of 
somebody else’s’.107  
According to this account, the overall climate ‘burden’ should be first divided up 
amongst states. Only once this has been done do individuals have duties to act, and this 
is only if their state has decided that is the best way of fulfilling their responsibilities. 
As Miller suggests, instead of passing on costs directly to citizens, a state might instead 
decide to levy a tax on highly polluting industries. In the case that a state does decide to 
require its citizens to take on responsibilities, these are derivative individual duties that 
stem from the duties borne by the state in which the individual lives. In this sense, 
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individuals have duties as citizens of their countries to obey the laws set by their states. 
Miller offers both a practical and principled argument to back up his approach. The 
practical argument does not differ significantly from the practical reasoning given by 
Posner and Weisbach in the first approach we considered, which is rooted in the claim 
that nothing else will work. Miller states: 
‘Were we to try to move directly to the individual level, then even if we could perform 
the necessary calculations and give each person an emissions target, we would simply 
have created a massive collective-action problem with no agency capable of solving it. 
Each person would have an incentive to overshoot their target, and there would be no 
effective constraint to stop them from doing so.’108 
Since there is no global sovereign capable of making sure that individuals in all states 
are all doing their fair share, Miller proposes a practical argument that primary-level 
individual duties are not feasible. Whilst similar to Posner and Weisbach’s argument 
about the infeasibility of individual duties, Miller stresses the lack of effective 
enforcement at the global level, given that nation states are sovereigns in their own right, 
whilst Posner and Weisbach’s argument is based on a more realist critique that 
individuals lack the power to be able to instigate any meaningful change in a state 
system. Whilst slightly different in their reasoning, both critiques question the 
feasibility of individual duties, and therefore a response to both of these critics will 
involve rejecting the claim that individual duties are not feasible. I will come back to 
this later on, when I consider the problem of feasibility.  
Miller also offers a principled argument for his statist approach. He claims that states 
must be the primary climate duty bearers due to the importance of national self-
determination. He states: 
‘We should want our climate-change policies to encroach as little as possible on 
national self-determination. Rather than imposing policy solutions from above, it is far 
better to agree upon targets for each nation, and then to allow policies for meeting 
those targets to be decided internally, ideally through a process of democratic debate. 
Practical changes of the kind required to combat global warming have significant 
implications for other areas of national policy, especially economic development and 
employment. They impinge also on questions of social justice, since if individuals are 
going to be asked to bear certain costs when climate-change policies are implemented, 
decisions have to be made about how those costs will be distributed [and] such 
questions will be answered differently in different societies, according to prevailing 
conceptions of social justice.’109 
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Miller’s principled approach is nationalist in theory. Whilst he recognises the need for 
individual actions to combat climate change, he argues that primary global individual 
duties would impinge on nations’ right to self-determination, since the duties of 
individuals should be decided internally by each state depending on that particular 
state’s conception of social justice. In Miller’s account, then, individual duties are not 
primary but delegated duties, derived from the weight of the burden assigned to the 
nation in which each individual lives.  
Before moving on to examine Miller’s argument in more detail, let us first look at a 
third approach which provides an argument for individual duties by highlighting a 
feature of climate change which cannot be combatted with state duties alone. 
2.1.3 Harris’s Individualist Approach 
Harris argues that we should approach climate change in such a way as to focus on 
individuals as the primary bearers of climate duties as opposed to existing statist 
approaches which, he argues, cannot adequately address the problem of climate 
change.110 Harris’s proposal is a dual-actor approach which treats individuals as the 
relevant focus of duties, but accepts that states must play a role in enabling individuals 
to fulfil their duties in the current global political system, acting as ‘facilitators of global 
climate justice’.111 Harris argues that there are several hundred million ‘new consumers’ 
living in the developing world. This is the term Harris uses for rich persons who live in 
developing countries. These affluent individuals are exempt from climate duties under 
the current system since climate responsibilities are divided up between states. 
Assessing responsibility on a state-to-state level uses averages of indicators such as 
income and emissions. Developing countries have lower average incomes than 
developed countries, and since industrial processes are responsible for a large amount of 
emissions, developing countries that are still in the process of industrialising also tend 
to have lower per capita levels of emissions. For these and other reasons, developing 
countries, or non-Annex-I countries in the UNFCCC terminology, are currently exempt 
from binding climate duties. Harris’s argument is that this system of assessing 
responsibility at the state level means that we are ignoring the impact of several million 
affluent individuals who are contributing to the build-up of greenhouse gases in the 
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atmosphere and who are affluent enough to bear climate duties without impoverishing 
themselves.  
The reasoning behind Harris’s argument is primarily practical, though he also makes a 
principled argument. He provides two justifications for his practical argument. First, 
Harris argues that it will not be possible to stop dangerous climate change from 
occurring if individuals all over the world do not have the duty to reduce their emissions. 
The size of large developing countries such as China and India means that there are 
several hundred million ‘new consumers’ polluting at high and uncontrolled levels in 
the developing world. Harris states: 
‘If the behaviours of these people are not constrained in some way, GHG pollution from 
developing countries will increase markedly, and there will be no hope of averting 
climate catastrophe—even if developed states were to live up to their legal and moral 
obligations to reduce their emissions.’112  
The practical implication is that rich people in developing countries must be made to 
share the burden of climate change mitigation by assigning primary duties to individuals. 
If this does not happen, Harris argues that it will be impossible to avert dangerous 
climate change since the number of ‘new consumers’ is increasing so rapidly that their 
polluting effect on the atmosphere will soon outweigh any mitigation actions taken by 
the developed countries alone. The inclusion of individual duties is a practical necessity. 
Harris’s second claim is also essentially practical, although it has an underlying theme 
of fairness. We might call this the political necessity/fairness claim. Harris claims that 
actors in the developed world will be unwilling to commit to the reductions necessary to 
combat climate change whilst there are affluent polluters in developing countries who 
are producing similar levels of greenhouse gases, yet who are exempt from climate 
duties. Harris argues that the current system is demanding more of poor individuals in 
developed countries than rich citizens in developing countries, which seems intuitively 
unfair. Harris frames this argument in terms of political necessity; a purely statist 
approach is impractical because the developed states will be unwilling to sign up to an 
agreement which they see as unfair since it does not place the same demands on affluent 
or high polluting individuals in developing countries. Harris argues that this is likely to 
lead to a situation in which the developed states are unwilling to sign up to a new 
burden sharing agreement, resulting in a political stalemate which will allow climate 
change to continue unabated.  
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Before moving on, we might make an observation about the defence of the second 
argument. Harris claims that individual duties are politically necessary in order to 
garner the support of developed states that will otherwise see as unfair the fact that the 
growing number of rich individuals in developing countries such as China are not 
required to share in the burden. However, the claim of political necessity could also be 
made from the opposite side. For example, an individualist approach such as Harris’s 
which demands that rich individuals all over the world should bear climate costs might 
seem unacceptable to developing states who may thus refuse to sign up to a treaty that 
requires their citizens to bear climate costs which they think should be borne by the 
developed states. Harris’s argument focuses on what the developed states might find 
unacceptable, without considering that there may be other factors that certain 
developing states, including China, might find unjust. The key point here is that 
different states adopt different conceptions of justice. A climate proposal that one state 
thinks is justified and acceptable may be unacceptable to another state. The issues 
surrounding climate change involving historic responsibility and development are 
strongly emotive to many states, which makes the problem of agreeing on a just 
approach even more pronounced. Because of this, it is likely that there will be 
disagreement between some states about the fairness of any approach, and dismissing an 
approach as impractical each time one side feels it is unjust is likely to leave us with no 
possible solution. So Harris’s argument that a statist approach is impractical simply 
because the developed states will not accept it is not a strong argument, since there is no 
approach that will fit with all parties’ conceptions of justice.  
However, Harris’s position is underpinned by an important normative argument rather 
than an empirical one. Harris might therefore argue that not all claims about the 
injustice of climate proposals are equally valid. One group’s reservations about a 
proposal may not be as defensible as another’s. In defending his individualistic position, 
Harris’s second practical claim must therefore rely on his principled claim that it is 
unjust for rich or highly polluting individuals anywhere in the world to be exempt from 
paying climate costs, particularly while poorer individuals living in developed states are 
required to pay simply because of their nationality. He asks, ‘who is more responsible 
for the suffering of someone in, say, India: a lavishly well-off fellow Indian … or a 
badly off person – in, say, Britain?’113 Harris assumes the response to be intuitively 
evident, and states, ‘it should not be the case that we focus entirely on state obligations 
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to cut greenhouse gases and to aid those suffering from climate change … [instead] we 
should focus … on the obligations of people’.114 Harris’s principled defence of his 
position comes from his support of the ‘cosmopolitan corollary’, in which 
‘responsibility for climate change impacts is primarily a cross-level distributive justice 
issue among all actors causing climate change impacts and all actors harmed by climate 
change impacts.’115  
The argument that one side will simply not be willing to accept a specific proposal can 
be made from different positions and therefore cannot be made in defence of one 
particular position. However, fair consideration of the rights and duties of all 
individuals, regardless of nationality, is both a practical necessity and a requirement of 
justice. Assessing responsibilities for the costs of tackling climate change based upon 
state averages is both unfair to poor individuals living in developed states, and also fails 
to recognize the practical need to regulate emissions from actors all over the world in 
order to successfully mitigate climate change.  
Before critically engaging with issues raised in Harris’s approach as well as the 
previous two accounts, I shall consider one further approach to climate justice. This 
final account supports a multi-actor account, and will provide the basis from which I 
will defend the scope of my theory of climate justice. 
2.1.4 Caney’s Multi-Actor Approach 
A fourth account suggests that we consider several different actors that might be 
potential candidates for climate duties. This account is motivated by Caney’s assertion 
that ‘a wholly statist analysis is incomplete because it omits the importance of 
corporations, individuals and supra-state political institutions and practices.’116 Caney 
has not defended this approach in detail. However, he has suggested that climate change 
may call for a multi-actor approach, particularly if causal contribution is an important 
consideration in determining the allocation of duties. Many of the arguments for state 
responsibility rely on this principle of causal responsibility generating duties. As Caney 
states, ‘it is simply not true that [states’] actions are the sole causes of global 
warming’.117 So, if the argument for state responsibility is largely based on this 
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principle of causal responsibility, then, following the same logic, other actors should 
also bear climate duties. Caney suggests that we might consider corporations, 
individuals and supra-state institutions. Corporations contribute causally to climate 
change in many ways, coal-burning factories, for example, or high emissions caused by 
the transportation of goods. Caney states that ‘any comprehensive analysis of climate 
change must include a [corporation level] component.’118 Individuals causally 
contribute to climate change in several ways, such as flying in airplanes and driving cars. 
Caney argues that many of these actions are undertaken by choice, and that individuals 
could choose to fly less or to ‘buy cars which do not use up enormous amounts of 
petrol’.119  
This fourth account, based on Caney’s suggestion of a multi-actor approach, is based on 
a similar principled argument to that of Harris, which is that those who causally 
contribute to climate change have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions. 
Assigning responsibility to states alone does not target all of the causal actors involved 
in climate change. The causal contribution argument makes two distinct moral claims. 
First, those who emit high levels of greenhouse gases must share in the responsibility 
for the costs associated with resulting harms. This is a normative claim about bearing 
responsibility for the costs caused by one’s actions. Second, those who emit high levels 
of greenhouse gases have a moral responsibility to reduce their emissions due to the 
human rights dangers posed by dangerous climate change. The moral weight of this 
claim comes from the importance of protecting the rights in question. As such, the 
multi-actor account does not depend solely on the acceptance of the idea of retributive 
responsibility. Furthermore, the second claim is supported by a practical claim based on 
empirical research concerning the need to control global emissions to prevent dangerous 
climate change, and therefore to require all emitting actors to reduce their emissions. As 
Harris has argued, the only way we can tackle the problem of climate change is to 
regulate the actions of actors that either emit or significantly influence the emissions of 
other actors.120 
                                                
118 Caney, ‘Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History’, 468. 
119 Caney, ‘Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History’, 468. 
120 There might be claims for further expanding the scope. However, it is not clear that other actors should bear direct 
duties that are more than the sum of duties of their members: Civil society organizations are voluntary organisations 
that should only act in ways that are consistent with the individual duties of their members; Supra-state institutions 
are controlled directly by the state-actors that make up their membership; Sub-state governments such as cities or US 
states do also have climate responsibilities, but their duties are likely to be best dealt with by being delegated from 
the state level duties. 
 35 
I have so far introduced and briefly considered four accounts of climate justice, each 
discussing the key question of which actors should bear climate duties. Through the 
discussion, we have seen some good reasons to extend climate duties beyond the level 
of the state. There are several other actors capable of moral agency that are also 
contributing to climate change. Within a statist approach, these actors are not required 
to bear any responsibility for climate change beyond the duties imposed on them as a 
result of the laws passed by the state in which they are located. However, the actions of 
these actors will need to be regulated in order to prevent dangerous climate change. I 
have argued that it is also unjust that the consideration of whether a highly polluting 
entity is required to bear responsibility for its actions is based solely on the arbitrary 
consideration of which country it is located in, and the laws that country has set based 
upon its share of the climate burden at the international level. Developing countries are 
currently exempt from bearing binding responsibilities in international climate 
agreements or treaties, and therefore affluent, highly polluting companies or individuals 
who are living in the developing world are also exempt, even though they have a similar 
standard of living and effect on the environment as their counterparts who are based in 
developed states. It would seem unjust to argue that rich, highly polluting states should 
pay the costs of climate change without also being open to the possibility that rich, 
highly polluting individuals and corporations in other parts of the world should also be 
included in the group of global burden sharers. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
defend a multi-actor approach against five potential counter-arguments, including the 
arguments offered by advocates of the other accounts that I have outlined in the first 
part of this chapter. The five arguments are: (1) We cannot specify with exactness what 
harms are caused by individual greenhouse gas emissions; (2) Not all actors that have 
causally contributed to climate change still exist; (3) Nations are the morally relevant 
actors; (4) Individual and corporation level duties should be limited to respecting the 
law; (5) Individual level responsibilities are not feasible. I shall begin by considering 
the first counter-argument, which is that of exactness. 
2.2. Responding to the critics – Five Problems 
2.2.1 The Problem of Exactness 
The first objection, raised by Posner and Weisbach, relates to the problem of exactness. 
Let us investigate the basis of this claim. Climate change is caused by the accumulation 
of acts by a large number of actors. The individual duties proposed cannot therefore fit 
the paradigm of direct duties such as the duty not to harm another human being in 
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which the duty bearer’s relationship with those he is not to harm is direct and obvious. 
It is not possible to link a specific act of pollution to a specific effect of climate change. 
Posner and Weisbach therefore argue that individuals should not bear moral 
responsibilities for climate harms, since we cannot say exactly what harm each 
individual has caused. This argument implies that individuals can only be responsible 
for direct harms in which the causal chain between actor and effect is simple and 
obvious. Assigning climate responsibilities to individuals would require deviating from 
direct, causal principle for duty allocation, and resorting to some kind of ‘rough 
justice’.121  
I will defend the multi-actor approach against this objection by proposing three possible 
responses. In doing so, I will show that this problem does not pose a significant 
challenge to our multi-actor approach. 
First, several theorists have argued that individuals can bear duties in cases where the 
action-effect relationship is complex. For example, Thomas Pogge has famously argued 
that individuals in the developed world bear causal responsibility for the dire situation 
of the global poor. Pogge argues that ‘the citizens and governments of the wealthy 
societies, by imposing the present global economic order, significantly contribute to the 
persistence of severe poverty and thus share institutional moral responsibility for it.’122 
Pogge’s argument leads him to advocate a negative duty not to uphold unfair 
institutions. Clearly, in this example, as in the case of climate change, the link between 
duty bearers and rights bearers is complex and indirect. It would be extremely difficult 
to identify the effect of an act of an individual person in the developed world on a poor 
person in the developing world, and yet, by advocating a negative individual duty, 
Pogge is claiming that individuals in the developed world share in the causal 
responsibility for the poverty that exists in the developing world. To defend his claim, 
Pogge appeals to institutionally grounded duties, since institutions are capable of having 
an effect on the lives of those in poor countries and also of being upheld or affected by 
those in developed countries in the current global order. The institution carries the link 
between individual duty bearer and end effect. This is one example of a situation in 
which it is impossible to identify a precise causal chain between specific action of an 
individual and effect, yet in which individual duties are advocated.  
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In the case of climate change, Cripps has also argued for individual responsibilities. She 
addresses the contentious complex nature of the relationship between individual actions 
and climatic effects, specifically addressing the fact that ‘it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to pin down individuals responsible for climate change’, due to the fact that climate 
change is caused by the actions of many individuals.123 However, this does not lead her 
to the conclusion that individuals can therefore not be bearers of climate duties, but 
simply that we must look at the relationship in a different way. Cripps instead argues 
that ‘demands on individuals in such cases are most appropriately identified by 
reference to the harm for which we, collectively, are responsible, and our corresponding 
collective duty to do something about it.’124 This does not require identifying a 
collective with a specific identity, but simply requires awareness that the individuals are 
part of a ‘putative’ group, which, as a whole, is responsible for dangerous levels of 
pollution. As Cripps argues, ‘collections of individuals who do not constitute 
formalized, acknowledged groups can and do cause great, and morally regrettable, 
harms.’125 It would be wrong, therefore, to dismiss individual responsibilities in such 
cases simply because the type of relationship between action and effect is complex. 
Cripps therefore defends a principle of ‘weak collective responsibility’ in which three 
criteria must be met in order to hold individuals responsible for actions caused by a 
collective. First, the harm must have been ‘reasonably expected to have been foreseen’, 
thus meaning that the individuals were not reasonably unaware of the possible impact of 
their actions.126 Second, the individuals must have been reasonably expected to be 
aware that there were other individuals whose combined efforts would be enough to 
bring about the harm. Third, the harm must have been ‘collectively avoidable’, meaning 
that there were alternate ways in which the individuals who constitute the ‘putative 
group’ could have acted to avoid the harm.127 In the case of climate change and 
individuals as duty bearers, we can see that there are many individual persons whose 
actions can be considered to fulfil all three criteria. We do not need to show the exact 
causal chain between action and effect, but simply that the person in question had 
enough knowledge about the likely effects that his or her actions would have. This is 
enough to confer moral responsibility on the actor as part of a group of actors who also 
share the responsibility.  
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A second response questions the logic of Posner and Weisbach’s argument. They argue 
against individual duties, whilst affirming state duties. However, it is not clear that the 
problem of exactness disappears when we are considering state actions. Whilst we can 
establish estimations of historic emissions of states, and could use this to calculate an 
approximate share of ‘blame’ if we so wished, the problem of exactness is still there. 
For example, we cannot say which exact harms the emissions of the United States or 
China have caused. The argument raised against individual duties does not seem to be 
an argument against individual duties specifically. Instead, it amounts to an argument 
against climate duties in themselves, where this argument relies upon a backward-
looking principle that can never be exact. So if we think that causal responsibility for 
past emissions is at all relevant for an account of climate duties then we cannot use the 
problem of exactness as a reason to dismiss individual duties specifically. 
The argument of the second response relates to Posner and Weisbach’s allocation of 
responsibility for emissions that have already taken place. However, we also need 
principles for distributing responsibility for limiting current and future emissions. This 
raises a third objection. These principles are independent to claims of historic 
responsibility, and are less sensitive to the problem of exactness. This is because we can 
make plausible general predictions about the effects of our combined actions. We know 
that climate change is not a direct, instant action-harm problem, but the effects of 
emissions on the climate are foreseeable and we can make use of this knowledge in 
making choices about our actions. Scientific research tells us that the build up of 
greenhouse gases in the air is causing the climate to change and beyond a certain point 
this will lead to serious harms. This is the key concept of foreseeability that Cripps 
refers to. When we consider the problem of exactness and current responsibilities, it is 
clear that the foreseeability of climate harms enables actors to make informed choices 
about their actions. It is this foreseeability of the effects of the actions that can be used 
to justify the attribution of responsibilities to various actors.  
I have provided three responses to the problem of exactness. First, I showed that whilst 
individual effects on the climate cannot be calculated in an exact matter, individuals can 
contribute to climate change in a very real way as part of the aggregate of actors that are 
contributing to climate change. Their contribution to this group links them to the 
impacts caused as a result of the cumulative emissions. Second, I showed that Posner 
and Weisbach’s backwards-looking claim was not only applicable to individual level 
duties but also state level duties, which they accept. Third, I argued that their argument 
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was not relevant to forwards-looking principles, and therefore did not undermine the 
argument for individual duties for current and future emissions. The problem of 
exactness, therefore, does not provide us with good reason to reject our multi-actor 
approach. 
2.2.2 The Problem of Existence 
A second possible critique of a multi-actor approach is the problem of existence. This 
argument claims that our multi-actor account is troublesome because not all of those 
causally responsible for climate change still exist, so causal responsibility cannot be the 
basis for an account of moral responsibility for climate costs if all are to share in the 
costs. It claims that it would be unjust to make the causal actors alive today pay for 
climate costs since they will be paying more than their far share since there are several 
‘shares’ which can no longer be paid by those responsible since they are no longer alive. 
This argument attaches too much importance to a misplaced claim of fairness which 
states that current individuals would be bearing more than their fair share if they are 
required to bear climate duties since past individuals did not bear the same 
responsibility. The key point is that the past people are quite simply past people. We 
cannot change what they did. If we think that there is a relationship of unfairness 
between the behaviour of past and present individuals, then we must also support the 
idea of justice between current and future individuals. The scientific basis of climate 
change means that with each generation that does not act, the weight becomes more 
burdensome for the next generation and the tipping point beyond which some serious 
harms are no longer preventable gets nearer and nearer until it is passed. The question 
here is not of bearing responsibilities as a form of reparation or punishment for the 
emissions of previous generations, which were quite clearly not the fault of current 
generations. Instead, we should recognise that the very fact that we think this is unfair 
means that we have a responsibility to future generations to avoid the same behaviour. 
Now that the link between manmade greenhouse gas emissions and climate change is 
‘unequivocal’, continuing to delay climate action would be worse than the behaviour 
that the argument objects to.128 We cannot change what past individuals did, but we can 
prevent further harms from occurring. 
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In a similar way to our response to the problem of exactness, the force of the problem of 
existence is affected by the direction in which our principle is looking. A backwards 
looking principle which aims to distribute blame and reparative duties faces a more 
serious challenge from the problem of existence than a forwards looking principle does. 
Historic emissions will likely need to be addressed separately, and the boundaries of the 
backward-looking principle further defined. I will return to the issue of historic 
responsibility in Chapter Five. A key importance for an account of global climate 
justice is how to respond to future and current emissions, since it is these emissions that 
we can affect today in order to mitigate climate change. The problem of existence is not 
relevant for forward-looking principles, since the question of justice in this case is the 
relationship between current and future individuals, and what justice requires of current 
individuals. The failure of past generations to control their emissions does not excuse 
inaction from current and future generations. The fact that some causally responsible 
individuals no longer exist does not change the fact that current individuals can foresee 
that they have the power to impact the lives of individuals in the future. 
2.2.3 The Problem of Nationality 
A further problem is raised by the claim that nations are morally important. In 
emphasizing the moral importance of national boundaries, Miller is sceptical about 
global principles of justice. According to Miller’s approach individual duties are 
necessarily derivative from the duties of the nation because of the importance of 
national self-determination and the special responsibilities between fellow nationals. 
However, as climate change is a global problem, it does not seem fair that an individual 
should contribute less to climate costs simply because of his nationality when there are 
others in less fortunate positions who are required to pay higher costs due to their 
nationality. Furthermore, as Harris’s argument claims, it is important to consider all of 
the actors that are causally contributing to climate change on a large scale if we are to 
prevent dangerous climate change. Miller might reply that the rich who live in poor 
countries only have duties of distributive justice to their fellow nationals. These duties 
will be more or less expansive depending on the principles of distributive justice 
accepted in that particular society, but nations should be allowed to distribute duties 
within their own boundaries.  
In this section I will claim that the national boundaries are not as important as Miller 
claims. I will first show that nationalism can accept some duties of global responsibility 
when human rights are at stake. Second, I will show that individual climate duties are 
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not inconsistent with nationalist claims of special duties to compatriots, and need not 
undermine a nation’s right to self-determination. Third, I will claim that Miller’s 
assertion that individuals can only feel affinity to fellow nationals is unfounded. Fourth, 
I will make the claim that in some cases, the importance of national self-determination 
might be best served by some degree of individual duties. Finally, I will claim that these 
arguments have shown that the arguments about the importance of national boundaries 
are simply misplaced in the case of climate change duties. 
First, Miller acknowledges that the global community has a responsibility when human 
rights are at stake: 
‘Protecting human rights is not just a matter of each state protecting the rights of its 
own citizens, even though this is one of its primary functions and (arguably) a condition 
of its legitimacy. For various reasons that I will come to shortly, making human rights 
protection purely an internal responsibility of states is not going to be effective in many 
cases. So the wider responsibility falls on that rather elusive entity ‘the world 
community’’129. 
As we saw in Chapter One, there is good reason to talk of human rights violations when 
we discuss the harms that climate change is likely to cause if global emissions are not 
reduced urgently. There are good reasons for thinking that the scope of climate duties 
must extend beyond nation-states, since climate change has the potential to impact the 
lives of individuals all over the world. Miller’s assertion that human rights cannot be 
effectively protected if each state is concerned only with its internal functioning might 
seem to lend support to the argument for global climate duties. This first claim shows 
that nationalism is not entirely unresponsive to the idea of certain duties of the 
international community.  
However, Miller thinks that the responsibility of the global community to protect 
human rights from the threat of climate change should still be borne in the first instance 
by nation-states. In Miller’s view, individual duties would call for a system of global 
equality of opportunity, which would not respect national self-determination. He states: 
‘What can justice mean in a world made up of culturally distinct communities each 
enjoying some degree of political autonomy? It cannot require that everyone 
everywhere must enjoy the same bundle of freedoms, opportunities, and resources—a 
view that I shall refer to as global equality of opportunity. It cannot require this 
because people in different communities will want to have these advantages distributed 
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in different ways. In particular, they will attach different relative weights to different 
components of the bundle.’130 
Miller’s position is that a global scheme of egalitarian distributive justice could not 
work since those in different nations have different preferences for their particular 
balance of goods. So, whilst the first point has shown that nationalism can accept duties 
that are not decided entirely by the nation-state in certain situations where human rights 
are at risk, Miller wishes to claim that these global responsibilities would still best be 
served by national duties.  
In response to this I will make a second argument, highlighting the difference between 
an entirely global system of distributive justice, and a system in which individuals can 
bear climate duties according to their personal situation. Miller’s concerns about global 
equality of opportunity are unfounded in relation to individual climate duties. Such 
duties do not require a commitment to global equality of opportunity, and can be 
supported without denying the claim that individuals have special responsibilities to 
fellow nationals.131 For example, due to the fact that states currently function separately 
and have national accounts and budgets for many services, compatriots are required to 
pay their taxes in order for the state to run properly. This is an example of a special duty 
that cannot currently be met by individuals in other states in the current global set-up. 
But it does not mean that there cannot be some duties that expand beyond national 
boundaries. The argument for individual climate duties requires only that the better off 
in poor countries pay a fair share of the costs of climate change, and does not make any 
broader claims about distribution of opportunities. So, the argument that individual 
duties would require a system of global equality of opportunity that does not respect 
national self-determination is unfounded in the case of climate duties. As such, this 
aspect of the argument for nationalism does not threaten the idea of individual climate 
duties. 
A third argument contests Miller’s assertion that acceptability is a key issue in 
implementing individual climate duties:  
‘Climate-change policies can be successfully implemented only if there is general 
consent to their introduction [and so] allowing nations to map their own route within 
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the constraints on emissions set internationally not only respects their rights of self-
determination but is likely to produce a higher level of compliance in the long run.’132  
Miller’s argument is that individuals identify with their national boundaries and so will 
be unwilling to enter into distributive agreements that expand beyond the nation-state. 
He argues:  
‘Any view holding that people can make claims on one another that go beyond simple 
non-interference - must presuppose a background set of social relationships against 
which claims of this sort would appear legitimate […] We can only expect [people] to 
consent to institutions that enforce the preferred distribution if they regard themselves 
as bound to the beneficiaries by strong ties of community.’133 
The nation is the largest type of community that can fulfil these criteria according to 
Miller, and therefore global duties of justice between individuals are unrealistic since 
people would not consent to such principles outside of their nation. In Miller’s account 
national boundaries represent the limits beyond which interpersonal affinities are non-
existent.  
However, we might argue that Miller’s assumption that people are emotionally bound to 
their national boundaries in an unalterable way is too quick. As Beitz argues, people’s 
affinity to certain groups is not ‘static’, and is indeed changeable over time.134 He states: 
It is a commonplace that the size of the circle of affinity is historically variable and that, 
under favorable institutional and cultural circumstances, the range of sympathetic 
concern can extend well beyond those with whom people share any particular ascriptive 
characteristics … The modern multicultural state would be inconceivable if this were 
not true … If motivational capacities are variable and subject to change with the 
development of institutions and cultures, then it gets things backward to assume any 
particular limitations on these capacities in the structure of a political theory.135 
We might therefore expect Beitz to respond to Miller’s nationalist approach by arguing 
that the claim that individuals will only agree to enter into systems of distribution with 
fellow nationals is an assumption that is not consistent with the potential for change in 
human behaviour that we have seen throughout history. Therefore, to limit our 
conceptions of the scope of justice in this way is too restrictive since it does not allow 
for the possibility of changing institutional structures which may very well have an 
impact on the affinity individuals feel towards other individuals. For example, the fact 
that individuals can affect other individuals by way of affecting the climate may well 
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give rise to more expansive ideas of institutional structures. We might say that Miller 
takes the wrong starting point. He mistakenly takes the existing status quo to be 
evidence of human affinity to compatriots. Instead, we should consider the possibility 
that, inversely, this feeling may have been developed following the implementation of 
the current status quo, and therefore other conceptions of distributive schemes may well 
be possible.  
So, I have so far shown that: (1) Miller’s nationalism is sensitive to the fact that 
protecting human rights might sometimes require duties of the international community. 
I have shown that two of his reasons for claiming that the nation-state is the right actor 
to delegate these duties is undermined since: (2) individual climate duties do not require 
a denial of the nationalist claim of special duties between co-nationals, and do not 
necessitate the kind of global equality of opportunity against which Miller protests; and 
(3) Miller’s claim that individuals will not accept responsibilities to those outside of 
their nation is unfounded.  
A fourth argument might be suggested that would support some individual duties, from 
a nationalist perspective. It might be argued that national sovereignty is itself threatened 
by climate change. As climate change is a global problem, the emissions of foreign 
actors can affect the risk of human rights harms domestically. We might say that climate 
change itself is capable of encroaching on a state’s sovereignty since the harms that 
affect the citizens of one nation-state may have been caused by actions of foreign actors. 
Therefore, protecting a nation’s right to self-determination might well depend on 
mitigating climate change. In extreme cases, the harms of climate change might include 
the disappearance of the land on which a nation lives, thereby seriously jeopardizing its 
ability to continue to exist as a self-determining nation. In this sense, the idea of 
reciprocity to which Miller appeals may entail nations being best able to protect the 
human rights of their own compatriots as well as those in the wider world by entering 
into a global agreement in which all have the duty to mitigate against climate change, 
regardless of the average responsibility of the state in which they live. As Parks and 
Roberts argue: 
‘The notion of the nation-state contributing to, being vulnerable to, and responding to 
climate change may obscure important intra-country distinctions. Many developing 
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nations now have a sizeable middle class that affects and is affected by warming of the 
Earth’s atmosphere much differently to the rest of [their] society’.136 
Harris argues that ‘there will be no hope of averting climate catastrophe’ without 
requiring the new consumers in the developing world to bear climate duties.137 If this is 
the case, then it may be that the best way to protect the human rights of fellow nationals 
is to support a system that would require these rich individuals in poor countries to bear 
climate duties. As such, the special duties individuals have to fellow nationals, might 
require them to support individual duties, since this might be the only way to protect the 
rights of their fellow nationals not to suffer from dangerous climate change. 
We might further reconcile Miller’s argument with that of Harris’s by adopting the 
approach suggested in Baer et al’s Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. In 
their approach, state-level duties are calculated not on state averages but based upon the 
aggregate of responsibility and capacity held by individuals within the state.138 In other 
words, it is the individual actors that bear primacy in determining the weight of duties 
of a state, rather than the state average that is indifferent to high emitting individuals 
within developing states. So, national self-determination is not affected, but the duties 
of a nation-state are proportional to the number of affluent actors within the state and 
not a state average. This would still rely on the acceptance of some degree of global 
duties, but could be a bridge to garner acceptance from a wider theoretical audience 
whilst remaining true to the claim that all emissions must be regulated. This option 
might be the most readily accepted in the current state-led system, as it would still allow 
nation-states to distribute responsibility according to their own domestic systems of 
distribution. However, this approach relies on nation-states differentiating fairly 
between the different situations of their citizens. There is no guarantee that the 
individuals with the most responsibility or capacity would end up paying their fair share 
of the costs. As such, this approach is an improvement from the current state-led system 
in which responsibility is determined by state averages, but it cannot ensure that the 
actors with the greatest capacity or responsibility are the ones that end up paying their 
fair share of the costs. 
Nationalism can support the claim that there may be global duties where human rights 
are at stake. I have claimed that the argument made by nationalism that individuals have 
special duties to compatriots is not inconsistent with the claim that individuals might 
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also have climate duties, since this does not require expanding national schemes of 
distributive justice to the global level, but simply recognizing that there are certain 
duties which individuals everywhere must adhere to. In this sense, nationalism can be 
consistent with the idea that there may be some individual duties that exist on a global 
scale. The ability of a nation-state to self-determine may well be jeopardized if 
dangerous climate change is not mitigated, so if multi-actor duties are likely to be the 
most successful at preventing this as well as protecting human rights, then nationalism 
itself may well be able to support some degree of global individual duties. Indeed, as the 
Greenhouse Development Rights approach suggests, there may be ways of keeping 
national self-determination whilst also accurately dividing responsibility based on the 
aggregate responsibility of individuals within a nation. However, the discussion has 
shown that the arguments for nationalism do not provide us with a legitimate reason to 
believe that individual duties for a global problem should be determined by nationality. 
2.2.4 The Problem of Legality 
Let us now consider a fourth criticism of the idea of a multi-actor approach. A critic 
might argue that individuals and corporations are only under a duty to respect the laws 
of the countries in which they are located. This critic argues that the only relevant moral 
duty that individuals and corporations have is the duty to obey the law. On this account, 
individuals and corporations can be held responsible for climate costs when their 
actions are illegal, but this is because they have broken the law, and not because they 
can be considered as moral agents who bear climate duties separate to the demands of 
the law.  
A first point to be made is that laws are not set in stone and can be modified, removed 
or created. Laws are rules that have been decided by decision-making bodies throughout 
history as a way of institutionalising normative claims about what is right and wrong. 
As the world develops and changes, it is entirely possible that it may become apparent 
that some moral concepts are not fully captured within the legal system, and so new 
laws may be created to accommodate these concepts. It follows, therefore, that the lack 
of illegality of an act does not automatically imply that it is morally acceptable, for laws 
are not always as they should be.139 For example, let us consider the case of slavery in 
the United States. The slave trade was not legally abolished until 1808, having been 
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signed into law by President Thomas Jefferson in 1807.140 So, before this date, it was 
not illegal to engage in the slave trade. However, the morality of the issue was discussed 
in the public sphere for very many years before the law was actually passed, and it 
would be difficult to argue that those who were profiting from the slave trade had no 
moral obligation to stop their activities simply because there was no law in place. As 
Hart states, there is an ‘intersection of law and morals’, in which ‘there are rules that 
have every moral qualification to be laws and yet are not laws.’141 The moral principle 
that it is wrong to enslave another human being did not simply appear with the 
institutionalisation of the law which condemned it, and the act did not suddenly become 
wrong only once the law had appeared.  
We can make similar claims about the responsibility to act in the case of climate change. 
The serious harms which are predicted to occur to human beings and natural ecosystems 
if global emissions do not decrease means that we can morally call upon highly 
polluting actors to contribute to the task of reducing global emissions, even if the law 
does not oblige them to do so. As far as individuals are concerned, it is not unusual for 
claims of moral responsibilities to be made for cases in which the acts are not enshrined 
in law. For example, this can be the case in situations where not bearing such moral 
duties would cause harms to others. For example, most states of the world do not legally 
require individuals to prevent harms to other individuals where the harm occurring to 
the suffering individual is not related to the first individual’s conduct. Let’s say two 
individuals are swimming in a lake and one begins to drown. The other swimmer is 
under no legal responsibility to go to the aid of the struggling swimmer, even if he 
could do this very easily and save the person’s life. This failure to help is not punishable 
under law, and yet most would argue that this individual was wrong not to help and he 
acted immorally. There may be reasons given, for example, the accused swimmer might 
have been unsure that he could help without endangering his own life, or that there may 
have been others in a better position to help. But for the purposes of this discussion let 
us assume that this is an uncontroversial case in which the first swimmer could have 
very easily saved the life of the other swimmer without endangering himself or others, 
and that he was aware of this and could foresee that the swimmer in trouble would die 
without his help. This is a case in which it would seem relatively uncontroversial to 
claim that the strong swimmer had a moral duty to rescue the swimmer in trouble. Not 
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all acts or omissions can be fully covered by law, and some may be institutionalised into 
law as time goes by. Our swimming story gives one such example of a situation in 
which we would expect an individual to act in a certain way in order to fulfil a moral 
duty that is not required by law. So the argument that individuals should not be 
considered as bearers of climate duties because individuals only have a duty to obey the 
law is too restricted and cannot provide the basis of a defence for a purely statist 
account to climate duties. 
As far as corporations are concerned, the problem of legality is less straightforward, 
since the claim that corporations are fully-fledged moral persons is controversial. For 
example, Becker has argued that corporations’ responsibilities are limited to 
‘maximis[ing] stockholder value, adhering to contracts, implicit as well as explicit, and 
obeying the laws of the different countries where they operate’.142 In other words, 
Becker argues that corporations are not moral agents, and their only responsibility is to 
their shareholders to whom they have a duty to maximise profit within the boundaries of 
the law. Similarly, Morawetz has claimed that ‘although a corporation is frequently 
spoken of as a person or unit ... the existence of a corporation independently of its 
shareholders is a fiction’.143 On the other hand, French argues that corporations ‘can be 
full-fledged moral persons and have whatever privileges, rights and duties, as are, in the 
normal course of affairs, accorded to moral persons.’144 Space will not allow me to 
debate the intricacies of the debate about corporate moral personhood. However, 
without defending a fully-fledged definition of the corporation as a moral person, I will 
offer three arguments to defend the position that corporations do, in certain 
circumstances, have certain minimum moral obligations that go beyond and are distinct 
from their legal obligations.  
First, this claim is intuitively persuasive. For example, a corporation might not be 
breaking any laws by exploiting loopholes in the law, or by shifting money and profit 
between countries in order to avoid paying tax. However, this is generally seen as 
wrong. A recent example is highlighted by the publicity given to the case of coffee 
chain Starbucks, which was forced into admitting it had paid only £.8.6m of corporation 
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tax in the UK over a period of 14 years between 1999 and 2013.145 Starbucks had not 
acted illegally, and yet was heavily criticised for ‘aggressive’ tax avoidance by several 
newspapers and also publicly by the British Prime Minister David Cameron.146 
Companies such as these are condemned by the public for such immoral acts even when 
those acts are not illegal. The expectation that corporations will not exploit loopholes in 
tax laws seems to be based on the idea that corporations have a moral duty to pay their 
share as members of the community. If the claim was simply related to abiding by the 
law, then tax avoidance would not be worthy of criticism since the tax avoidance 
actions are not ‘illegal’.  
Second, the normative claim that corporations have responsibilities that go beyond their 
legal obligations is supported by UN agreements on the kinds of behaviour that is 
acceptable from corporations. Indeed, certain kinds of moral behaviour are required 
from corporations as part of the implementation of the United Nations’ “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework. The document, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights’ produced by the UN Office of the High Commissioner and endorsed by 
the Human Rights Council in resolution 17/4 on June 16th 2011, states: 
‘The responsibility to respect human rights is a global standard of expected conduct for 
all business enterprises wherever they operate. It exists independently of States’ 
abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations, and does not 
diminish those obligations. And it exists over and above compliance with national laws 
and regulations protecting human rights.’147 
The United Nations asserts the responsibility of corporations to respect human rights, 
thereby affirming the moral intuition that corporations have duties over and above 
maximising profit for shareholders. Corporations are ‘specialized organs of society’, 
which, as members of society have the responsibility to make sure that their actions do 
not impinge on the ability of the human members of the wider society to achieve their 
rights as embodied in the International Bill of Rights.148 This does not require 
corporations to take on the same moral responsibility as other actors which more 
straightforwardly fulfill the criteria for full moral personhood, but it does serve as a 
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minimum moral requirement which corporations are expected to adhere to. In particular, 
‘enterprises should respect the human rights of individuals belonging to specific groups 
or populations that require particular attention, where they may have adverse human 
rights impacts on them.’149  
The complex nature of the relationship between emissions and impacts of climate 
change should not reduce this responsibility. These harms are foreseeable, and a 
forward-looking principle of climate responsibilities requires this to be taken into 
account. Corporations are rightly condemned if they engage in activities that result in 
serious immediate harms, for example, to individuals living in the vicinity of their 
factories. A recent example of this can be seen in China’s ‘cancer villages’, which are 
towns in which cancer rates and deaths have soared since the arrival of polluting 
factories that use toxic compounds, banned in many countries of the world, yet not 
illegal in China.150 Stories such as these have appeared in the media around the world, 
and are clearly, and rightly, considered to be shocking. Several of these cases have 
resulted in successful legal demands for compensation from the families of victims, 
which shows that the law can also recognise that corporate behaviour can be punished 
as immoral in certain cases where harms are great. However, future individuals who 
will suffer the effects of harms caused by climate change are not able to go back in time 
and sue the corporations whose high levels of emissions have contributed to their harms. 
Furthermore, even if this were possible, paying reparations once a harm has occurred 
cannot make up for the serious nature of the predicted impacts of climate change, many 
of which are ‘non-substitutable’ and may involve irreversible damage to land and 
ecosystems. Corporations should therefore abide by the UN’s guiding principles to 
support and respect human rights. Where it is foreseeable that the use of certain 
methods of production or certain actions are likely to cause serious harms, it is morally 
unacceptable for corporations to undertake these actions in the pursuit of profit. The fact 
that the harms of climate change are not as obvious and direct should not undermine 
their duty. The intergenerational nature of the harms that are likely to be produced by 
the effects of climate change should not lessen the importance we attach to them. So, as 
part of the global aggregate of polluters, corporations have to bear their share of the 
responsibility to prevent serious harms to persons by mitigating climate change.  
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Third, the claim that corporations should bear distinct climate duties above their legal 
responsibilities is further strengthened when we consider the power of corporations 
today. Transnational corporations (TNCs) are not bound to any one state, and can move 
their assets between countries to avoid laws that they do not like. As Rondinelli states, 
‘the ability of TNCs to create separate legal entities to shield shareholders from liability 
in different countries around the world, their location in multiple jurisdictions, and the 
political reluctance of some governments to enforce laws against large investors and 
employers all tend to weaken conventional concepts of national sovereignty.’151  
Corporations are also applying their influence in law and decision-making at the highest 
levels. As we discussed previously, laws can be made and changed. In the process of 
making this happen, governments often consult with community actors before such 
changes.152 As important contributors to the economy, corporations are often involved 
in these processes, and can in this way influence the laws that are made. Furthermore, 
the emergence of supra-state trade agreements is giving power to corporations to legally 
challenge state policies that threaten their commercial interests. One such example is the 
‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’, a potential new trade agreement 
between state and business actors in the United States and Europe, which has been 
proposed to include an ‘investor-state dispute settlement’ clause.153 This clause would 
give corporations throughout the trading area the right to legally challenge states in 
international tribunals where these corporations felt that actions by the state were 
damaging its investments. Senior corporate lobbyists have specifically mentioned that 
this would allow them to legally challenge ‘public policy objectives, including human 
and labour rights’.154 Similar existing clauses in other trade partnerships have led to 
cases where multinational corporations have sued states for such ‘crimes’ as attempting 
to protect the health of their citizens with anti-smoking laws in the case of Philip Morris 
vs. Australia, or for putting environmental protection laws into place in the case of Lone 
Pine vs. Canada.155 The fact that such agreements are not only discussed but already 
exist in some parts of the world and may soon exist between Europe and the United 
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States of America shows the power which corporations hold, given that states are 
potentially signing away the rights of their citizens.  
In the past, states could control corporate behaviour more easily with laws, but the 
growth and expansion of powerful, transnational corporations means that the claim that 
national laws are sufficient in regulating the actions corporations take is outdated, and is 
likely to become even more outdated as treaties that place corporate investments above 
public social policies become more frequent. On top of the power they hold, 
corporations also play a large part in causal responsibility for climate change. A recent 
study claims that ninety corporations are responsible for two thirds of historic 
emissions.156 The growing power of corporations allows them to conduct much of their 
business above the law whilst at the same time influencing political decisions. This fact, 
combined with the polluting effect that corporations have on the climate, shows that 
simply requiring them to obey the law is no longer enough if global efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions are to be successful. States are not able to adequately control 
the behavior of the relevant polluting agents. As such, I reject the claim that there is no 
need for individual and corporation level duties.  
2.2.5 The Problem of Feasibility 
Finally, let us now return to a criticism raised by both Posner and Weisbach and Miller, 
which is the problem of feasibility. Both of these approaches raise a practical objection 
to the idea of individual duties, stating that they are not workable. Posner and Weisbach 
state simply that the statist division of the world is a ‘basic constraint’ on duties, which 
must therefore be state-led.157 Miller argues, firstly, that individual duties that are not 
governed by the state are not workable because this would lead to ‘a massive collective-
action problem with no agency capable of solving it’, and secondly, that individuals 
would be unlikely to fulfill their duties since each would have an incentive to free ride 
by ‘overshooting’ their individual target.158 How can we respond to this contention that 
individual duties are unworkable?  
A first point to note is that the feasibility objection is a practical argument. It does not 
rely on a moral claim that it is wrong to allocate duties to multiple actors, but relies on a 
practical claim about the feasibility of doing so. I will respond to this objection by 
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directly contesting it, by claiming that not approaching climate duties from a multi-actor 
approach is impractical, since state duties alone will not be enough to prevent dangerous 
climate change. The discussion so far has shown us several reasons why a statist 
approach is too limited in the case of climate change. Consider, for example Harris’s 
claim about the rising emissions of new consumers in the developing world, or our 
discussion of the supra-governmental power of corporations and their high emissions. A 
purely statist account cannot respond to these key points, and is likely to be 
unsuccessful at preventing dangerous climate change since key actors are overlooked. 
The causal contribution each polluting actor has on climate change requires all actors to 
reduce their emissions, and this cannot be regulated by states alone. This is the first 
reason why our approach must be multi-actor.  
But the practical need for a multi-actor approach does not stop there. The need for a 
multi-actor approach is more complicated than the impact that each actor can have on 
the environment directly, since it is also bound in the influence that each actor can have 
on the polluting actions of the other actors. Actors are both contributing to climate 
change through their own polluting actions and through the influence they have on other 
polluting agents. For example, let us think back to our previous discussion related to the 
problem of legality and the case of the coffee chain that was avoiding paying tax. 
Individuals were critical of the tax-avoidance behaviour that Starbucks had shown. 
Following protests, the company ‘promised to pay £20m over two years, amid fears of a 
consumer boycott.’159 This is a situation in which individuals were able to put pressure 
on the company by threatening a boycott if it did not change its tax policies and begin 
paying tax at the appropriate rate in their country. As we have seen, multinational 
corporations do not fall under the jurisdiction of any one government, meaning that 
states no longer hold the power they once did over corporations. Individuals, on the 
other hand, can influence the behaviour of corporations, as the previous illustration 
highlights. Individuals can choose to support companies that produce goods in 
sustainable ways, and boycott those that are highly polluting. Amongst others, 
individuals can play different roles as consumers, voters, employees, and shareholders. 
In each of these roles, they can influence the actions of other actors, and therefore 
influence the levels of emission caused by these other actors. As voters, individuals can 
give their support to candidates whose policies are morally sound and in this way 
influence the action of their state by voting in governments who are more likely to put 
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in policies that will reduce national emissions. As consumers, individuals can boycott 
companies which are acting immorally, or choose to support companies which are local 
or making attempts to reduce their carbon emissions. The duties that we may assign to 
individuals are likely to involve a wide-spectrum of possible acts and are certainly not 
limited to asking them to reduce their individual carbon footprint. For example, these 
might involve moral responsibilities to vote for green politicians, to support civil 
society groups in raising awareness about climate change or to advocate just 
institutional structures to coordinate global efforts to reduce emissions.160  
Corporations can also influence state actions in the ways we have previously discussed, 
such as lobbying. They can also influence individual choices by aggressive marketing 
campaigns that encourage consumers to buy their products over more environmentally 
sound alternatives. This can be either supported by governments to encourage public 
spending and increase growth, or discouraged by governments by subsidising local 
companies whose policies are greener. States can implement policies which make it 
easier for businesses to protect human rights without worrying about losing out 
financially to other companies who are not doing the same. For example, as stated in the 
Guiding Principles for Businesses on Human Rights, ‘states should set out clearly the 
expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction 
respect human rights throughout their operations [thereby] ensuring predictability for 
business enterprises by providing coherent and consistent messages’.161 Each actor can 
affect the behaviour of the other actors, and for this reason it is essential that they are all 
targeted as bearers of climate duties in order to have the best chance of working 
together and reducing global emissions. The practical argument of feasibility is 
therefore rejected since responding effectively to climate change makes it a practical 
necessity that the actions of all climate actors are regulated. 
2.3. A Multi-Actor Approach to Climate Change 
In this chapter, I have defended a distinctive multi-actor approach to climate change in 
which individuals, states and corporations are all considered to be bearers of climate 
duties. The main argument for this approach rests on the practical claim that many 
different types of actors can foreseeably contribute to climate harms. In order to prevent 
dangerous climate change we must morally ‘regulate’ the behavior of all of them. The 
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defense of this argument comes from six key claims, four principled and two practical. 
First, it is unfair to assign responsibilities using state-level averages because this would 
be unfair to poor individuals in developed states. Second, the foreseeable effects of 
greenhouse gas emitting actions means it is not necessary to be able to trace the specific 
causal link between one actor’s emissions and someone suffering climate harms to 
defend forward-looking climate duties. Third, the claim that past generations acted 
unfairly does not excuse inaction from current individuals. Fourth, the moral duties of 
actors are not exhausted by the duty to obey the law. Fifth, states cannot adequately 
regulate the behavior of all other actors, and so appeals to nationalism or legal 
responsibilities only are also practically insufficient. Sixth, the actions of different types 
of actors are intertwined in complex ways such that we need all actors to have moral 
duties to support each other to avoid or prevent climate harms. The practical necessity 
stems from the fact that not only do polluting actors contribute themselves to 
atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases but they also exert influence on the polluting 
actions of other actors.  
While states must play a key role in any realistic theory of climate justice, due to the 
current international political system and the urgency of the need to respond, purely 
statist accounts fail to capture the reality of the global problem that climate change 
poses, which will require all capable actors to contribute to efforts to reduce global 
emissions, rather than just the richest states. The most important implication of the 
multi-actor approach for China is that some individuals in China may be expected to 
bear climate duties due to their individual greenhouse gas emissions when they would 
be exempt from such duties under a statist approach. But this is consistent with China’s 
claims that those who are most responsible and more capable should bear greater 
responsibility. On a state level, developed states will still be expected to bear greater 
responsibility since they have higher percentages of individuals who are eligible 
candidates to bear climate duties. A requirement for affluent or high emitting actors 
everywhere to contribute to climate costs is likely to engender further cooperation on a 
state-level from developed states who have argued that China should be expected to 
make climate change commitments. Corporate-level duties will make the transfer of 
technology a moral duty and will help China to reduce emissions produced within 
Chinese borders as a result. We will see further implications of the multi-actor approach 
for China in subsequent chapters, as we consider the right to development, 
responsibility for embedded emissions and historic responsibility. 
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This chapter has responded to the question: ‘Which are the relevant actors to bear 
climate duties?’ In doing so, it has determined the scope of my account of climate 
justice, which will be multi-actor in nature, considering individuals, states and 
corporations to be the relevant duty bearers. The next step in the development of the 
account is to determine the importance of the claim made by China that developing 
countries should be permitted to prioritise development, and I will now move on to 
considering this in Chapter Three. 
 57 
 
Chapter 3 
Climate Change and the Right to Development 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, responding to climate change effectively 
requires a global response. Within the UNFCCC negotiations, state actors have been 
working towards creating a new international treaty to control global carbon emissions 
and distribute duties related to preventing and adapting to climate change. To date, this 
process of negotiations has been wrought with disagreement about how the ‘burden’ of 
climate change should be fairly shared. The relationship between a new climate burden 
sharing agreement and the right to development is one such area of contention. As Yi 
Xianliaing, an official from China’s Foreign Ministry, stated in 2009, ‘the diplomatic 
and political wrangling over climate change that is opening up will be focused on the 
right to develop’.162 China has argued that climate change ‘is ultimately a development 
issue and it can only be addressed in the course of sustainable development.’163 It is 
clear that China’s willing cooperation in any burden sharing agreement is contingent 
upon what it views as the appropriate level of respect for its right to development, since 
‘sustainable development and poverty eradication remain urgent challenges and 
overriding priorities for [China].’164 
This chapter will respond to the question: ‘Does the right to development justify 
increasing emissions?’ This is an issue of key importance to China. As an issue raised 
by a key actor in the climate change negotiations, it is therefore important that a theory 
of global climate justice can respond to this question. Having set the boundaries for the 
scope of my account in Chapter Two, I will now develop the framework for the account 
further by considering the relevance of the right to development.  
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In this chapter, I will first set the importance of the issue within the wider political 
context of the right to development. I will show that the right to development features in 
several international texts and declarations, which have been widely accepted by 
developing and developed countries. I will then briefly discuss the context of China’s 
claim within the political discussions.  
In section 3.2, I will discuss the idea of development, and how it is currently measured. 
I will consider two existing approaches to development. First, I will discuss economic 
development, which is measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National 
Income (GNI). Second, I will consider human development, measured by the Human 
Development Index (HDI). I will then argue that neither of these measures can 
accurately tell us about the fulfilment of the right to development, since the right to 
development is not a right of states, and so cannot be fully captured by state-level 
average measures. I will argue that the right to development is a right of individuals, 
and its fulfilment entails a process in which individuals become more developed as they 
have the opportunity to fulfil a wider range of their human rights. I will then provide a 
prima facie defence of China’s position. Taking account of the important role that 
carbon emissions can play in development, I will argue that the Chinese state is justified 
in increasing its emissions where these are needed for the fulfilment of the right to 
development of its citizens.  
In sections 3.3, and 3.4 I will consider two key objections to the prima facie defence. 
Section 3.3 will engage with the first objection, which claims that development must be 
sustainable. I will begin by considering a strong version of the claim, which would limit 
development where this cannot take place without increasing greenhouse gas emissions. 
I will respond to this claim by making reference to the different ends that can be met by 
greenhouse gas emissions. I will argue that there are two categories of morally 
important types of emissions, both fulfilling human rights-based needs, and a further 
category that involves emissions for ‘luxury’ ends. As a result, I will defend the claim 
that a globally sustainable system can be consistent with increases in morally important 
emissions processes, if these are counter-balanced by greater reductions in ‘luxury’ 
emissions. Following this, I will argue that the sustainability of development should be 
supported by developed countries and affluent actors, in order to prevent ‘lock-in’ of 
carbon intensive systems. I will then discuss two potential measures for implementing 
this, informed by the Clean Development Mechanism and the Greenhouse Development 
Rights Framework.  
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Section 3.4 will consider the second key objection to the prima facie defence, based 
upon a holistic approach to human rights. This argument will claim that commitment to 
one right entails commitment to other, connected rights. The objection will claim that 
China may not be a fit actor to fulfil its role as the key duty bearer for the right to 
development of its citizens, as it has not demonstrated a commitment to other human 
rights that the right to development aims to protect. I will assess this objection by 
considering China’s commitment first to civil and political rights, and secondly to 
socio-economic rights. I will show examples which illustrate ways in which the state 
does not enable citizens to fulfil many of these rights. I will claim that the argument that 
developing countries should prioritise socio-economic rights before civil and political 
rights is unfounded, before arguing that even if this were the case, Chinese individuals 
are not able to fulfil their full range of socio-economic rights either. I will conclude that 
the state of China does not fulfil the criteria to be considered a fit actor by a holistic 
approach to rights. However, I will conclude that the important ‘gatekeeping’ role 
played by the state means that the best response here might be one which engages the 
Chinese state despite this shortfall.  
The chapter will conclude with discussion about the implications of the discussions for 
China’s responsibilities, as well as the responsibilities of other climate duty bearers. In 
doing so, the argument presented in the chapter will enable the further development of 
my account of global climate justice. 
3.1 The Wider Political Context 
The first section of this chapter will discuss the political context of the right to 
development in order to locate the issue within political discussions and highlight the 
importance of the issue. I will first discuss the institutional documents that refer to the 
right, before considering its importance in the political negotiations surrounding climate 
change. 
The Right to Development has been formally institutionalised in the Universal 
Declaration on the Right to Development, which was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1986. It went through by majority vote, with the United States the 
only country to vote against the resolution, although eight other countries abstained.165 
However, by 1993, a global consensus including the United States was reached with the 
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adoption of the Vienna Declaration, which ‘reaffirms the right to development, as 
established in the Declaration on the Right to Development, as a universal and 
inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights.’166The 
institutionalisation of the right to development affirmed its status as a human right, 
universal and inalienable in nature, therefore owed to each and all persons. The global 
agreement of the Vienna Declaration shows that states were in agreement about this fact, 
with China aligning itself with the majority of states in affirming this right in 1986. A 
statement from China emphasises the important role that the international community 
should play in the fulfilment of the right to development: 
‘To the people in the developing countries, the most urgent human rights are still the 
right to subsistence and the right to economic, social and cultural development. 
Therefore, attention should first be given to the right to development. China appeals to 
the international community to attach importance and give attention to the developing 
countries' right to development and adopt positive and effective measures to eliminate 
injustice and unreasonable practice in the world economic order. An earnest effort must 
be made to improve the international economic environment, alleviate and gradually 
eliminate factors disadvantageous to developing countries and establish a new 
international economic order … A favourable international environment must be 
created for the realization of the right to development.’167 
China’s demand for a ‘favourable international environment’ is backed by the text of 
the Declaration on the Right to Development as well as the Vienna Declaration, which 
both place an obligation on the international community to work together to ensure the 
fulfilment of the right to development. Article 4(2) of the Declaration on the Right to 
Development reads: 
‘Sustained action is required to promote more rapid development of developing 
countries. As a complement to the efforts of developing countries, effective international 
co-operation is essential in providing these countries with appropriate means and 
facilities to foster their comprehensive development.168’ 
The Vienna Declaration features a similar proclamation: 
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‘States should cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating 
obstacles to development. The international community should promote an effective 
international cooperation for the realization of the right to development and the 
elimination of obstacles to development. Lasting progress towards the implementation 
of the right to development requires effective development policies at the national level, 
as well as equitable economic relations and a favourable economic environment at the 
international level.169’ 
The Declaration on the Right to Development also emphasises the importance of the 
fulfilment of wider human rights in the process of development, stating that: 
‘In order to promote development, equal attention and urgent consideration should be 
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights.’170 
Considered in isolation from issues of climate change, the previous discussion shows 
that the duty of states to enable the fulfilment of the right to development through their 
international cooperation is institutionalised within several international declarations.171 
There has, however, been much disagreement about how to implement the right to 
development. The differing interpretations of the right to development, and in particular 
how much of the burden to fulfil this right falls on developed countries, are at the root 
of this lack of consensus. For example, developed states might interpret the requirement 
for a ‘favourable economic environment’ merely as an environment that does not inhibit 
development. Developing countries on the other hand might be inclined to view this 
duty as a more demanding requirement of global distributive justice. The difficulty in 
coming to a political consensus on the right to development is further complicated by 
issues raised by climate justice. I will now provide an overview of the interconnected 
nature of development and climate change, and present some of the political positions 
on the issue taken by different states. 
Climate change itself poses a threat to development. First, climate change measures can 
have an impact on a state’s capacity to develop since processes of development involve 
increased energy use, and this normally entails increased carbon emissions since the 
most affordable technologies and the technologies which developing countries have the 
best access to tend to use carbon as their energy source. Developing countries have 
argued that they have no reasonable choice but to increase their carbon emissions if they 
wish to develop. Second, if developing countries do not prioritise development for their 
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citizens now it is likely that they will be less able to adapt to the changing climate, 
which will in turn make the fulfilment of the right to development more difficult. 
Whilst an effective mitigation response to climate change will require a global effort to 
reduce emissions, China and other developing countries have argued that the right to 
development means that they are justified in prioritising their development. Practically, 
this means that their emissions will ‘peak’ at a later moment in time, continuing to 
increase in the meantime as a result of development. In support of this argument, China 
has made reference to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, and 
the ‘Principle of Sustainable Development’, in which ‘the overall framework of 
sustainable development, economic development, poverty eradication and climate 
protection should be considered in a holistic and integrated manner so as to reach a win-
win solution and to ensure developing countries secure their right to development.’172 
This requires the developed states to take the lead on climate change as part of 
‘effective international cooperation for the realization of the right to development and 
the elimination of obstacles to development’.173  
The contested nature of the requirements of the right to development has become a 
sticking point in international negotiations on climate change. Developing countries 
have claimed this right justifies their increasing emissions, and developed countries 
have refused to sign up to agreements which do not also impose binding duties on large 
developing countries, such as China. For example, prior to the COP17 meeting in 
Durban, the United States Climate Envoy, Todd Stern, stated: 
‘[The kind of agreement that would be acceptable to the United States] would have to 
cover all the major Parties in a full way, so it would bind with equal legal force. 
Everybody who made commitments would be bound fully, unconditionally, no kind of 
escape hatches in the text, and it would also have to be based on something different in 
terms of the categories of countries than the 1992 categories, which are already quite 
outdated and will be that much more outdated ten years from now.’174 
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Stern’s statement is referring to the economic development many of the developing 
states have gone through in recent years since the division of Annex I – non-Annex I 
was first agreed. The United States has been reluctant to commit to climate measures 
whilst countries such as China, which is viewed as a key economic competitor, are not 
required to undertake similar commitments.  
On the other side of the argument, China is not alone in its claim that the developing 
countries should be exempt from emissions caps. For example, India has released 
several press statements on this issue. One such release states: 
‘It is inevitable that the pursuit of social and economic development by developing 
countries will result in an increase in their GHG emissions, for the foreseeable future. 
This is recognized in the UNFCCC itself.’175 
In a statement to the G77, Bolivian President Evo Morales has also argued this point, 
claiming that it is essential that developed countries reduce their emissions ‘so that 
developing countries might satisfy the needs of their populations without affecting 
planet Earth’.176 
Existing climate treaties have not required developing countries to commit to any limits 
on their emissions, a situation which has become contentious during subsequent 
negotiations. As Vanderheiden argues, this is the result of considerations of fairness but 
also political realism, which has led to ineffective agreements that do not require 
anyone to do enough to tackle the problem of climate change. He states: 
‘Denying developing countries sufficient GHG emissions allowances to accommodate 
development would have been tremendously unfair (and unacceptable to them), but 
adjusting the assigned emissions allowances within the industrialized nations to reflect 
significant per capita increases in India and China while allowing the same global 
aggregate emissions levels would have been hugely unpopular, and even less likely to 
be accepted by the relevant parties.’177 
Before engaging further with the arguments surrounding the right to development and 
climate change, the following section will spend some time reviewing the idea of 
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development and what it represents, in order to develop a clearer idea of the importance 
of the right to development. 
3.2 Development 
The language of development is familiar, with the terms ‘developing’ or ‘developed’ 
country widely used. However, the meaning of ‘development’ is unclear. I will consider 
two different ways of approaching and measuring development, both of which are 
widely used in political and philosophical discussions. First, I will examine economic 
development and economic statistics as a measure of development. Second, I will 
consider the Human Development Index. I will then argue that neither of these state 
level analyses can accurately represent fulfilment of the right to development, which is 
a right of individuals and not states. I will argue that the right to development is a 
process of human development, the importance of which lies in the ability to fulfil 
human rights and achieve a standard of life in which important ‘functionings’ can be 
achieved.178 
3.2.1 Economic Development  
The first approach to development treats development as an issue that is determined by 
economic measures. I will outline the basis of this approach before arguing that it is too 
narrow in its approach to fully encompass what development entails, since development 
requires the fulfilment of more than economic measures. 
An economic conception of development considers development to be the attainment of 
a certain level of wealth or income, and evaluates a country’s level of development 
using its progress along a scale towards the ‘high income’ status. The World Bank 
states: ‘The main indicator of economic development is increasing GNP per capita (or 
GDP per capita), reflecting an increase in the economic productivity and average 
material wellbeing of a country's population. Economic development is closely linked 
with economic growth.’179 The two most commonly used statistics which represent the 
economic status of a country are gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national 
income (GNI). GDP is the value of all the goods and services produced within a state’s 
borders over a set period of time. GNI is the sum of GDP plus the value created by that 
state’s citizens abroad, minus the value created domestically by foreign citizens. GNI 
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therefore denotes the overall net national ‘income’ created by citizens both domestically 
and abroad. Following this method, the World Bank considers countries to be developed 
once they have reached the ‘high income’ status of $12,616 gross national income 
(GNI) per capita.180 Economic development is therefore a measure of development that 
is entirely based on the economy of a country. It is made comparable across states by 
using per capita figures that show a state’s average product or income per inhabitant, as 
opposed to an overall income figure, which is influenced by population size. Since 2004, 
China’s GNI per capita has been growing annually, and has more than doubled from 
$4,340 in 2004 to $10,890 in 2012.181 In terms of economic development, or economic 
growth, China is a developing country following a path that is improving the average 
economic development level of its inhabitants, moving towards the level of income that 
would define the Chinese state as developed. 
An economic measure of development might therefore exempt states with per capita 
GNI below $12,616 from climate duties that would limit their growth, since, if 
development is measured by the attainment of a level of economic income then the right 
to development must entitle states to continue their growth until they reach the 
‘developed’ level of per capita income. However, it does not seem clear why the cut-off 
point of $12,616 per capita should be of such great importance in distributing climate 
duties on the basis that some actors have a right to development. The implication of 
China’s claim would be that countries below that level should be permitted to prioritise 
development needs above mitigation policies, while countries above this threshold 
would be required to actively decrease their emissions, since they are ‘developed’. It is 
difficult to see why this point should be chosen as the point at which countries suddenly 
gain the capacity to be able to pay for emissions reductions. A scale along which more 
and more responsibility was gradually accrued would seem to be fairer. The 
implications of this would weaken China’s claim, since, if only economic development 
matters, then with a GNI per capita of $10,890, China is much further along this scale 
than many of the other developing countries, and might, therefore, be expected to take 
on more responsibility than other developing countries. China is less than $2000 below 
the level of per capita GNI, which would make it a developed country, and in this sense 
it does not seem justified for China to expect to have the same reduced level of 
responsibility as other developing countries that have much lower financial capacity. 
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Such a threshold might be of more relevance at the lowest end of the scale of economic 
development in order to determine a level of economic development below which actors 
cannot be expected to contribute to climate measures since these are quite simply 
unaffordable. For example, Baer et al suggest that such a threshold might fall at $7,500 
per year.182 According to their argument, this is ‘the level at which the southern “middle 
class” begins to emerge’, and thus the point at which it begins to be fair to ask people to 
contribute to the costs of climate change.183 This threshold might be useful therefore in 
defining a minimum level below which the economic capacity of the state is considered 
to be insufficient to cope with contributing to climate measures without further 
impoverishing those within the state already living in poverty.  
However, whilst economic development may be part of what is needed for development 
to take place, development is about more than poverty alleviation. As the 1986 
Declaration on the Right to Development states, ‘development is a comprehensive 
economic, social, cultural and political process’.184 Its complexity cannot possibly be 
captured by a single measure of economic growth. GNI or GDP per capita of a state are 
simply indicators that tell us the average income of a state. Economic measures can give 
us a picture of the financial status of a country but they cannot tell us about the 
fulfilment of the right to development in that country because economic growth may be 
a precursor to development but economic growth does not equal development. As 
Costanza et al note, ‘GDP measures mainly market transactions. It ignores social costs, 
environmental impacts and income inequality.’185 We can see this in the example of 
China, whereby the state is moving rapidly towards the income of a developed state, yet 
hundreds of millions of people are still living in poverty. A growing economy does not 
mean that the right to development of individuals within the state is being fulfilled. As 
Sengupta argues, ‘economic growth, attended by increased inequalities or disparities 
and rising concentrations of wealth and economic power, and without any improvement 
in indicators of social development, education, health, gender balance and 
environmental protection respecting the human rights standards and, what is most 
important, if such growth is associated with any violation of civil and political rights, it 
cannot fulfil the human right to development.’186 Sengupta’s claim highlights the fact 
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that economic growth may increase quite independently of other areas important to 
development, and without measuring these we cannot use economic indicators as a 
measure of development.  
This section has argued that economic measures such as GDP or GNI are not 
representative of the level of fulfilment of the right to development within a state. 
Although economic growth brings greater capacity to implement the policies needed for 
human development, the right to development is much more complicated than this, and 
measures of economic development such as GDP or GNI cannot give us an accurate 
portrayal of a state’s progress towards the fulfilment of the right to development. 
3.2.2 The Human Development Index 
I shall now consider an alternative measure, the Human Development Index (HDI). This 
is another key measure used in development literature. I will first argue that the HDI is a 
better measure of the right to development than economic measures, since it includes 
indicators of human development in its analyses. However, I will argue that as a state-
level, composite indicator combining only three different factors, it does not fully 
represent fulfilment of the right to development. 
The HDI is a composite indicator, which combines markers of human wellbeing, 
represented by life expectancy and educational attainment, with GNI per capita. In this 
way, it is a more expansive measure of development than economic development alone, 
as it also factors in indicators of health of its citizens, measured by life expectancy, and 
social development, measured by years of schooling. The HDI is ‘a widely used 
measure of national development’, which can tell us more than purely economic 
measures about development progress.187 The HDI was developed as part of the United 
Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Reports.  
‘Given the imperfect nature of wealth as gauge of human development, the HDI offers a 
powerful alternative to GDP and GNI for measuring the relative socio-economic 
progress at national and sub-national levels. Comparing HDI and per capita income 
ranks of countries, regions or ethnic groups within countries highlights the relationship 
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between their material wealth on the one hand and their human development on the 
other.’188 
The Human Development Index was intended to be a more expansive measure of 
development, which supplements an economic indicator with measures of the fulfilment 
of human ‘capabilities’ based on Amartya Sen’s theories of development. The 
‘capabilities approach’ treats the ability to fulfil important human functions as the goal 
of development, and thus places human wellbeing, and not material wealth at the centre 
of the aims of development, in line with the rights based approach embodied in the right 
to development. Sen supports Aristotle’s claim that ‘wealth is evidently not the good we 
are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else’.189 Increasing 
income may form part of the conditions necessary for development and is therefore a 
useful indicator of capacity to develop, but the aim of development, to which the right 
pertains, is achievement of a state in which humans are capable of achieving certain 
‘functionings’ that are essential to human wellbeing.190 Working alongside Sen, the 
UNDP developed the HDI to be ‘an index that captures the three essential components 
of human life … longevity and knowledge refer to the formation of human capabilities, 
and income is a proxy measure for the choices people have in putting their capabilities 
to use.’191 The HDI gives equal weighting to each of the three indicators and uses the 
geometric mean of the three indices to calculate the HDI, which is a figure between 0 
and 1. The nearer the index is to 1, the higher the level of development is considered to 
be within the state. Comparisons can then be made between countries to compare 
varying levels of development. For example, according to the 2013 report, Norway has 
the highest level of development of all the countries assessed, with an HDI of 0.955.192 
This is classed as a ‘very high level of development’, as a figure higher than 0.905.193 
Of the 195 countries that feature, China comes in 101st place according to the rank of 
HDI figures, with 0.699. According to the report, this classes China as having ‘medium 
human development’ which includes countries with an HDI between 0.64 and 0.758.  
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The HDI is a wider measure of development than GDP or GNI since it combines other 
indicators that are not income-based. However, as I shall now discuss, an increased HDI 
is not an appropriate way to think about what the right to development entitles people to 
since it does not capture an essential part of the right to development, which is the fact 
that this is a right of individuals and not of a state. 
Whilst the HDI is based on an idea of human development that is consistent with the 
right to development, the HDI itself is a simplified index, which cannot grasp the 
enormity of the processes involved in development.194 Whilst it should be noted that the 
HDI is only one of a number of indicators developed by the UNDP within their annual 
Human Development Reports, the HDI is none-the-less the most well-known and 
widely used of these indicators and many sources use the HDI alone in discussions of 
development without reference to the more expansive set of indicators present in the 
reports. Sen himself has referred to the HDI as a ‘crude index’, which ‘could not be but 
a very limited indicator of development’.195 Several types of criticism have been raised 
against the HDI.196 Many authors have criticised the limited nature of the index in 
considering only three measures. For example, Dar has stated that whilst the HDI is 
‘unambiguously an improvement over the previous measure based on economic growth 
[…] it is a summary, not a comprehensive measure of human development, and the 
search for a better approach continues.’197 He therefore suggests adding other values to 
the calculation of the index such as measures of democracy and freedom. Ranis et al 
state, ‘It has long been recognized that the HDI is a very incomplete measure of human 
development, leaving out many aspects of life that are of fundamental importance.’198 
They propose 11 other areas, which they argue should be included in any measure of 
human development. They also claim that the indicator of health chosen for the HDI 
would be better represented by under-five mortality rate, thus questioning not only the 
limited number of indicators but also the measures chosen for the HDI. 
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Another type of criticism argues that the HDI is not a good measure of development 
since it gives only an average picture of a state, without considering the differences 
between individuals. Chatterjee (2005), for example, has argued: 
‘A drawback of the [HDI] is that, while it more or less takes account of the general 
level of quality of life in the population, it ignores the extent of inequality in quality of 
life over the members of the population, and a population cannot be regarded as having 
a high degree of human development if the general level of quality of life in it is high 
but there is too much inequality among its members.’199 
Similarly, whilst noting that the HDI is ‘readily comprehensible, attractive, and popular’, 
Seth argues that it ‘ignores an important aspect of the measurement of human 
development’, since it is ‘completely insensitive to inequality across people’.200 
As such, while the HDI is a more expansive measure of development than a purely 
economic statistic, several types of criticism support the claim that it is too limited in 
terms of the capabilities it assesses (life expectancy, GDP per capita and years of 
schooling) and it is also only able to tell us about the level of fulfilment of the state on 
average. Inequality within the state cannot be captured by the HDI and it is therefore 
capable of being skewed by extremes. In this sense it does not tell us very much about 
the level of fulfilment of the right to development of those living within a state since the 
right to development is a right of individuals and cannot be accurately represented by an 
average state-level figure.  
Whilst recent Human Development Reports have responded to some of these critiques 
by introducing measures such as the Inequality-Adjusted HDI, the Gender Equality 
Index and the Multidimensional Poverty Index, these are still not commonly used. The 
HDI remains the flagship measure of human development, and therefore the most 
relevant for our discussions. The HDI itself was ‘never intended to be an overarching 
definitive measure of development’.201 It was designed to provide a new alternative to 
the previously dominant economic measures, thus being simple and easily accessible 
without being ‘as blind to social aspects of human lives as GNP is.’202 The discussion 
on the HDI has shown that as an alternative to the first example of economic 
development, this index might be seen as a step in the right direction towards a more 
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expansive notion of development. However, as a simple composite index that gives a 
measure of the average level of human development within a state based upon the three 
indicators embodied in the HDI, it cannot capture the importance of the right to 
development, which is in enabling individuals to develop a level of wellbeing in which 
they are able to fulfil their human rights.  
Having considered the two key ways in which development is measured in economic 
and political literature, I have concluded that neither of these two measures can give us 
an accurate representation of the fulfilment of the right to development. I will now 
move on to defining the right to development, making reference to its importance for 
individuals. 
3.2.3 The Human Right to Development 
Measures such as GDP or the HDI may be useful for showing a country’s progress on a 
macro scale. However, they cannot tell us about the lives of individuals within the state, 
and it is to individual lives that the right to development is important. For example, an 
increase in a country’s HDI score may be achieved in a context of increasing inequality 
within a state or in the presence of continued human rights violations. As Amnesty 
International’s Secretary General, Salil Shetty states, ‘the poorest, most disadvantaged 
and marginalised groups are being let down. Governmental drives to meet targets often 
ride rough-shod over basic human rights […] Governments need to stop paying lip 
service to human rights and make it central to the sustainable development agenda; 
otherwise targets are being achieved at the expense of deepening inequalities, 
discrimination and injustice. There is a widening gap between rich and poor and 
between men and women and those from minority groups.’203 In state-level analyses of 
development it is entirely possible for human rights violations and inequalities within 
these faceless statistics to go unrecognised, since state level analyses of development, 
such as the Human Development Index, can only show averages of what is happening 
on a state level.  
As stated in Article 1 of the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, ‘The right 
to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person 
and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, 
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cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
can be fully realized’.204 Development involves ‘a process of expanding the real 
freedoms that people enjoy’.205 It is important because of what it brings to individual 
human persons.206 As such, it is ‘the human person [that] is the central subject of the 
development process [and] development policy should therefore make the human being 
the main participant and beneficiary of development’.207 The right to development is not, 
therefore a right of states, but a right of individuals. Fulfilment of the right to 
development cannot be captured by state level analyses and statistics. It is measured in 
the wellbeing of individual lives; their ability to fulfil their needs and rights, and the 
freedom to do so. As Sen states, ‘the basic concern [of freedom] is with our capability 
to lead the kind of lives we have reason to value.’208 
A detailed account of what the right to development entails is given by Arjun Sengupta, 
the ‘Independent Expert on the Right to Development’ for the Human Rights 
Commission. He states:   
‘The right to development refers to a process of development which leads to the 
realization of each human right and of all of them together and which has to be carried 
out in a manner known as rights-based, in accordance with the international human 
rights standards, as a participatory, non-discriminatory, accountable and transparent 
process with equity in decision-making and sharing of the fruits of the process. Equity—
which is essential to any notion of human rights derived from the idea of equality of all 
human beings in rights, dignity and opportunity, and is associated with fairness or the 
principles of a just society—is basic to that process. Secondly, the objectives of 
development should be expressed in terms of claims or entitlements of right-holders, 
which duty-bearers must protect and promote. The identification of the corresponding 
obligation at the national and the international level is essential to a rights-based 
approach. As the Declaration on the Right to Development itself points out, the primary 
responsibility for implementing the right to development belongs to states. The 
beneficiaries are individuals. The international community has the duty to cooperate to 
enable the states to fulfil their obligations.’209  
What we refer to when we discuss the right to development is therefore not a right of a 
state to economic growth, or an increase in an index measuring the state average, but a 
process of human development in which human rights fulfilment plays a key role. This 
development is a process that goes from initially lifting people out of dire poverty to a 
situation in which they have the opportunity to fulfil a broad range of human rights. 
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States are key actors in the process of development, not as rights-holders but as key 
duty bearers of the responsibility to fulfil this right, as embodied in Article 3,which 
reads, ‘States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and 
international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development.’210 I 
will now present a prima facie defence of the claim that the right to development can 
justify increasing greenhouse gas emissions within a state that requires emissions to 
fulfil this right. 
3.2.4 A Prima Facie Defence of China’s Position 
I have so far argued that the right to development is a right of individuals to a process of 
development, in which they have the capability to lead a life in which they are able to 
realise their human rights. The right to development places the duty on states both to 
pursue domestic development policies that will enable their own citizens to fulfil their 
rights to development, and also to cooperate internationally to create a fair international 
system in which individuals in other states also have the opportunity to fulfil their rights 
to development. As article 2(3) of the Declaration on the Right to Development 
indicates, ‘states have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national 
development policies’.211 In line with this, developing countries, such as China, may 
argue that this justifies their prioritisation of national development policies, and that the 
international community must allow this in accordance with its role of secondary duty 
bearer responsible for providing the conditions for development to take place. The 
process of fulfilling the right to development is likely to require increasing emissions 
for China, and other developing countries, since fossil fuels often provide the most 
inexpensive means of generating energy. As Baer explains: 
‘The only proven routes to development – to water and food security, improved health 
care and education, and secure livelihoods – involve expanding access to energy 
services, and, given today’s inadequate, expensive, low-carbon energy systems, and the 
South’s limited ability to afford them, these routes inevitably threaten an increase in 
fossil fuel use and thus carbon emissions.’212 
Restricting emissions growth might therefore jeopardise the processes that are needed to 
enable development. Given the essential rights embodied in the right to development, 
developing states may be justified in claiming that their citizens have a right to 
development and that taking on costly climate measures or capping carbon emissions 
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would jeopardise their efforts to make the realisation of the right to development 
possible.  
In the following section, I shall address two key objections to the prima facie defence of 
China’s position, which has defended the claim that emissions increases can be justified 
if these are needed to fulfil the right to development. Section 3.3 will address the 
objection that development should be sustainable, and thus emissions increases in 
developing states are not justified. Section 3.4 will then address the objection raised by 
the ‘holistic approach’ to human rights, which claims that China might not be a fit actor 
for fulfilling the right to development of its citizens, due to the lack of commitment 
China has shown to defending wider human rights fulfilment domestically. 
3.3 The Sustainable Development Objection 
The first objection to the prima facie defence of China’s position is that development 
must be sustainable. This objection does not deny a right to development, but places a 
constraint on the means that may be used to develop. I will first discuss the meaning of 
the term ‘sustainable development’, and it’s use in international climate documents. I 
will then show that the ‘strong version’ of the sustainable development argument is 
unfounded since it is not sensitive to the fact that not all emissions are fulfilling morally 
important ends. I will make reference to Henry Shue’s two category distinction between 
‘subsistence’ and ‘luxury emissions’, before arguing that we should support a third 
category of ‘development emissions’.213 I will argue that the high level of global luxury 
emissions should be reduced before development emissions. As such, the argument for 
sustainable development is not inconsistent with an increase in development emissions, 
as long as the overall balance of emissions is reduced. I will further argue that the duty 
to develop sustainably should be primarily borne by developed actors and corporations, 
who should work together to provide the means for this to take place. Finally, I will 
consider two possible suggestions for the implementation of the duty to enable 
sustainable development. I will begin with an outline of the objection. 
This objection claims that there is a right to sustainable development, entitling rights-
bearers to develop sustainably. In recent years, the term ‘sustainable development’ has 
seen widespread growth in its use, and importance in international discussions. 
Principle three of the 1992 Rio Declaration states: 
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‘The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.’214 
Twenty years later, at the Rio+20 Conference, the parties ‘reaffirm[ed] the need to 
achieve sustainable development’.215 The outcome document makes specific references 
to the implications for climate change agreements. Article 25 states that parties: 
‘Acknowledge that climate change is a cross-cutting and persistent crisis and express 
our concern that the scale and gravity of the negative impacts of climate change affect 
all countries and undermine the ability of all countries, in particular, developing 
countries, to achieve sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goals 
and threaten the viability and survival of nations. Therefore we underscore that 
combating climate change requires urgent and ambitious action, in accordance with the 
principles and provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.’216 
The addition of the sustainability clause to the idea of development has significant 
implications for what rights-holders can reasonably demand, and how processes of 
development should take place. We might refer to the following definition from the UN 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987, which is the 
first time the term was used in an official context to denote the link between 
environmental and developmental needs: 
‘Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’217 
Global emissions must sharply decline in order to avoid tipping the climate into a state 
of irreversible change, which would have dire consequences for the future of the planet 
and its human and non-human inhabitants. The idea of developing sustainably 
recognises the need to develop in such a way that the fulfilment of current development 
needs does not impinge on the needs of future generations.  
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3.3.1 The ‘Strong Version’ of the Sustainable Development Argument  
I will now present the ‘strong version’ of the argument for sustainable development. 
This claims that in the event that the means for sustainable development are unavailable, 
a limit should be placed on the process of development. For example, the unavailability 
of resources might be due to sustainable technologies being too expensive or beyond the 
technological competences of the state in question. This strong version of the 
sustainability condition claims that it is not justifiable for states to increase their 
emissions in order to meet the development needs of current individuals since emissions 
increases will jeopardise the rights of future individuals. Such development would be 
unsustainable. The implications of the strong version of the sustainability condition 
would likely be widespread non-realisation of the right to development due to the 
limited energy solutions available in most parts of the world. Figures show that 
currently only 19% of the world’s energy production is met using renewable energy 
sources, many of which are much more costly than fossil fuels.218 This limited capacity 
to produce energy in a carbon neutral way on a global scale means that in most cases 
individuals do not have much choice about the source of their energy, and many 
developing states do not have the capacity to provide sustainable options to their 
citizens. Indeed, within developing countries, 60% of people do not even have access to 
any form of ‘modern fuels’, which includes ‘electricity, liquid fuels (such as kerosene), 
and gaseous fuels (such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), natural gas), and excludes 
traditional biomass and coal.’219 From the perspective of the rights-bearers, they may 
have little choice about the type of energy sources they can use. Since access to energy 
resources is highly precarious in many parts of the world, and developing states may not 
be readily able to provide their citizens with the means to develop sustainably, it may be 
argued, therefore, that developing countries have no reasonable choice but to increase 
their carbon emissions if they wish to develop.  
The strong version of the sustainability condition, which implies that current individuals 
should be obliged to stay in poverty if their only way of developing involves increasing 
carbon emissions, is clearly morally dubious. While the risks of serious impacts that 
would jeopardise the human rights of future people provide strong support for the 
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sustainability condition, it seems unfair to current individuals living in poverty to argue 
that any increase in emissions in order to fulfil their right to development is unjustified. 
However, a more modest version of the sustainability condition may be more plausible. 
The strong version considers the emissions that an individual is using for development 
in isolation, yet it is at the global level that emissions must decrease. As such, an overall 
decrease in global emissions may not be inconsistent with an increase in some parts of 
the world as long as this is counterbalanced by a greater decrease in other parts. In what 
follows, I will defend a modest version of the sustainable development argument, which 
locates the responsibility for reducing global emissions with affluent actors, including 
developed states, corporations and rich individuals everywhere, rather than placing this 
responsibility on those that are using emissions as a means to fulfil their right to 
development. I will base my argument upon the assertion that some types of emissions 
are more morally important than others, and that those of least moral importance should 
be reduced before we require a limit on emissions serving development needs. 
3.3.2 Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions 
In literature on climate justice, emissions are generally considered to fall into two 
distinct classes. Henry Shue’s widely referenced paper ‘Subsistence emissions and 
luxury emissions’ first developed the idea of these two distinct categories of emissions. 
First, there are ‘subsistence emissions’. These emissions are produced to meet essential 
ends without which human beings cannot live. For Shue, subsistence emissions include 
those which are needed to fulfil a person’s ‘basic rights’, including such interests as 
‘adequate food, adequate clothing [and] adequate shelter.’220 Subsistence emissions are 
necessary both in the nature of the essential ends they fulfil but also due to the fact that 
they are the only option for energy generation where there are no affordable or safe 
alternatives which do not produce greenhouse gas emissions. Subsistence emissions are 
therefore positively correlated with poverty. Luxury emissions, on the other hand are 
emissions that are fulfilling needs that are superfluous to important human interest, and 
are associated with high levels of income. 
Latest figures from the World Bank show that 310 million people in China (or 23.2% of 
China’s population) are living below the international poverty line of $2 per day.221 
There is some debate about the level of income which should denote an international 
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‘poverty line’, with the World Bank classing ‘extreme poverty’ as being below what 
some have argued to be an ‘outrageously low’ figure of $1.25 per day.222 Pogge has 
argued that $2.50 per day would be ‘a more adequate poverty line’, which would 
increase the poverty headcount to 427 million Chinese individuals, or 32% of the 
population.223 These figures show that the number of people living in poverty in China 
is more than the whole population of the United States (318 million), with 
approximately 110 million more added to that if we use the $2.50 poverty line.224 The 
large number of individuals living in poverty in China means that a large proportion of 
China’s emissions are going towards the fulfilment of the subsistence needs of these 
people. So, many of China’s emissions are fulfilling morally important needs to 
subsistence. As we saw earlier, the process of development is likely to require 
increasing emissions. The hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens that are on the low 
end of the development scale are likely to need to cause an increase in emissions as they 
move along the process of development. Globally, engaging with activities that produce 
emissions is fulfilling different needs for different actors. The emissions of those that 
are engaging with emission-processes in order to fulfil their human rights needs are of 
much greater moral importance than emissions being produced by others elsewhere 
which are not meeting essential ends. As the key duty bearer for the right to 
development of Chinese citizens, the Chinese state may therefore be justified in refusing 
to cap emissions, since a large number of individuals in China are using emissions to 
fulfil their vital human needs. As Shue argues: 
‘The CO2 emissions of most countries that contain large percentages of the human 
population will be rising for some time. I believe that the emissions from these poor, 
economically less-developed countries also ought to rise insofar as this rise is 
necessary to provide a minimally decent standard of living for their now impoverished 
people … Those living in desperate poverty ought not to be required to restrain their 
emissions, thereby remaining in poverty, in order that those living in luxury should not 
have to restrain their emissions.’225 
Shue’s differentiation between two classes of emissions highlights the unfairness in the 
claim that emissions due to development must be ‘restrained’ whilst there are non-
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essential ‘luxury’ emissions taking place in the world. The idea that there are two 
classes of emissions, ‘subsistence’ and ‘luxury’, is widely cited within the literature on 
climate justice and seems intuitively plausible. It enables us to differentiate between that 
which is essential, and that which is not, in order to give priority to the former when 
atmospheric space for emissions is limited. As Shue argues, ‘justice requires that one 
not begin by slowing the economic development of the countries in which considerable 
numbers of people are already close to the edge of starvation so that the affluent can 
retain more of their affluence than they could if the poor countries contributed less’. He 
concludes, ‘poor nations, therefore, ought not to be required to make sacrifices in their 
sustainable development.’ In this way, developing countries may be justified in 
claiming that their emissions should be allowed to increase in the short term, if these 
emissions are fulfilling subsistence rights, whilst affluent states and individuals 
continue to emit high levels of luxury emissions. We can dismiss the strong version of 
the sustainability condition, which states that no emissions increases are acceptable, 
since increasing subsistence emissions can be counter-balanced by decreasing luxury 
emissions. As Shue states, ‘the central point about equity is that it is not equitable to ask 
some people to surrender necessities so that other people can retain luxuries.’226 
3.3.3 A Third Category of ‘Development Emissions’ 
However, as we have seen, the process of development is complex, and goes far beyond 
meeting the basic subsistence needs of individuals. Not all emissions used for 
development can be considered to be subsistence emissions, but they can hardly be 
considered to be luxury emissions either. The two-category division, whereby emissions 
are either subsistence or luxury, may lead to the conclusion that all emissions which are 
not fulfilling subsistence needs must therefore be luxury emissions. On this account, 
emissions that are for human development ends above the level of subsistence are 
placed in the same category as emissions that are fulfilling luxury ends. However, it is 
quite clear that the process of fulfilling the human right to development should not be 
considered a ‘luxury’, unless ‘luxury’ means only that which is not essential for survival. 
If this is the way we interpret the term, we may need a way of distinguishing between 
different types of ‘luxury’ that are more or less morally important. However, what may 
be considered to be an extravagance or luxury in one society may be the norm in 
another society. As Kemp states: 
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‘The perception of what is necessity and what is luxury does vary from society to society 
despite the apparently constant nature of basic human needs. Moreover, although the 
status of goods as luxuries is partly determined by social perception, it is possible for 
different people to disagree as to whether particular commodities are luxuries or 
necessities.’227 
Since the idea of luxury may be context dependent, I suggest defining a third class of 
emissions rather than attempting to compare the relative ‘luxury’ of all emissions above 
the subsistence level. The fulfilment of the right to development is likely to involve 
increased energy use. Emissions produced in the pursuit of realising this right are of a 
much higher moral importance than emissions produced for luxury ends. It seems 
intuitively plausible, therefore, to distinguish between these types of emissions. Let us 
call this third class of emissions ‘development emissions’. Whilst the idea of 
‘development emissions’ is novel in the existing literature, we might infer a similar idea 
from Traxler’s statement that ‘emissions become progressively more excusable as we 
move from inexcusable luxury emissions to fully excused subsistence emissions.’228 
Whilst subsistence emissions are morally justified, development emissions represent a 
third category in the scale, which become gradually less excusable as an actor moves 
along the path to development. The right to development provides a morally important 
reason for engaging with emissions-processes, where the ends being fulfilled by the 
emissions are meeting human rights. It is on the basis of the need for subsistence or 
development emissions that a state may appeal to the international community to allow 
it space to increase emissions. As Vanderheiden states: 
‘While the right to develop cannot trump the right to survival emissions (nor can it 
trump the equally basic right to an adequate environment), the former must be 
recognized as making a more compelling claim to limited atmospheric space than do 
those de facto claims now being made upon that space by the relatively affluent 
residents of industrialized nations, who selfishly seek to protect and enlarge their 
undeserved advantages by denying to the less advantaged a prerogative (i.e. sufficient 
emissions for development) upon which their present prosperity is largely based.’229 
Along with Traxler’s statement, Vanderheiden’s claim also lends support to the idea of 
developing a third class of emissions which fall below subsistence emissions in terms of 
their moral importance but are clearly more important than ‘excessive luxury 
emissions’.230 
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In the context of our discussion, we need to consider where these ‘development 
emissions’ fit in to our account of sustainable development. Whilst subsistence 
emissions are entirely excusable, and those who produce them should be exempt from 
liability for the costs of climate change mitigation, what should we say about 
development emissions beyond subsistence? The right to a hospitable environment is a 
basic human right that the sustainable development argument aims to protect by limiting 
emissions and preventing lock-in of unsustainable ways of generating energy. Whilst 
the right to development is an issue of human rights, human development above the 
subsistence threshold cannot outweigh the right of future people to a hospitable 
environment, without which their very survival is untenable. Development emissions 
cannot provide a moral justification for increasing emissions where this will jeopardise 
the basic rights of future people. So, the sustainability condition on the right to 
development does not limit subsistence emissions, but does limit development 
emissions where those emissions might lead to the subsistence rights of future 
generations being compromised. 
However, the three classes of emissions enable us to differentiate between emissions 
based upon their moral relevance, and weigh up the moral importance of the ends being 
met by these emissions with the right of future people to a safe and healthy environment. 
Subsistence and development emissions are both meeting human rights needs. Whilst an 
increase in global emissions jeopardises the human rights of future people, the global 
picture of emissions involves a third type of emission which is not fulfilling any need of 
comparable moral importance. The empirical reality of climate change means that we 
do not need to make a choice between the fulfilment of human rights of current and 
future people. Whilst development emissions might be limited for the sake of subsistent 
emissions, they should not be limited for the sake of luxury emissions. Given this, the 
question arises as to why those using emissions for development needs should bear 
responsibility for sustainability when the developed world and affluent individuals 
everywhere are using many times more emissions for comparatively luxurious ends. 
The primary responsibility for reducing global emissions must fall on those who are 
responsible for high levels of luxury emissions, including developed states, corporations 
and affluent individuals everywhere.  
3.3.4 Preventing Lock-in in Developing Countries 
So far, I have argued that more affluent states, whose populations have higher levels of 
development and are producing luxury emissions, should be held responsible for 
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enabling less affluent states to fulfil their duty to their citizens to secure their citizens’ 
right to development. I have suggested that this implies that less affluent states can 
continue to increase both their subsistence and their development emissions while more 
affluent states should reduce their luxury emissions. But there is one further 
consideration. If we allow development to take place using unsustainable means, we are 
likely to find that the same means used for development will continue to be used once 
human development is achieved. In other words, it is likely to lead to lock-in of ‘dirty’ 
technologies. It is therefore important that the international community of states and 
corporations work together to prevent such ‘lock-in’ of unsustainable energy systems, 
since whilst development is taking place and most emissions are subsistence and 
development, developing states are unlikely to have the resources or technological 
know-how to implement sustainable technologies on a large scale. The costs of setting 
up large-scale energy production systems will mean that these systems are likely to 
continue being used even once human development reaches a satisfactory level within 
the state. This is known as ‘lock-in’, and is indeed one of the further arguments for 
sustainable development, which is to avoid developing countries being locked-in to 
carbon-intensive energy production systems.231 If a country develops its energy system 
by building coal-plants, for example, it is likely that it will continue to use this form of 
energy generation for several decades since it takes 30-40 years for the returns from the 
investment in the original plant to be recovered.232 The fact that advanced energy 
systems may not yet be in place in many developing countries means that this is an 
opportunity to prevent future emissions before they occur by making the initial energy 
systems sustainable. Research from leading global management consulting firm 
McKinsey& Company states, ‘any new investment in “clean” alternatives (nuclear and 
renewable energy) needs to arrive before any major expansion of coal-based power 
generation. Pre-empting the lock-in effect is critical for China given its stage of 
economic development and the scale of its population.’233 Within economic circles this 
is often referred to as ‘green growth’, which ‘offers a development pathway that 
                                                
231 W. Brian Arthur, ‘Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events’, 
The Economic Journal, 99 (1989): 116-131. 
232 McKinsey and Company, ‘China’s Green Revolution’, (February 2009) [Online] 
(http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/sustainability/cost%20curve%20pdf
s/china_green_revolution.ashx). [Accessed 24 June 2014]: 49. 
233 McKinsey and Company, ‘China’s Green Revolution’, 49. 
 83 
reconciles the urgent need for sustained growth with the imperative of avoiding lock-in 
to unsustainable growth patterns and irreversible environmental damage.’234 
The current ‘developed countries’ developed in largely unsustainable ways, producing a 
large proportion of carbon emissions, which we now refer to as historic emissions. I will 
discuss this further in Chapter Five. The aim of sustainable development is to avoid the 
currently developing countries being ‘locked-in’ to the same carbon-intensive system of 
fossil fuel based energy production. However, since developing countries may lack the 
resources to prevent this ‘lock-in’, and since developed states have high levels of 
technological know-how as well as high levels of luxury emissions, as members of the 
international community with the responsibility to enable the right to development, the 
initial responsibility for the costs of preventing lock-in and enabling sustainable 
development lies with the developed states. As Baer et al argue, the ‘industrialised 
states’ must fulfil their ‘dual obligation to not only make major domestic cuts but also 
to make equally ambitious commitments to support international mitigation and 
adaptation.’235 As development takes place, the governments of developing countries 
have more and more responsibility to ensure that their development is sustainable. For 
example, this might involve putting into place laws, which regulate energy standards of 
new buildings, or making sure that the resources provided by developed countries are 
equitably shared amongst their populations in order to make it possible for development 
to take place sustainably. China is taking this type of measure already, for example, the 
Chinese state has introduced a new policy to exempt buyers of electric cars from paying 
the standard 10% tax on their vehicles, as well as providing subsidies for the cost of the 
cars themselves.236 Developed states have the responsibility to bear the initial costs of 
sustainable development in order to enable developing states to then develop policies to 
fulfil the right to development of their citizens in a truly sustainable way. 
3.3.5 Enabling Access to Sustainable Development 
The previous discussion has argued that states and affluent actors should bear 
responsibility for sustainability. The way in which this should be implemented in 
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practice is a further question. The issue of providing ‘equitable access to sustainable 
development’ has made progress politically, being mandated by decision 1/CP.16 of the 
COP16 meeting in Cancun in 2010.237 Existing work suggests there are different ways 
in which this distribution of costs for sustainable development might be implemented 
practically, though to date the practical solutions have not been entirely effective. For 
example, one of the ‘two objectives’ of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
which forms part of the Kyoto Protocol, is to enable sustainable development funded by 
developed countries to take place in developing countries.238 In order to make this 
appealing to the funding countries, they are allowed to deduct the reductions in 
emissions (compared to a hypothetical level which would have otherwise occurred) 
from their own national emission totals. In this way, the Clean Development 
Mechanism aims to ‘stimulate sustainable development and emission reductions, while 
giving industrialized countries some flexibility in how they meet their emission 
reduction or limitation targets.’239 The effectiveness of the CDM in fulfilling this goal 
of sustainable development has, however, been questioned by several commentators. 
Sutter and Parreno argue that ‘the absence of international sustainable development 
standards alongside a highly competitive supply side of the CDM is likely to cause a 
trade-off in favour of the cost-efficient emission reduction objective.’240 Olsen comes to 
a similar conclusion, arguing that the CDM ‘does not work’ in its current form since its 
market-based nature means that there are ‘trade-offs between the two goals of the 
mechanism in favour of producing low-cost emission reductions at the expense of 
achieving sustainable development benefits’.241 Bumpus and Cole ‘concur with other 
authors that the CDM as it stands does not ‘deliver’ sustainable development’.242 
So, ‘as it stands’, the CDM does not contribute to the right to development. It is more 
useful as a tool to enable emissions reductions to take place globally in the most cost 
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effective manner. A similar measure which placed less emphasis on allowing developed 
countries to choose the lowest cost options for achieving certified emissions reductions, 
and instead placed sustainable development at its core might be effective. An alternative 
approach could follow Baer et al’s Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) Framework, 
which is based directly upon the right to development of individuals everywhere, and is 
therefore justice-based rather than purely economic with a sustainable development 
add-on. They state: 
‘The core of the GDRs framework is the right to sustainable development, from which 
we derive an effort-sharing system that combines a measure of responsibility (historic 
contributions to greenhouse gas pollution, excluding emissions associated with meeting 
basic necessities) with a measure of capacity (broadly, the ability to pay for mitigation 
and adaptation, without sacrificing necessities).’243 
As such, Baer et al propose a framework that requires developed countries with the 
greatest financial and technological capacity, as well as greater historic emissions, to 
undertake or pay for a share of the mitigation measures in developing countries in order 
to promote global emissions reductions as well as sustainable development. This might 
involve creating a global fund to support sustainable development. 
In response to the objection that development must be sustainable, I have argued that 
subsistence and development emissions are morally excusable in a global system that 
includes so many luxury emissions. I have defended the claim that actors become 
gradually more responsible for the sustainability of their energy systems as they move 
along the development path, while the initial responsibility for the costs of enabling 
sustainable development lies with the developed states. Duties lie with affluent actors in 
all states, including China, who can reduce their own emissions to make atmospheric 
space for development emissions, and corporations who must play their role in enabling 
the transfer of technology. Whilst subsistence and development emissions are excusable, 
development is a process in which human needs are fulfilled, and is not an excuse for 
economic growth for the sake of growth. As people begin to have their needs fulfilled, 
they also gradually become part of the group of actors that we expect to bear climate 
duties. The term ‘sustainable development’ thus also embodies the idea that whilst 
essential needs at the beginning of the path to development may justifiably be achieved 
using whatever means possible, as individuals and groups become more developed, 
their responsibility for the emissions they are producing also increases.  
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It does not seem to make sense to talk of a certain point or a threshold at which liability 
for development emissions suddenly become the responsibility of those who are 
developing. This may differ in different cases depending on ease of access to alternative 
methods of energy production and also the specific levels of human development and 
rights that are being fulfilled. It seems reasonable, therefore, to claim that development 
must be sustainable in the sense that rights bearers should gradually take on 
responsibility for their actions. Emissions are morally justifiable when they are used for 
subsistence, excusable at the lower ends of development, becoming gradually less 
excusable as their development needs are fulfilled until they become fully responsible 
for controlling their ‘luxury’ emissions.  
The sustainable development objection has led us to the conclusion that the right to 
development should be achieved sustainably, but that liability for this is initially with 
the duty bearers and not with the rights holders. As development takes place, the rights 
holders gradually accrue greater responsibility for their actions as they become more 
developed and have greater capacity to adopt cleaner technologies and therefore less 
justification in using ‘whatever means necessary’ for their own development needs. The 
implications for developing countries’ claims that their right to development entails 
reduced climate responsibilities will depend on the situation of peoples within each 
country.  
As we saw earlier, the situation within China involves almost 400 million people living 
in poverty, and who are therefore likely to be using subsistence and development 
emissions. To the extent that China is unable to fulfil the needs of its citizens at the 
lowest end of the development scale without emissions increases, the sustainable 
development argument obliges states and corporations with the capacity to provide 
clean technologies to do so. But China might also be required to be ensuring that 
emissions increases are contributing towards human rights fulfilment. As I will discuss 
in the following section, China might be required to repurpose some of its emissions 
towards sectors that contribute to human rights. State-level emission increases can only 
be justified if they are required to fulfil subsistence and development needs. This means 
that developing states that are permitted to increase their emissions should ensure that 
increases are fulfilling these needs, and are not the result of luxury emissions of rich 
actors within their borders. This is a key point. As our multi-actor account showed, 
individuals and corporations are also responsible for climate duties, and we must not let 
state level negotiations allow those within the state who have the capacity to contribute 
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to climate change mitigation to ‘hide behind their states’ poverty’.244 So whilst China’s 
poor may warrant reduced national climate duties, this must be in line with China’s 
most affluent fulfilling their separate duties as capable climate actors whose emissions 
are not needed for subsistence or development. 
3.4 A Holistic Approach to Human Rights 
Let us now move on to the second major objection to the claim that the right to 
development entitles developing countries to reduced climate responsibilities. The 
objection is that if a state is not a ‘fit agent’ to fulfil the role of primary duty bearer for 
the right to development of its people, for example, because it fails to respect or protect 
their human rights, then it cannot claim that their right to development justifies 
increasing emissions. So, if China is not fit to fulfil the role of primary duty bearer for 
the right to development of Chinese citizens, then, in line with our multi-actor approach, 
this objection claims that other actors in the international sphere should seek to work 
directly with the rights bearers to promote their right to development. In this section, I 
will argue that China is not fit to fulfil that role, based upon the claim that China has not 
demonstrated a domestic commitment to enabling human rights fulfilment. However, I 
will concede that it is likely to be extremely difficult for other actors to work around the 
Chinese state. Therefore, the right to development of Chinese citizens might justify a 
reduction in the climate responsibilities of the Chinese state because imposing 
demanding climate responsibilities on the Chinese state (if it were possible to do so) 
would be likely to lead to the further impoverishment of those in the most need of help 
to achieve development. So, this section will consider the implications of the holistic 
approach to China’s position. 
As Caney explains, ‘the acceptance of some specific rights entails the acceptance of 
some other specific rights’, since, ‘the rationale grounding one right also grounds 
another distinct right’.245 This is known as ‘rights holism’.246 The right to development 
entails the fulfilment of several different human rights that are essential to the process 
of development. Claiming the importance of the right to development thus entails the 
acceptance of the importance of certain other rights. Article 6.2 of the 1986 Declaration 
states: 
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‘All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal 
attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion 
and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.’247 
It would be inconsistent for an actor to pledge a commitment to the right to 
development whilst simultaneously denying one or several of the human rights that 
form a key part of the process of development. As states are the key duty bearers for the 
right to development of their citizens, a requirement for being a fit actor to fulfil this 
right is respecting other human rights. The Vienna Declaration also refers to the 
‘interdependent and mutually reinforcing’ nature of the issues necessary for the right to 
development, further affirming the need for a holist approach to the fulfilment of the 
right to development.248 The implication of this for our purposes is that a claim to a 
right to development as a reason for continuing growth of emissions, despite the need to 
mitigate climate change, places responsibility upon the state in question to ensure that it 
has adopted a holistic approach to rights fulfilment within its borders. A state claiming 
the right to development of its people as a reason for increasing emissions is increasing 
the burden on other states to reduce their own emissions. If the claim to the right to 
development is legitimate, then this may well be justified since declarations on the right 
to development have committed the international community to create an environment 
in which the right to development can be fulfilled. 
I have argued that the right to development entitles rights bearers to sustainably develop 
in order to reach a decent standard of well being and that this right entails a process of 
development in a broader context of respect for human rights in general. Viewed in this 
way, China’s claim to its right to development seems to be weakened by its stance on 
human rights. Despite having a key role in the drafting of the UN Declaration on 
Human Rights, with the Vice Chairman of the drafting committee representing China, 
and voting in support of the adoption of the Declaration in the UN General Assembly of 
1948 when the Declaration was formally adopted, China has been widely criticised by 
human rights organisations, civil movement groups and other states, for its record on 
human rights.249 In this section I will first argue that China has not demonstrated a 
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commitment to civil and political rights. I will consider the claim that developing states 
should prioritise socio-economic rights, which I do not find persuasive. However, even 
if we accept this claim, I will argue that China’s position with regards to the fulfilment 
of socio-economic rights does not demonstrate a commitment to these rights either. As 
such, I will claim that according to the holistic approach China does not currently fulfil 
the criteria of a fit actor to bear the responsibility for the fulfilment of the right to 
development of its citizens. However, I will conclude that in order to protect the right to 
development of Chinese individuals, our best response would be to engage with China’s 
position, whilst requiring improvement on commitment to human rights. 
3.4.1 Civil and Political Rights 
I shall first consider the situation in China with regards to civil and political rights. The 
rights I will discuss here are included in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which is referenced in the preamble of the Declaration on the Right to 
Development. Article 9 of the covenant states that ‘No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention.’250 However, this is a key area of human rights for which 
China is often criticised. Reports from independent human rights agencies claim that 
arbitrary detentions are not unusual in China. A sample of organisations that have 
produced reports which give examples of this include Amnesty International and the 
World Organisation Against Torture.251 A related civil and political right is found in 
article 14 of the covenant, which states: 
‘All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.’252 
Human Rights Watch have produced a 142-page document detailing the ‘control, 
intimidation and harassment of lawyers in China’, in which it claims that ‘lawyers often 
face violence, intimidation, threats, surveillance, harassment, arbitrary detention, 
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prosecution, and suspension or disbarment from practicing law for pursuing their 
profession’, and that ‘this is particularly true in politically sensitive cases.’253 
Furthermore, the report claims that lawyers working to protect civil rights are 
‘disproportionately affected’.254 
Consider next freedom of expression, which includes the ‘freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds’.255 In China the media is highly controlled, 
including television, news outlets and the internet. Many internet pages including 
international news sites, such as the New York Times, and social networking sites, such 
as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook, are inaccessible from within China.256 Information 
that Chinese citizens have access to is therefore severely controlled by government 
censorship.  
These few examples raise fundamental questions about China’s commitment to civil 
and political human rights. We have seen that within China, citizens are not able to 
exercise the full range of capabilities that their civil and political rights should afford 
them. Given the holistic nature of the approach required to fulfil the right to 
development, it may be that China cannot be regarded as a fit agent to fulfil this role.  
3.4.2 Socio-economic vs. Political Rights  
However, China might respond that as a developing state it must prioritise economic 
and social rights above political and civil rights. So whilst civil and political rights 
might currently be unsatisfactorily fulfilled, this is due to the pressing nature of socio-
economic rights, which must be given priority. China made this claim in its 1991 
Government White Paper entitled ‘Human Rights in China’ in which it states: 
‘China must give priority to political stability and economic rights over political rights 
– ‘right[s] to subsistence’ must take priority over political and civil rights in a large, 
poor nation such as China.’257 
We can see further evidence of this stance in the fact that China has signed and ratified 
the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, yet whilst it is a 
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signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it has not ratified 
this treaty.258  China argues that its ‘national conditions’ mean that it must prioritise 
certain rights over others. Consider the following statement from China regarding its 
reasons for its rights prioritisation: 
‘It is a simple truth that, for any country or nation, the right to subsistence is the most 
important of all human rights, without which the other rights are out of the question. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and the security of person. In old China, aggression by imperialism and 
oppression by feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism deprived the people of all 
guarantee for their lives, and an uncountable number of them perished in war and 
famine. To solve their human rights problems, the first thing for the Chinese people to 
do is, for historical reasons, to secure the right to subsistence.’259 
It would be reasonable to suppose, therefore that China might respond to the holistic 
argument by claiming that as a developing country it must prioritise economic and 
social rights. This requires being able to defend itself and its sovereignty in order to 
create a stable environment in which Chinese citizens can then work to fulfil their civil 
and political rights. Without the creation of a stable domestic environment, human 
rights cannot be fulfilled.  
I will argue that this response is unsatisfactory for two reasons. The first questions the 
legitimacy of the argument itself and the second aims to show that there are also many 
social and economic rights that Chinese citizens are currently unable to realise due to 
government policies, thereby undermining China’s commitment to the rights it claims to 
be prioritising. 
3.4.3 Prioritising ‘Asian Values’ 
Let us first consider the claim that socio-economic rights should be prioritised over 
political and civil rights in a developing country. There is much debate on this subject. 
Much of this debate focuses on the different cultural norms between Western societal 
ideologies and ‘Asian values’ or ‘Third World views’, which are often seen to be 
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conflicting on this issue.260 Space prevents a full discussion of the conflicting arguments, 
but the argument put forward by China that socio-economic rights must come before 
political and civil rights seems unpersuasive. As Donnelly argues:  
‘[This argument] fails to consider the contribution of civil and political rights to the 
realization of economic and social rights. The right to vote may have a major impact on 
the amelioration of living conditions in countries run by inept, corrupt, or vicious 
government.’261  
Furthermore, where limited resources require making priorities and therefore choices, 
there is a difference between prioritising certain rights over others by allocating more 
resources to their fulfilment yet still respecting those which are deemed less urgent, and 
prioritising certain rights whilst actively restricting the ‘secondary’ civil and political 
rights. For example, it might be claimed that developing countries may not have the 
resources available to put into place expensive institutional bodies. One example of this 
could be a judiciary system of law courts, which would be necessary for the fulfilment 
of political and civil rights. The argument would claim that these rights can be fulfilled 
only once economic rights have been fulfilled. We might call this the ‘affordability of 
rights’.262 As Li explains: 
‘There are expensive rights (as well as cheap ones) … For example, poor societies may 
not have the necessary resources to build legal institutions that safeguard everyone's 
right (as specified in the ICCPR) "to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law"’.263  
Whilst this might indeed be an expense that some developing countries could not afford, 
as we have seen, the problem in China relating to fair trials does not relate to the lack of 
infrastructure, but instead relates to the fact that these are controlled by the government, 
meaning that the independence needed for a fair trial is not possible. This is not a 
question of resources, but rather a question of political will. 
Given the points considered above, it is difficult to see why an appeal to the ‘right to 
development’ should allow China reduced responsibilities in a climate burden sharing 
agreement. It does not seem consistent to claim a commitment to the right to 
development, a key part of which is to ensure access to human rights, whilst the state is 
currently restricting the ability of its citizens to fulfil these rights. Furthermore, the state 
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violation of other human rights puts into question the commitment of that state to the 
right that it claims entitles it to reduced climate duties. A cynical observer may call this 
hypocritical or even accuse China of using the ‘right to development’, which invokes 
the powerful resonance of the language of rights, as an excuse to continue its growth 
unhindered by climate responsibilities. The right to development specifically refers to 
‘an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are 
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully 
realized.’ 264 It also states that, ‘the promotion of, respect for and enjoyment of certain 
human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.’265 It is difficult to provide a moral defence of the claim for 
special treatment due to the ‘overriding priority’ of fulfilling one right, whilst at the 
same time preventing another right that forms an integral part of the right being claimed.  
3.4.4 Socio-economic Rights within China 
The first response has questioned the moral justification of prioritising socio-economic 
rights over civil and political rights, from a strict holistic approach, which requires equal 
respect for political, civil and socio-economic rights. However, the second response will 
show that we do not have to appeal to the strict holistic argument of the mutual 
indivisibility of all rights in order to see that there is an inconsistency in China’s 
position based on the rights which China claims are important for its development. In 
order to be considered a fit-actor in a holistic approach to human rights, the actor in 
question must, at the very least, show genuine commitment to the set of rights that it 
claims to be prioritising. Therefore, China’s stated prioritisation of socio-economic 
rights must be consistent with domestic policies that affect these rights.  
However, if we look at the effects of the Chinese state’s policies on the fulfilment of the 
socio-economic rights of Chinese citizens, we are likely to have some concerns. For 
example, consider Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR): 
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the right of everyone to 
form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the 
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organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social 
interests.’266 
Within China, this right is not fulfilled, as there is only one legally recognised trade 
union. This is the ‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions’ (ACFTU), which is a 
government-controlled organisation. Chan argues that the ACFTU ‘is an arm of the 
party–state’, which, ‘rejects criticisms of Chinese human and labour rights 
violations’.267 Yu makes similar criticisms, stating ‘the ACFTU tends to prioritize the 
state’s goals over its function in representing workers’ right and interests’, since it 
‘lack[s] autonomy in relations with Chinese party-state and employers’.268 The right to 
strike is another labour right that is not recognised in China, having been removed from 
the Chinese constitution in 1982.269 A further right, which features in Article 13 of the 
ICESCR, is the right to education. The widely varying levels of fulfilment of this right 
are linked to the broader problem of growing inequality within China despite high 
levels of economic growth.270 Rapid urbanisation and movement of migrant workers has 
created a situation in which many children living in urban areas are not eligible for their 
local schools due to the two tier ‘household registration’ system known as ‘hukou’ in 
which urban and rural individuals are granted different rights to access state social 
provisions.271 This ‘hierarchical system’ has resulted in ‘large populations of rural 
migrant children living in Chinese cities without urban hukou [being] effectively shut 
out of the public school system with few other viable options.’272 As well as being 
denied access to education, these ‘rural-urban migrants’ are also ‘treated as second-class 
citizens in the cities’, and face a ‘considerable wage disadvantage in comparison with 
nonretrenched [sic] urban workers.’273 Such inequality alongside the non-realisation of 
socio-economic rights is surely inconsistent with any approach to human rights, which, 
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by the very nature of being concerned with human rights must treat humans as being 
worthy of equal respect and dignity. 
Given the examples above, it is not clear that China is effectively prioritising socio-
economic rights above civil and political rights, since there are several examples in 
which important socio-economic rights are not being fulfilled. So, even if we put aside 
the non-realisation of political and civil human rights and accept China’s claim that 
certain rights must be prioritised above others in the path to development, the examples 
above give us strong reason to question the Chinese state’s true commitment to rights in 
general since even the rights which are supposedly supported are not being fulfilled in 
practice. There is much progress that needs to be made before China could realistically 
be considered a fit actor for the right to development even in a highly diluted version of 
the holistic approach, which would overlook failures in political and civil rights 
fulfilment. 
3.4.5 The Gatekeeping Role of the State 
The current domestic policies within China make it difficult to justify the claim that its 
climate responsibilities should be reduced because of its citizens’ rights to development. 
However, whilst we might have reason to reject the Chinese state’s use of this argument 
in climate negotiations, we should not forget that Chinese citizens still have the 
individual human right to development.  
In such a situation, there appear to be two options for the international community. The 
first option would involve denying the state any emissions increases since it is not a fit 
actor to bear the duty to fulfil the right to development of its citizens. However, this is 
likely to have a detrimental effect on the realisation of the right to development because 
it is likely that emissions increases would be required to fulfil the subsistence and 
development needs of its citizens. In the current global system of states, individuals are 
highly reliant on their governments to provide the means for their development. 
Imposing strict limits on China’s state level emissions might have a very detrimental 
effect on the human rights of Chinese citizens.  
Therefore, the international community might adopt a second option when it is dealing 
with the government of a developing state that does not fulfil the criteria to be a fit 
agent to bear the duty to secure the right to development for its own citizens. In order to 
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international community should agree to emissions increases from the state in question. 
However, it might make such an agreement subject to ‘human rights conditionality’, in 
which agreement is conditional upon certain human rights requirements.274 Within this 
conditionality, the international community would require measurable progress on 
human rights against a specified timescale, with sanctions in the case that progress is 
not achieved. Such measures may be doubly effective, both on climate change 
mitigation and human rights, by, for example, repurposing emissions from heavily 
polluting industries that do not promote human rights fulfilment towards emissions 
processes for human development. Similarly, we might see resources diverted from the 
police and military sectors, which are extremely carbon-intensive, and yet which are 
also implicated in the restriction of individuals’ rights to freedom and liberty. As 
Berners-Lee and Clark explain, ‘modern armed forces are rapacious consumers of 
energy and kick out vast quantities of carbon – emissions that may contribute towards 
human harm well beyond the battlefield.’275 If there are measures that can be taken 
within the state to repurpose existing emissions towards human rights fulfilment, then 
the state has the responsibility to do so, and the international community should 
encourage such behaviour.  
It might be argued, from states such as China, that such ‘human rights conditionality’ 
would challenge their sovereignty. For example, in a 2011 white paper relating to 
foreign aid, China states that foreign aid should ‘impos[e] no political conditions 
[…and] respect recipient countries' right to independently select their own path and 
model of development … believ[ing] that every country should explore a development 
path suitable to its actual conditions.’276 They might, therefore be reluctant to agree to 
the terms of the conditionality. However, as human rights organisations have argued, 
the argument of sovereignty is not justified, and amounts to an ‘attempt’ to ‘avoid 
acknowledging their obligations to account for their failures in the promotion and 
protection of human rights.’277 Where the state is unwilling to comply with such 
measures, the international community would be morally justified in imposing on the 
sovereignty of a government that is not fulfilling its duty to secure the right to 
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development of its citizens. This might even involve taking side-measures to aid the 
individuals themselves to realise their human rights. For example, this might involve 
campaigns of micro financing directly to individuals or macro-credit lending to 
communities.278 In reality, a mix of bargaining with the state to encourage progressive 
realisation of human rights and direct action on human development, where possible, is 
likely to be the best solution.  
Section 3.4 has discussed the objection raised by the holistic approach to human rights, 
which claimed that a state was not a fit duty bearer to fully secure the right to 
development of its citizens if it was not also enabling the fulfilment of further, 
connected human rights. Through engagement with China’s domestic situation 
regarding civil, political, social and economic rights, I have argued that China is not 
currently fulfilling the role as it is required to do. I rejected the ‘Asian values’ argument, 
which claimed that developing states should prioritise socio-economic rights. I then 
argued that even if we accepted such a minimal conception of the requirements of the 
holistic approach, China would not be considered a fit duty bearer as many socio-
economic rights are currently not secured in China. Finally, I suggested that despite the 
concerns of the holistic approach, the importance of the gatekeeping role played by the 
state means that the best response might be to engage with China’s demands, whilst 
making agreement conditional upon human rights improvements.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a response to the question: ‘Does the right to development 
justify increasing emissions?’ I have argued that the right to development can justify 
emissions increases where these are needed for morally important development needs. 
As such, I have defended the importance of the right to development in theory of global 
climate justice, arguing that it is important to differentiate between emissions that are 
being used for subsistence, development and luxury ends. An account of climate justice 
must be sensitive to the importance of the human development needs embodied in the 
right to development. This chapter has argued that China’s position on the right to 
development and climate change duties is largely justified, though the international 
community may require further action from the Chinese government on human rights 
fulfilment more broadly within China.  
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After locating the relevance of the issue in the political context of climate change 
negotiations, I first considered different approaches to development, arguing that neither 
GDP nor HDI were accurate measures of the fulfilment of the right to development. I 
argued that as a human right, its importance lies in the fulfilment at the level of the 
individual, and so it cannot be captured by state-level averages. Whilst these averages 
might be useful in comparing overall progress of different states, they should not be 
considered to be a fully representative measure of the fulfilment of the right to 
development. The right to development is an individual human right, and is 
encompassed in a process that lifts individuals from poverty to a state in which they 
have the capability to fulfil a broad range of human rights. States are the duty-bearers 
for enabling the process of development, and are therefore justified in implementing 
development policies as a priority. Having established the basis of the right to 
development, I then provided a prima facie defence of the claim that emissions 
increases are justified where these emissions are needed in order to enable the fulfilment 
of the right to development of citizens. The process of development will in most cases 
require increasing energy use. For example, developing infrastructure and access to 
health-care and education, energy systems to heat houses and cook food are all 
important to the process of development. Having provided an initial defence of the 
position, I defended this against two key objections: (1) development must be 
sustainable, and (2) according to rights holism, the state must be committed to the 
connected rights in order to be fit actors for climate duties.  
The first objection claimed that the right to development must be sustainable. I first 
considered a strong version of the objection, which claimed that where a state could not 
provide the means for its citizens to develop cleanly, development should be limited. I 
responded to this claim by arguing that whilst sustainability required global emissions 
to decrease, this was not inconsistent with emissions increases in some parts of the 
world if these increases were counter-balanced by greater reductions in other areas. To 
support this argument, I made reference to Shue’s categories of ‘subsistence’ and 
‘luxury’ emissions, in order to highlight the fact that not all emissions are of the same 
moral importance. Some are ensuring rights fulfilment of the very basic needs for 
human survival, and others are fulfilling luxury desires. I argued that we should also 
support a third class of emissions, known as ‘development emissions’ that are fulfilling 
non-subsistence, yet still morally important development needs. I claimed that 
development emissions should not be subject to caps whilst there are high levels of 
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luxury emissions in the world. This formed the basis of the modest version of the 
sustainable development condition, in which development emissions must take 
precedence over luxury emissions. I argued that actors at the very lowest levels of 
development are completely justified in their emission use, and that emissions become 
gradually less excusable as actors move towards having their development needs fully 
satisfied. The liability for the sustainable aspect of the right to development falls with 
the duty bearers, although as development level increases, the rights bearer becomes 
gradually more responsible for the means being used for energy production. Beyond a 
certain level of well being, individuals are required to use sustainable means or slow 
their development since at this point the benefits they gain from development can no 
longer be considered of equal moral significance to the rights of future people that will 
be threatened by dangerous climate change. I briefly considered two different practical 
approaches which might be used to implement the requirement to enable sustainable 
development. I argue that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is not currently 
suitable. I suggested that a variant of the CDM, or Baer et al’s Greenhouse 
Development Rights Framework could be used as a practical tool in which affluent 
actors could fulfil their duty to enable sustainable means of development. Having 
responded to the sustainable development objection, I then moved on to consider the 
second key objection, which considered the implications of ‘rights holism’ for China’s 
claim. 
The second objection claimed that a state is not justified in increasing emissions due to 
the right to development if it was not considered to be a fit actor from a holistic 
approach to rights. The holistic approach requires that the bearer of the duty to fulfil the 
right in question is taking an approach that also respects other human rights that are 
closely connected to the right to development. The right to development embodies a 
process in which individuals are able to reach a good level of well being, and in which 
they are able to achieve fulfilment of their human rights, including political and civil 
rights. The Chinese state is justified in increasing emissions if these are needed to fulfil 
the right to development of its citizens. However, the state must also be respecting and 
enabling the fulfilment of the connected human rights, which are an integral part of the 
right to development in itself. I first engaged with the situation in China relating to the 
fulfilment of civil and political rights, showing that there was much progress to be made 
on enabling these rights within China. I then considered an argument that fulfilment of 
civil and political rights was preceded by the need to fulfil socio-economic rights. This 
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argument claimed that civil and political rights could only be fulfilled once socio-
economic rights had been prioritised. I argued that this was not a persuasive position. 
Furthermore, though examination of the level of fulfilment of socio-economic rights in 
China, I showed that this argument did not support China’s position anyway, since 
many socio-economic rights are also widely unfulfilled. As such, I concluded that 
according to the holistic approach to rights, China does not currently fulfil the criteria of 
a fit actor to bear the duty for the fulfilment of the right to development. The Chinese 
government has not shown a commitment to several other human rights that the right to 
development aims to protect. However, I concluded that the importance of the role of 
the state means that the best approach is to engage with China’s position and to permit 
an emissions increase, which is justified by the right to development of the many 
individuals within China. Where a state is not properly fulfilling its role as duty bearer, 
the international community might place conditional requirements upon such an 
agreement, in which the state is required to improve its domestic policies to enable 
fuller realisation of human rights. 
A theory of climate justice should recognise the importance of the right to development. 
In line with the multi-actor approach, states and non-state actors, whose rights to 
development have already been fulfilled, have the responsibility to reduce their own 
emissions and to enable access to sustainable technologies. Affluent individuals within 
China must contribute to sustainable development by supporting new legislation and 
complying with the state’s aim to develop sustainably, thereby reducing their own 
luxury emissions. The importance we assign to historic responsibility, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Five, will also have an impact on whether recently developed 
individuals who now have the financial capacity to live carbon-intensive lives should be 
required to reduce their emissions as much as individuals in developed countries who 
have spent their whole lives using relatively large amounts of luxury emissions. If 
historic responsibility is important, we might expect those individuals in developed 
states to contribute more to current mitigation strategies than those who have fewer 
historic emissions, even if current levels of emissions are approaching similar levels. 
However, as we have seen, the question of how to share the burden of mitigating 
climate change is not just a question of global distributive justice, but, as the 
sustainability clause shows, it is also about intergenerational justice. So, whilst a 
principle of intra-generational justice might allow recently developed individuals to 
pollute more than lifelong affluent individuals, the issue of sustainability might well 
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consider it unjustified for individuals in developing countries to raise their levels of 
emissions to the level of those in developed countries. Whilst it may be argued that it is 
unfair to place a cap on the emissions of recently developed individuals whilst those in 
the developed countries have produced many more emissions historically, we are no 
longer considering emissions which are being used for development or subsistence 
rights, but purely for luxury ends, and as Sachs argues, ‘in a closed environmental space, 
the claim for justice cannot be reconciled any longer with the promise of material-
intensive growth’.279 There is no right to such emissions, and the consumption model of 
western societies cannot be sustained without severely jeopardising the rights of future 
individuals. Since we are now well aware of the impact of carbon emissions on the 
climate, it is not justifiable for currently developing states to follow the same path of 
development which goes far past the actual human needs of its citizens, even if this is 
what developed states have done, and affluent individuals within developing states gain 
this moral responsibility as they move towards being highly developed. Two wrongs do 
not make a right, and ‘instead of living more like Americans, affluent people in 
developing countries ought to upstage them by showing how living simpler, more 
environmentally benign lives can make them happier and can be more rewarding.’280 
The right to development, therefore, justifies an increase in emissions on a state level, 
where these emissions are needed for the fulfilment of the right to development of the 
citizens of that state.  
This chapter has responded to the second research question and as such has developed 
the implications of issues raised by China’s position for a theory of climate justice. I 
have so far argued that the scope of a fair account of climate justice must target multiple 
actors and must be sensitive to the right to development. In the following chapter, I will 
develop the deeper implications of this approach for climate change by considering how 
we should account for emissions. I will defend a principle that is capable of responding 
to the requirements of the multi-actor approach, as well as being sensitive to the right to 
development. 
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Chapter 4 
Allocating Responsibility for Emissions 
The previous chapters have developed the theoretical basis for my account of climate 
justice, advocating a multi-actor approach to climate duties, and that it should be 
sensitive to the right to development. This chapter will consider how to operate the 
distribution of responsibilities within this theoretical framework, in responding to the 
question: ‘How should we allocate responsibility for emissions?’ This is a key question 
that any adequate account of climate justice must respond to, since controlling carbon 
emissions is necessary to mitigate climate change. As I discussed in Chapter One, much 
of the literature on climate justice refers to different principles that might be used to 
allocate responsibilities. But China’s position raises a question that has not been 
adequately addressed, which is how to account for responsibility of emissions of 
different actors in a globalized system of trade and movement between different regions 
of the world. The current system of ‘territorial accounting’ considers emissions that take 
place within a state’s borders to be the responsibility of that state, and the UNFCCC 
requires states to ‘develop, periodically update, publish and make available [… their] 
national inventories of anthropogenic emissions’.281 Legal instruments such as the 
Kyoto Protocol then consider these ‘national inventories’ to gauge fulfilment of 
commitments on greenhouse gas reductions. However, existing studies estimate that as 
the ‘factory of the world’, around one third of China’s territorial carbon emissions come 
from the production of goods that are exported.282 China has argued that this system of 
territorial accounting is unfair, as it does not take into account the effects of global trade 
on emissions:  
‘As one of the developing countries, we are at the low end of the production line for the 
global economy. We produce products and these products are consumed by other 
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countries [...] This share of emissions should be taken by the consumers, not the 
producers.’283 
This chapter will engage with the issues of fairness raised by China’s position, and 
consider how a fair account of climate justice should approach the issue of allocating 
responsibility for emissions. 
I will first consider an existing method of accounting, based upon the idea that 
emissions should be allocated at the point of consumption rather than production. I will 
present two arguments in favour of consumption accounting: one primarily practical 
argument and one principled argument. First, I will argue that consumption accounting 
would provide a more ‘carbon efficient’ scheme of global accounting for emissions as it 
would prevent carbon ‘leakage’ and it would allocate responsibility for international 
transport emissions, which are currently not accounted for in the territorial accounting 
system. I will further defend the carbon efficiency argument, by responding to an initial 
objection that claims consumption accounting is only more effective in a situation in 
which not all countries have emissions caps. I argue that consumption based accounting 
would be more likely to result in emissions reductions since ‘internalising’ the carbon 
cost of producing an item into its monetary cost would place responsibility for the 
emissions with the rich, consuming actors. These powerful actors are more likely to 
influence a reduction in emissions if they are bearing responsibility for the carbon 
emissions embedded in the goods they consume. Second, I will present a principled 
argument for consumption accounting, which claims that it would be fairer than 
territorial accounting, since it would require those that gain the benefit of the emissions 
to bear responsibility. However, in considering this, I will argue that if benefiting from 
emissions processes is the morally relevant link which ties emissions to the appropriate 
duty bearers, then the principle of consumption based responsibility is not adequate. I 
will then argue that neither territorial nor consumption accounting can provide a fair and 
efficient method for accounting for emissions. I will propose that we should instead 
account for emissions using the Revised Beneficiary Pays Principle (RBPP). Section 4.2 
will define the RBPP, which will consider the threshold of receiving non-subsistence 
benefit as a necessary condition for generating responsibilities. The level of 
responsibility an individual actor bears is then modified according to the level of 
fulfilment of three modulating factors: (1) Level of development; (2) Degree of 
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voluntariness with which benefits are accepted; (3) Ability of the actor to exert 
influence on the emissions process. I will defend this as the best way of accounting for 
responsibility for emissions by responding to two objections. First, I will respond to the 
objection that it is counter-intuitive to replace the polluter pays principle. I will argue 
that the RBPP applies to many actors benefitting from emissions that would not be 
considered responsible according to a traditional PPP, yet, which fairness indicates 
should bear responsibility. I will then respond to a second objection, which claims that 
the RBPP is simply a reworking of the PPP. I will defend the RBPP against this claim 
by arguing that the RBPP acknowledges the relevance of causal contribution, yet 
considers the receipt of non-subsistence benefits to be the morally relevant connection 
between duty bearer and emissions. Finally, I will consider the implications for China 
of a theory of climate justice which accounts for responsibility for emissions using the 
RBPP. 
4.1 Consumption Accounting  
In this section I will discuss consumption accounting, as an alternative to the current 
system of territorial accounting, and which responds to the issue of emissions that are 
embedded in goods and traded globally. I will first show that this method has received 
support from several studies and organisations, including the OECD. I will then defend 
consumption accounting by making reference to a practical argument based upon the 
claim that it would provide a more efficient system of accounting for carbon emissions, 
with reference to carbon leakage and the emissions from international transport. I will 
then present a moral argument in favour of consumption accounting, as a system that 
would be fairer than territorial accounting. However, I will conclude that neither system 
can adequately capture the relevant moral relationship between emissions and duty 
bearer, before moving on to the following section to defend a new approach to 
accounting that considers benefit to be the morally relevant factor. 
‘Consumption accounting’ is capable of responding to the claim that the consumers of 
goods should bear responsibility for emissions produced in the manufacture of those 
goods. Instead of using geographic location of production, this method considers the 
location of consumption of the good to be the morally relevant factor. This method 
recognizes the effect of global trade on carbon emissions and assigns responsibility for 
emissions embodied within a good or service at the consumption end of the commodity 
chain rather than the production end, meaning that emissions produced during the 
manufacture of goods are the responsibility of the consumer. The idea of consumption 
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accounting has been supported by several theorists.284 Pan et al have argued that ‘a 
reliable consumption-based accounting methodology is feasible and could improve our 
understanding of which actors and states are responsible for emissions.’285 Wiebe et al 
state that consumption-based accounting is ‘fairer’, since, ‘it is not the producing, but 
the consuming country’s demand that drives GHG emissions.’286 Davis and Caldeira 
highlight several benefits that make a consumption-based accounting scheme more 
attractive than territorial accounting, including the argument that ‘consumption-based 
accounting of emissions provides grounding for ethical arguments that the most 
developed countries—as the primary beneficiaries of emissions and with greater ability 
to pay—should lead the global mitigation effort’.287 Several studies also demonstrate 
the feasibility of putting such a system into place. For example, a 2003 paper from the 
OECD, entitled ‘Carbon dioxide emissions embodied in international trade of goods’ 
demonstrates a method of using ‘input-output models’ to calculate the carbon embedded 
in trade flows in order to calculate the production and consumption emissions of 
countries.288 Input-output models measure the balance of emissions imported and 
exported by a country, and can be applied over multiple regions.289 So, consumption 
accounting has received wide support within the literature as an approach capable of 
being applied globally to account for emissions. I will now consider a first argument in 
support of this. 
The first argument in favour of consumption accounting is a practical one, which claims 
that consumption-based accounting would be more carbon efficient than territorial 
accounting. Consumption accounting would have two key practical implications that 
would in turn lead to a more efficient way of accounting for carbon, thereby 
incentivising the use and development of technologies to reduce carbon intensity. The 
first practical implication would be to reduce ‘leakage’ of emissions into areas of the 
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world that are not covered by carbon reduction commitments. Second, consumption 
accounting would capture international transport emissions, which are currently 
unaccounted for since they do not take place within territorial borders. I will now 
consider these two implications of the carbon efficiency argument in favour of 
consumption accounting. 
4.1.1 Preventing Leakage 
The first claim of the carbon efficiency argument is that consumption accounting would 
have the desirable practical outcome of eliminating ‘leakage’. The IPCC defines carbon 
leakage as ‘the increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries taking domestic 
mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries.’290 
Simply, leakage is an increase in emissions in one area of the world as a result of a 
decrease in another area, and it can be ‘measured in terms of C02 emissions that are not 
consumed in the same country where they are produced.’291 Leakage can be described 
as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. Strong leakage is leakage that occurs as a direct result of climate 
mitigation policies in the state out of which emissions are leaking. Weak leakage, on the 
other hand, is simply the migration of emission producing actions whether or not this is 
linked to climate policies. For example, corporations might move to China because 
labour is significantly cheaper than in developed countries. Using territorial accounting, 
the emissions involved in producing the output of such corporations are then considered 
to be China’s responsibility. In terms of carbon efficiency, the reason behind the 
leakage does not make a great difference to our purposes. As Bruckner et al argue, ‘for 
the global climate, it is less relevant if a policy change in an Annex I country caused 
production to increase in a non-Annex I country. What matters for global climate policy 
goals is the total amount of carbon consumption in industrialised countries that is 
produced in countries without binding GHG emission targets and policies in place.’292 
As we saw in Chapter One, the principle of Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities enshrined in the UNFCCC, means that developing states currently are 
not required to commit to emissions reductions. So, whether strong or weak, leakage is 
particularly troublesome in terms of reducing global emissions since it causes the 
migration of emissions from the Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol, which 
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committed to emissions reductions, to countries that have not signed up to mitigation 
commitments.  
Leakage occurs because it is often financially rewarding for businesses to relocate their 
production to developing countries. For example, in a recent publication ‘Making the 
move to low-cost countries’, global management consulting firm Bain and Company 
state: 
‘Our research finds that such moves are netting manufacturers in Europe and North 
America cost savings of 20% to 60%. When your competitors are realizing that kind of 
gain, whether to act is less a choice and more a matter of economic survival.’293  
Whether emissions migrate in order to avoid being capped or not does not change the 
fact that they do avoid being capped by moving, and the system of global trade 
combined with territorial accounting facilitates this migration of emissions. As Ferng 
argues: 
‘The current adopted accounting scheme induce[s] developed countries to reduce their 
domestic CO2 emissions through international trade. This kind of artificial reduction, 
referred to as ‘carbon leakage’, [is] likely [to] result in an overall increase rather than 
decrease in CO2 emissions at a global scale.’294  
Within a global system of territorial accounting, the potential for leakage means that 
national emissions reduction strategies may have little impact on overall levels of global 
emissions. This causes a problem for a truly global response to climate change, since 
states are only required to consider the emissions that take place within their borders in 
order to fulfill their emissions-reduction commitments. Brinkley et al show that whilst 
emissions in most countries in the European Union have been either flat or decreasing 
since 1990 on a territorial basis, consumption emissions have increased by 47%.295 A 
report into the emissions of the United Kingdom by the UK Energy and Climate Change 
Committee also shows evidence of decreasing territorial emissions whilst consumption 
emissions have increased.296 For example, one study from the UK Energy Research 
Centre shows that between 1990 and 2008 territorial emissions have decreased by 19% 
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yet consumption emissions have increased by 20%. These studies show that territorial 
emissions accounting alone cannot give us an accurate picture of the emissions for 
which a country should be held responsible or the effectiveness of mitigation policies, 
within the developed countries, in reducing global emissions. As Bruckner et al state, 
the current method of accounting ‘allow[s] the reduction of national carbon budgets by 
substituting domestic production for imports.’297  
Furthermore, for one unit of production, more carbon emissions are required in 
developing countries than in developed countries because less advanced technologies 
are often used in developing countries. As Yunfeng and Laike state, ‘The high use of 
coal means that every unit of energy produced in China results in more CO2 emissions 
than in developed countries.’298 So the problem of leakage is not simply the 
displacement of emissions, but their amplification that occurs when manufacturing 
moves from developed to developing country. A developed country may therefore apply 
emissions mitigation policies that can control the emissions produced within their 
borders but may exert no influence on the emissions produced externally, even if these 
are being produced to provide goods that are consumed by their citizens. A key problem 
is that carbon is a ‘negative externality’ in the current production system, meaning that 
effects caused by carbon emissions are not factored into the cost the consumer pays for 
the good: 
‘In the case of pollution—the traditional example of a negative externality—a polluter 
makes decisions based only on the direct cost of and profit opportunity from production 
and does not consider the indirect costs to those harmed by the pollution.’299  
As long as carbon emissions are an externality in the supply-production chain, 
consumers and producers have no financial incentive to favour greener goods or 
methods of production, since they bear no responsibility for the wider costs which result 
from these emissions. In comparison to territorial accounting, consumption accounting 
would internalize carbon costs into the price of a final product, thereby incentivizing 
reduced carbon usage. The fact that more carbon-intensive products would be likely to 
be more expensive would provide a reciprocal incentive for companies and consumers 
to make green choices. Companies would be more likely to invest in green technologies 
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since that would give them a competitive advantage over competitors making the same 
product using more carbon intensive methods. Consumers would be more likely to buy 
greener products since the same product made in a carbon-intensive way would be more 
expensive. The greener choices of consumer and corporation would be mutually 
reinforcing. As long as carbon is an ‘externality’, corporations will continue to move to 
areas of the world where they can gain an advantage due to cheaper manufacturing costs, 
and consumers will continue to make their choices independently of consideration of 
the carbon intensity of different products. As Bruckner et al state, ‘A consumption-
based approach to carbon accounting combined with appropriate policy instruments 
such as quotas or taxes may help shift comparative advantage away from pure economic 
measures to a logic that also considers environmental aspects … [thereby] 
encourage[ing] technology transfers and mitigation activities.’300 
The issues raised in this section show that consumption accounting can provide greater 
incentives to prevent leakage and reduce emissions by internalizing the cost of carbon 
into the production chain. This would stimulate investment in greener methods of 
production and greater consumer involvement in paying for the costs caused by the 
emissions embedded in the products they use. In this way, it can target several different 
actors and can provide a practical means of implementing the ethical claims of the 
multi-actor approach, as opposed to territorial accounting which places responsibility 
entirely on states. This section has provided a first claim in support of the carbon 
efficiency argument for consumption accounting. I shall now consider the second key 
implication. 
4.1.2 Controlling International Transport Emissions 
A second practical implication of consumption accounting is that it would include 
emissions from sectors that are currently unaccounted for in territorial accounting, since 
they do not happen within defined ‘territories’. It would therefore give fuller coverage 
of global emissions. Emissions from international transport take place outside of state 
borders as they involve transport between states. Territorial accounting therefore 
considers these emissions to be separate to state totals, and while states are encouraged 
to work together to report them, they fall outside the current climate mitigation system, 
which only attempts to control territorial emissions.  The official reporting guidelines 
from the IPCC state that ‘emissions from International Bunkers should not be included 
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in national totals’, but reported separately ‘under memo items’.301 The term 
‘international bunkers’ refers to international aviation and shipping. The Kyoto Protocol 
therefore does not include emissions from these sources. Instead, responsibility was 
handed to the International Civil Aviation Organisation and the International Maritime 
Organisation to develop a system of international burden sharing to control these 
emissions. As the predominant system of accounting is territorial, defining a rule for 
designating responsibility for these emissions, which do not happen within state borders 
has proved difficult, and to date no such global system has been put into place for 
aviation or maritime activities. Commitments to reducing such emissions therefore 
remain voluntary, since emissions from international transport sectors ‘are essentially 
unregulated at an international level’302. As I will now demonstrate, this is a key 
problem with territorial accounting, since the emissions from these sectors are rapidly 
growing. 
Latest figures from the International Energy Agency show that international transport 
accounts for almost 4% of global emissions.303  These emissions have experienced huge 
growth in the past 20 years, with international marine emissions growing by 78.1% and 
international aviation emissions growing by 82.7% between 1990 and 2011.304 The 
figures include emissions from the transport of freight and passengers. Passengers 
onboard planes or ships can be considered to be consuming the service of being 
transported from one country to another. The transport of freight further highlights the 
importance of international transport emissions for our purposes due to the fact that not 
only are they a sector of emissions that is excluded from territorial accounting, but they 
are also closely linked to international trade. As this shows, the emissions embedded 
within a good include not only the emissions from manufacturing, but also those 
produced during the transportation from point of manufacture to point of sale. Whilst 
these are not accounted for using a territorial methodology, consumption based 
accounting would include the total emissions caused in the product’s life cycle from 
point of manufacture to point of sale, as well as emissions produced in the disposal of 
the goods or its packaging at the end of the product’s life-cycle. Consumption 
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accounting can therefore provide a more efficient way of accounting for global 
emissions because it includes the 4% of global emissions produced by international 
bunkers. With an extra 3 billion more airline passengers expected by 2050, this 
percentage is only going to increase in coming years.305  
The carbon efficiency argument has claimed that consumption accounting would be 
preferable to territorial accounting, as it can eliminate the problem of leakage and 
provide more complete coverage of global emissions by including international 
transport emissions. I will now engage with an objection to this argument, which claims 
that consumption accounting is only preferable in the current system where some areas 
of the world are exempt from climate duties.  
4.1.3 An Objection to the Carbon Efficiency Argument 
A critic might argue that whilst a consumption-based method of accounting might 
provide a more efficient way of accounting for carbon in comparison to the current 
system, a system of territorial accounting could be used as efficiently if it had global 
coverage. Since emissions everywhere would be included, the method of accounting for 
emissions is only relevant while we have a situation in which emissions are not 
accounted for in all areas of the world.  In other words, it is not territorial accounting in 
itself which is the problem but the way in which the system is currently implemented 
that is at fault. With regards to leakage, a treaty which covered all states would mean 
that there would no longer be any areas of the world in which emissions were ‘free’. As 
a result, emissions in all areas of the world would be subject to limits, unlike the current 
system where developing states have no caps on their emissions. In this situation the 
question of whether we should prefer territorial or consumption accounting would seem 
to matter less since leakage of emissions from areas with emissions reduction targets to 
areas without such targets would no longer be possible. Similarly, a critic might argue 
that if territorial accounting had a truly global scope then emissions from international 
transport could simply be allocated to the territorial totals of countries based on 
departure or arrival location, and therefore would no longer be excluded from national 
inventories. In both contexts, the objection claims that the problems raised by the 
carbon efficiency argument are not problems that are intrinsic to a territorial system of 
accounting, but simply the way in which the system is currently put to use. I will 
respond to this objection, first considering the implications for leakage, and second, for 
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international bunker emissions. I will defend the logic of the carbon efficiency argument 
and argue that the objection is unfounded. 
4.1.4 Responding to the Objection 
A first response refers to the implications of this objection for leakage. Whilst the 
objection claims that expanding the scope of coverage would remove the advantage of 
consumption accounting, it is unlikely that such a global treaty would assign the same 
caps to all areas of the world. This would mean that there would still be an incentive for 
emissions to ‘leak’ to areas with higher emissions permits. Emissions quotas for 
developing countries are likely to be high enough to allow producers to pay less for the 
right to emit, allowing them to be able to use cheaper and dirtier technology, in 
developing countries than they would in developed countries with greater emission 
reduction requirements. China is the world’s biggest exporter, yet as a developing 
country, it is unlikely that China would be expected to have emissions caps at the same 
level as those in the developed countries. The carbon cost of producing goods in China 
would therefore still be lower than in the developed states, providing less of an 
incentive to reduce emissions involved in manufacture. Furthermore, this would provide 
an incentive for moving production from developing to least developed countries with 
the largest carbon allowances, where the cost of carbon would be lowest. This looks 
rather similar to the current system of leakage, yet with movement between different 
areas. As long as the accountability for emissions is territorial, it is possible for 
producers to displace factories in order to reduce the carbon cost of their manufacturing 
output. However, when accountability takes place at the point of consumption, this 
option is removed.  
The increased efficiency that a system of consumption accounting would enable 
becomes even clearer if we refer back to some earlier points about the direction of 
movement of global trade. As the report from Bain and Company showed us earlier, 
companies are making savings by offshoring their production to developing countries. 
Emissions are therefore leaking from developed to developing countries. The direction 
of the flow of emissions is important when taken in the context of global politics. If 
emissions are accounted for on a territorial basis, then, even with global coverage, this 
places the responsibility for reducing the emissions with the states in which they are 
produced. Whilst producers may pass costs on to consumers if the producers themselves 
incur costs as a result of such a global scheme of territorial accounting, the 
responsibility is still considered to be territorially-based. This means that the 
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responsibility for reducing the emissions from global trade is placed on the poorer 
producing countries rather than the richer consuming actors. Developing countries are 
likely to have less ability to enforce emissions quotas due to a lack of institutional 
infrastructure for monitoring and regulating companies that generate emissions. Placing 
the responsibility for emissions embedded in goods consumed by affluent actors with 
the less powerful and less financially capable countries is unlikely to result in reducing 
global emissions. Consumption-based accounting would place the responsibility with 
the consuming actors, which are likely to include developed countries and companies, 
who have more power to influence international policies and more money to spend on 
investing in cleaner technology. So, the objection fails to refute the claim that 
consumption accounting would be more efficient due to reducing leakage. 
In considering the implications for international bunker emissions, the objection claims 
that territorial accounting could deal with the problem of unaccounted for international 
emissions by simply adding these on to the inventory of either the departure or arrival 
state. However, it is not clear that a territorial accounting scheme, which considers that 
countries should bear responsibility for the emissions they cause can deal satisfactorily 
with emissions generated by international transport. A consumption-based approach 
would allow the emissions to be allocated to each journey and then to the consumers of 
the service, either by adding the share of emissions embedded in each good at its final 
point of consumption or by calculating the price of carbon and adding this to the ticket 
price in order to target the consuming individuals. This could take the form of a tax, or 
could be modelled on an emissions trading scheme. For example, since 2012 emissions 
from within Europe have been included in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). 
This requires emissions to be capped at 95% of 2005 levels, with the requirement to 
purchase allowances if airlines exceed this level.306 As PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
explain in their industry paper, modern airlines use newer technology and therefore emit 
less carbon per mile travelled in comparison with older models, meaning that ‘aircraft 
operators flying more modern fleets may have a substantial advantage’. 307 In this way, 
companies that have invested in newer and more carbon efficient planes are rewarded, 
and those with older fleets are incentivised to do the same in order to remain 
competitive. One key advantage of consumption accounting is that it can allocate 
responsibility for emissions to the individual actor that benefits from the polluting 
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action. In this way, it is a good example of how the multi-actor approach could be put to 
use, by incentivising greener choices for all the relevant actors. Territorial accounting, 
which simply added on the emissions from international transport to national accounts, 
would be likely to have much less impact on emissions reductions because the states to 
which the responsibility would be assigned might be powerless to influence the 
emissions for which they are being held responsible. Practically, then, consumption 
accounting would create a financial incentive for reducing carbon emissions, by 
requiring end users to bear responsibility for the emissions embodied in the goods they 
consume.  
4.1.5 A Moral Defence of Consumption Accounting 
I have so far argued that in terms of reducing global carbon emissions, consumption 
accounting would be more effective at responding to the problems caused by leakage 
and international transport emissions. I considered the objection that territorial 
accounting could account for these problems if the system was applied in a global way, 
and showed that this would still not be as carbon efficient as a system of consumption 
accounting. Consumption accounting would include the cost of carbon within the cost 
of producing and buying goods which would therefore place the responsibility for 
emissions on the rich, consuming actors rather than the often poorer producing actors. 
This would lead to a greater stimulus for reducing carbon emissions for those actors 
who are more likely to be able to act on this incentive and influence the level of 
emissions. Having argued that consumption-based accounting would be preferable from 
a practical point of view, I shall now discuss the moral basis of the argument for 
consumption accounting. 
The original claim by China was that consumers should bear responsibility for the 
emissions produced in China during the manufacture of goods to be exported. The 
moral claim is that it is unfair for China to pay for emissions that are being produced for 
goods or services to be used by those outside of China. A review of the existing 
literature shows that while arguments for consumption-based accounting often highlight 
the increased carbon efficiency gained by using this accounting method, the claim is 
also made that consumption accounting would be fairer than territorial accounting.308 
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For example, Bastianoni et al state that ‘[consumption-based] accounting would be 
fairer because it would make final users pay the GHG “bill”.’309 Yunfeng and Laike 
state: 
‘The proportion of China’s CO2 emissions that are due to net exports is large and 
significant, which demonstrates China’s position in international trade as a ‘‘world 
factory’’. Those who consume the goods made in China should also share the 
responsibility. Spreading ‘‘China threat theory’’ or blindly blaming China is unfair. In 
the global environmental negotiations, China should claim the consumption-based CO2 
accounting system. It is developed from the benefit principle and is a fairer method of 
allocating responsibility for GHGs.’310  
The underlying moral principle appears to relate to which actor is benefiting from the 
emissions. The consumer, in receiving a good or service he or she desires, is benefiting 
from the emissions produced in the manufacture of that good. The consumer should pay 
for the costs of the choices they make. Consumption accounting claims that this link is 
morally more significant than the causal action that produces the emissions. This moral 
intuition appears to be rooted in the claim that it is benefiting from emissions that is 
relevant, rather than being causally responsible for the action that causes the emissions. 
Assessing which principle should be used to assign moral responsibility for carbon 
emissions is not straightforward. It does not fit with our intuition about simple situations, 
in which causal responsibility is most often the seemingly relevant principle. For 
example, if someone breaks an object we generally think that they should pay for it. 
However, while it may be that we assume the responsibility lies in the fact that this 
actor has physically caused the event to occur, there may be many other factors at play 
here, which are also factored into our assumption that this person is morally responsible. 
For example, the person may have been acting recklessly, and therefore it was 
foreseeable that his or her actions might cause damage. He may have been acting 
purposefully and broken the object willfully. More often than not, in such simple 
examples, even if the damage was not intended the causal actor may be the only 
possible actor who has any links to the damaging action, and therefore may be held 
liable for his actions, even if he did not act wrongfully. If he is the only possible agent 
involved in the action, he is the only one who can be held morally responsible. The key 
point is that there are many relevant factors which may come into play in considering 
whether an actor is morally responsible, and these different factors may often be 
overlooked in such simple scenarios where the answer to the question of who should 
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bear responsibility is intuitively obvious. This may lead to a simplified understanding 
that causal responsibility always implies moral responsibility, when in fact there may be 
other factors at play. The polluter pays principle is based upon this simple link between 
causal responsibility and moral responsibility. However, climate change is not in any 
way a simple case of one causal actor and one result, but the result of very complex 
causal chains of actions and impacts. The complexity of the combined systems of global 
climate change, carbon emissions and global trade mean that there are many different 
actors who may be linked to polluting actions whether or not they are the causal polluter. 
This requires a more specific focus on the different relationships at play between actions 
which cause emissions and different actors. 
The current method of territorial accounting is supported by a commitment to the 
polluter pays principle, which underlies current international approaches to climate 
change, and reflects ideas of national sovereignty. In contrast, the argument that 
consumers should bear responsibility for emissions embedded in the goods they 
produce can be based upon the principle that the beneficiary of the emissions should 
bear responsibility. The idea that benefiting from an action entails bearing costs for that 
action has been supported by different theorists. For example, Page states ‘any agent 
should support, as a matter of fairness, practices that manage the negative effects of 
activities from which they benefit’.311 Shue states, ‘If whoever makes a mess receives 
the benefits and does not pay the costs, not only does he have no incentive to avoid 
making as many messes as he likes, but he is also unfair to whoever does pay the 
costs.'312 This appears to be the underlying moral principle behind consumption 
accounting, in which the causal actor is assumed to be simply a means of producing the 
good or service to be consumed by the beneficiary. In the case of emissions embedded 
in goods exported from China and other developing countries, the specific causal actor 
in question may only be involved at all because he will work for low wages, thus 
amplifying the benefit to the end user by ensuring that the goods are less expensive. The 
moral underpinning of consumption-based accounts challenges the polluter pays 
principle, by claiming that the polluter is not always the morally relevant party in cases 
where the production of emissions is for the benefit of other actors. The actual ‘polluter’ 
bears less moral responsibility than the beneficiary of the good or service being 
provided. Consumers benefit from the emissions produced when they use the final good 
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or service resulting from these emissions, and it is this moral claim of benefits as 
responsibility-determiners that underpins consumption-based accounting approaches.  
However, if it is benefitting that is the morally relevant link between emissions and 
responsible actor, it is not clear that consumption accounting captures this fully. 
Benefiting from emissions processes is not limited to consuming the goods produced by 
these processes. It is not only consumers that benefit. China, as a state has also 
benefited from the emissions that have been embedded in exports by way of the 
economic growth these exports have stimulated. Income from exports makes up 
approximately 35% of China’s GDP and thus contributes greatly to China’s 
economy.313 It is not coincidental that the rapid growth of China’s territorial emissions 
has taken place at the same time as dramatic economic growth, and much of China’s 
rapid growth has been attributed to growth in export-led sectors. Between 2002 and 
2007, China’s greenhouse gas emissions almost doubled, increasing by a staggering 
92% from 3406 million metric tonnes (MMT) in 2002 to 6566 MMT in 2007.314  A 
study of the causes of the emissions increase between 2002 and 2005 found that only 
7% of the increase was due to domestic household consumption, whilst just over 50% 
of the increase was due to the production of goods and services to be consumed in 
foreign countries.315 Zhu and Kotz argue that China’s economic growth has been highly 
dependent on exports since 2001, and that this can be seen when comparing the 
previously small export surpluses that China experienced with the ‘enormous export 
surplus’ that began in the mid-2000s.316 At the same time, China’s GDP also increased 
by an average of 10.7% annually between 2001 and 2007.317 The figures show that 
China has benefited economically from the emissions increases that have taken place 
within its borders as a result of increased export manufacturing. This is also the 
conclusion drawn by Bruckner et al, who state: 
‘The relocation of production processes […] brings economic benefits for the recipient 
countries in terms of export revenues, employment and faster economic growth […] 
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China’s rapid growth rates could not have been sustained on such a high level if the 
economy solely depended on domestic demand.’318 
If we think that consumers bear moral responsibility for these emissions due to the fact 
that they have benefited from them, then it is likely that we need to expand the scope of 
who we consider to be duty bearers as there are other actors who also benefit from these 
manufacturing processes. As we have seen, China as a state has benefited from the 
economic growth that has been generated through China’s large export sectors.   
In line with the multi-actor approach, there are other state and non-state actors that may 
also benefit from emissions. For example, corporations benefit through the profits made 
from selling the goods in which emissions are embedded. Individual factory workers 
benefit since their jobs and wages are dependent upon the production of such goods. 
Other individuals who are even further removed from the pollution might benefit. 
Transport emissions, for example, not only benefit the passengers or final consumers of 
the goods contained in the on-board cargo but also others linked to the journeys being 
made. Such benefits are examples of downstream benefits of the processes that cause 
emissions. 
There are also upstream benefits. For example, petroleum-rich Gulf States located 
upstream to the production of emissions benefit from the sale of their oil, which enables 
the emissions to occur. Approximately 90% of Saudi Arabia’s exports can be accounted 
for by petroleum sales, and these make up 45% of the country’s GDP.319 Another 
upstream example of benefiting from emissions comes from Australia’s coal industry. 
For example, consider the following statement from the state owned ‘Australians for 
Coal’: 
‘Australia was the only one of the world’s 33 advanced economies to grow in 2009 
during the worst global recession since the Great Depression. The principal reason for 
this was our continued coal exports. The importance of coal in the economy is also 
evident in its growing share of Gross Domestic Product. This share has more than 
doubled, from 1.7 % in 2006-07 to 3.5 % in 2008-09, making it the largest contributor 
to the mining sector.’320 
These examples show us several cases in which multiple actors benefit from the burning 
of fossil fuels. In some cases these are the causal actors, or polluters, in other cases they 
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are the consumers of the final good. However, in many cases, they do not fulfil either of 
these criteria, and therefore would not be considered to bear any part of responsibility 
for the resulting carbon emissions in a territorial or consumption accounting scheme. 
Territorial accounting uses a state level version of the polluter pays principle as its 
moral basis for assigning responsibility, and so considers causal responsibility to be the 
only morally relevant consideration. The examples show that there are several situations 
in which we might intuitively think that there are other actors that should pay for some 
of the costs of the emissions they benefit from. Consumption based accounting is based 
upon the idea that the beneficiaries should pay, but it is oversimplified in assuming that 
it is only the consumers who benefit. In the following section, I will propose a version 
of the beneficiary pays principle as the relevant principle for accounting for emissions.  
4.2. The Revised Beneficiary Pays Principle  
So far, I have argued that China’s concerns about territorial accounting may be morally 
justified. I have suggested that consumption accounting may be a plausible practical 
alternative to territorial accounting. Moreover, consumption accounting seems 
consistent with the moral intuition that the beneficiary pays principle might offer a more 
plausible account of who should pay the costs of climate change than the polluter pays 
principle. However, further investigation, has led us to the conclusion that there is a 
mismatch between consumption accounting and the beneficiary pays principle: 
consumers are not the sole beneficiaries of emissions. This section will defend a revised 
version of the beneficiary pays principle. I will refer to this principle as the Revised 
Beneficiary Pays Principle (RBPP).  
4.2.1 The ‘Modulating Factors’ 
The RBPP is based upon the idea that benefiting from an emissions-generating action is 
the criteria we should use to determine which actors should bear moral responsibility for 
the emissions generated by that action. This principle can capture both the causal actors 
(the polluters) and the end users (consumers), with the underlying moral criterion of 
benefit being key. As such, it is consistent with the requirements of the multi-actor 
approach developed in Chapter Two, as it can be applied to different actors. The RBPP 
will provide a principle for accounting for emissions that is sensitive to the situation of 
each actor, in defining the receipt of non-subsistence benefit as the necessary condition 
for generating responsibility for emissions. The necessary condition identifies the actor 
as a morally relevant beneficiary. The level of responsibility that actor is considered to 
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bear is then modified according to the level of fulfilment of three modulating factors: 
(1) the development level of the actor (2) the degree of voluntariness with which an 
actor accepts benefits, (3) the ability to exert influence over the process of emissions. 
The RBPP is therefore sensitive to the requirements of the multi-actor approach and the 
right to development, as well as providing a response to the issue of how to account for 
emissions in a system of global trade. The following section will further develop the 
definition of the RBPP, in discussing the three modulating factors that modify the level 
of responsibility borne by beneficiaries, before defending the RBPP against two 
objections relating to the principle’s comparisons with the PPP. 
The first modulating factor of the RBPP is the development factor. This responds to the 
requirements of Chapter Three, which argued that a fair approach to climate justice 
must be sensitive to the importance of the right to development. This is first reflected in 
the necessary condition of receiving non-subsistence benefits. At its lowest level, 
development will in many cases involve a need for subsistence emissions. I argued in 
Chapter Three that subsistence emissions were justifiable. So, benefiting from 
subsistence emissions should not generate responsibilities to bear the climate-related 
costs. Chapter Three also developed the idea of development emissions, with the 
responsibility an actor bears gradually increasing as the process of development is 
undertaken. The development factor of the RBPP reflects this, and level of 
responsibility is modified according to the needs being fulfilled as a result of the benefit 
gained from the emissions. Where these benefits are fulfilling luxury ends, the level of 
responsibility is considered to be much greater. The first modulating factor of the RBPP 
is therefore sensitive to the right to development. 
The second modulating factor responds to the notion that the degree of voluntariness 
with which an actor accepts benefits is of moral relevance. The idea that benefits must 
be voluntarily accepted can be found in Rawls’ principle of ‘fair play’, in which the 
voluntary acceptance of benefits is necessary in order for benefiting to confer 
responsibility.321 Nozick has also argued for this in ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’, stating 
that benefits must be voluntarily accepted in order for us to hold the beneficiary 
responsible for their costs. Nozick states, ‘One cannot, whatever one’s purposes, just act 
so as to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) payments.’322  Not requiring 
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benefits to be voluntarily accepted would allow for unjust payment demands such as 
this to take place. However, whilst this claim for voluntary acceptance of benefits might 
seem clear cut, there are different degrees to which we might consider an acceptance of 
benefits to be voluntary or not. Imagining these along a scale, the RBPP claims that 
agents become more responsible for the harms caused, the more voluntarily the benefits 
have been accepted.  
For example, I suggested earlier that factory workers in China may be said to benefit 
from the emissions they physically cause when fulfilling the tasks involved in the job of 
working on a production line making goods to be exported to other parts of the world. 
In one sense, the actor working in the factory could be said to be voluntarily benefiting 
since he is not being physically forced, we assume, to fulfil his duties within the factory. 
He is engaging in the emission producing aspects of his job through free will. This 
fulfils one initial characteristic required for action to be voluntary and not coerced, 
which is ‘willing the action without being under the controlling influence of another 
person or condition.’323 However, the level of voluntariness he is displaying may not be 
very high at all. Although he might not be physically forced to fulfil the actions his job 
entails, it is likely that there is little voluntariness in the decision to carry out the 
specific job. As Olsaretti argues, ‘a choice is voluntary if and only if it is not made 
because there is no acceptable alternative to it.’324 Factory workers in China earn very 
low wages, with the average income per hour $1.74 (in US dollars), in poor conditions, 
with long hours.325 It is unlikely that such workers would voluntarily choose to work in 
these conditions if there were ‘acceptable alternatives’ that would enable them to 
provide for themselves and their families. So whilst the factory worker’s earnings 
cannot be said in absolute terms to be a form of involuntary benefit, the worker may be 
severely constrained in terms of acting voluntarily due to the lack of reasonable 
alternative choices. In this sense the degree of his voluntariness is low.  
In determining responsibility for carbon emissions where there are multiple 
beneficiaries of emissions-generating actions, the degree of voluntariness of each 
actor’s actions should be an important factor in determining their share of the 
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responsibility relative to each other. For example, consider the situation of an affluent 
consumer. Imagine the consumer has the choice between two goods of identical merit in 
terms of the service they can provide to him. Product A was produced by Chinese 
factory workers using coal-powered energy, and then shipped across the world to the 
affluent consumer’s location. It is therefore highly carbon intensive. Product B is very 
similar, though much more expensive as it has been produced locally using sustainable 
means, and so has a dramatically smaller carbon footprint. The difference in price will 
not make any difference to the standard of living of the consumer, although perhaps he 
will not be able to consume as many ‘luxury’ products if he picks the sustainable option 
each time. Comparatively, this consumer is acting with a much greater degree of 
voluntariness when he accepts the benefits from the emissions embedded in product A. 
He had a choice between saving some money but disregarding the environmental 
impact of the good, or consuming a good with a much smaller carbon footprint at a 
higher financial cost. He is benefiting from the emissions that have produced and 
brought the good to him and has voluntarily decided to do this based upon the freedom 
his financial status allows him without fear of any risk to his livelihood as a 
consequence of his choice. The factory worker, on the other hand, may not be able to 
support himself or his family if he makes the choice not to do his job. It seems quite 
clear to say that although both actors have benefited from the emissions caused by the 
manufacture of the good, the rich consumer should bear significantly more 
responsibility for these emissions than the factory worker whose choices are severely 
limited. The degree of ‘voluntariness’ of the factory worker cannot be said to be of the 
same degree as the voluntary behaviour of the consumer who has based his choice 
purely on the personal economic savings he can make by purchasing the more carbon-
intensive yet cheaper product. Although his choice cannot be said to be strictly 
involuntary, the lack of alternatives he has reduces the amount of responsibility we 
should expect him to bear as a result of his status as a beneficiary of the pollution. 
Having accepted Rawls and Nozick’s claim that voluntary acceptance of benefits is a 
necessary condition for responsibility for costs, I have developed this claim and shown 
that it is not limited to only voluntary versus involuntary action. While involuntary 
acceptance of benefits does not result in responsibility for costs, the responsibility held 
by different actors who have voluntarily accepted benefits is not equal, and depends on 
the degree of voluntariness with which benefits are accepted. The more voluntarily an 
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actor accepts benefits, the more responsibility he should bear for the costs resulting 
from the action from which the benefit is derived. 
I shall now consider the third modulating factor, which refers to the beneficiary’s ability 
to exert influence on the emissions from which he is benefitting. This factor modifies 
the level of responsibility according to the influence the actor can have on the emissions. 
It is therefore sensitive to the relevance of causal contribution of different actors, as well 
as the interconnected nature of the responsibilities of actors we saw in Chapter Two. 
The implications of this will be clearer in considering an example. Let us come back to 
the factory worker and the rich consumer. We have seen that the factory worker is 
acting with a low degree of voluntariness. But he is also unable to exert influence in any 
morally relevant way on the emissions he is benefiting from and causally responsible 
for. Whilst he is in control of his own physical movements determining whether or not 
to pull a lever or press a button and thereby contributing to a production process, which 
is powered by fossil fuels, and so causes the release of carbon emissions, his individual 
actions will be unlikely to exert any influence over whether those emissions occur or 
not. Within the factory, he is but a ‘cog in the machine’ and can easily be replaced if he 
chooses not to do the job any more. Therefore, his individual choice of whether to work 
or not is very unlikely to affect the emissions the factory produces. His responsibility is 
therefore modified as a result of the low level of influence he exerts over the emissions.  
In the presence of other actors who are both benefiting more voluntarily (the moral 
condition) and are able to exert more influence over the polluting acts (the practical 
condition), it serves no moral or practical purpose to attribute moral responsibility to 
this actor whose benefit is the result of a very low degree of voluntariness and who is 
unable to influence the act which causes the pollution.  
In the case in question, there are many other actors who do fulfil both roles. For 
example, the rich consumer has a choice in the products he buys. This choice allows 
him to exert influence on the manufacturers of goods, and therefore emissions. In 
choosing one product over another, a consumer might be said to be ‘voting’ for that 
type of good.326 By providing positive or negative feedback to manufacturers in buying 
more or less of certain products, consumers can influence the types of goods 
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manufacturers make. As we saw in Chapter Two, in the example of the Starbucks 
boycott, the power of consumers can be great in terms of the influence they can exert 
over manufacturers. Where the same product can be produced in more or less 
environmentally friendly ways, consumers can ‘vote’ for the greener methods of 
production and boycott companies or products that are carbon intensive, thereby 
stimulating manufacturers to invest in cleaner technologies. They can therefore exert 
influence over the actors who are controlling the physical emissions. As Shaw et al 
argue:  
‘Increasing numbers of consumers are seeking to engage and influence the suppliers of 
products and services through their actions in the marketplace. Often responding to 
reports of questionable practices such as child labour, environmental pollution and/or 
animal welfare abuse, consumer backlash is manifested in attempts to redistribute the 
power between consumer and supplier. The ability to punish those suppliers deemed 
unethical through boycotting and protest and to reward those displaying genuine 
ethical credentials through buycotting has resulted in various manifestations of 
consumer empowerment directly targeted at changing traditional marketing and 
business behaviour.’327 
Although the amount of influence an individual consumer can have on a company may 
be insignificant in isolation, consumers acting together are capable of great influence.  
A further example to demonstrate the third modulating factor can be seen in the position 
of corporations. Consider a corporation such as Apple that design and market their 
products in the developed world as luxury items, while subcontracting the manufacture 
of these products to factories in China.328  Or consider international retailers such as 
Tesco that manufacture their own brand goods in China.329 Corporations such as these 
benefit greatly from the reduced costs of producing goods in China. Such corporations 
are able to exert a great deal of influence over the emissions that are produced as a 
result of their manufacturing. These examples suggest that different actors can exert 
different levels of influence over the emissions-generating actions from which they are 
benefiting.330 The more influence an actor can be said to have over an action he is 
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voluntarily benefiting from, the more responsibility he should bear for the costs of that 
action, because whether he accepts the benefits or not influences whether the emissions 
take place or not. This actor is therefore linked to the action not just as a beneficiary, but 
also as an actor who is able to influence whether the emissions are produced.  
The RBPP assigns responsibility to beneficiaries of emissions, which may include many 
different actors both upstream and downstream of the actions which produce the 
emissions. It then qualifies the principle with three refinements, which modify the 
degree of responsibility a beneficiary can be said to bear, based on the level of 
development, the degree of voluntariness of acceptance of benefits and the ability to 
exert influence over the emissions. In this way, the RBPP removes the need for the 
polluter pays principle because it will assign responsibility to the polluters unless they 
are not voluntarily benefiting from the action. As we have seen in the examples, where 
the polluter is acting in a way to produce a good or service for the benefit of another 
actor, his responsibility for the emissions will be limited by whether he benefits or not 
from the pollution, and then the extent of responsibility he bears will depend on the 
degree of voluntariness with which he is acting and the influence he is able to exert over 
the emissions. I will now defend the approach to accounting for emissions embodied in 
the RBPP against two objections, both of which relate to the polluter pays principle 
(PPP). 
4.2.2 Objection 1 to the RBPP: It is Counterintuitive to Replace the PPP 
A first objection to the RBPP is that acceptance of a beneficiary pays principle in place 
of a polluter pays principle is counter-intuitive: 
‘In light of the problem of combining the Causal Account and the Beneficiary Account, 
someone might suggest abandoning the Causal Account and simply affirming the 
Beneficiary Account. However, this is an extremely drastic option. It is a deeply 
entrenched view that those who cause a harm have some moral obligation to address 
that pollution. If I release some toxic waste in a river then surely, ceteris paribus, I 
should pay. To deny the Causal Account any role would be highly counterintuitive.’331 
This objection may be correct when applied to several standard versions of the 
beneficiary pays principle, which generally do not consider the question of whether the 
polluters are also the beneficiaries. However, the RBPP claims that the moral 
responsibility of an actor, whether they cause the pollution or not, is dependent upon the 
benefit they receive as a result of the action which causes the emissions.  
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Let us consider the example of a person releasing toxic waste into a river. Imagine two 
different scenarios. In the first scenario, the person releasing toxic waste into the river is 
doing so because disposing of the waste in a responsible manner is costly and he wishes 
to avoid paying those costs. In the second scenario, the person releasing the waste is 
doing so under duress from a third party who has threatened him with some terrible 
deed if he does not do so. The third party is also wishing to avoid the costs of disposing 
of the waste in a responsible manner. Under a polluter pays principle, the causal actor 
would, in most interpretations of the principle found in discussions of climate justice, be 
responsible for his actions in both scenarios. With the RBPP, the beneficiary would be 
responsible in both cases, meaning the polluter in the first case, but not the “polluter” in 
the second case, since there is another actor who is benefiting with a high degree of 
voluntariness and who is exerting control over the polluting action. In this way, the 
RBPP is able to differentiate between the moral relevance of different actors’ actions in 
a way that the polluter pays principle is not. While the example is highly simplified and 
cannot be said to be analogous to many of the emissions examples I have considered, 
my argument suggests that rejecting the polluter pays principle is not always 
counterintuitive. The case of climate change and global trade presents us with a much 
more complicated system of intertwined responsibilities for emissions. The RBPP offers 
a better account of these responsibilities because it recognises the complex moral links 
between actors and emissions rather than focusing simply on the causal connection 
between the polluter and their emissions.  
Let us consider this further. We have seen that the polluter pays principle is intuitively 
plausible, following the universally understood idea that if I break something I should 
pay for it or fix it.332 The RBPP does not contest the moral justification of this widely 
accepted intuition. However, the emission of carbon is not generally something that 
people do accidentally or for the thrill of emitting carbon. It is a means to an end. 
Carbon is emitted in order to create some kind of benefit: heating a home, driving a car, 
producing a consumable good. The RBPP does not challenge the notion that in a case of 
accidental harm, where nobody has benefited, the ‘polluter’ might be held strictly liable 
for the costs. It claims, however, that there are likely to be very few real world 
situations related to climate change that are analogous to this simplified situation. As we 
saw earlier, there may be many cases in which beneficiaries bear a more morally 
relevant link to the emissions than the actual polluters who have not benefited from 
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their action. If the polluter has benefited from his action and fulfils the conditions of our 
RBPP, then he is considered to bear responsibility using both the polluter pays principle 
and the revised beneficiary pays principle. In this way it is both practically preferable, 
since it is likely to encourage actors that are benefiting from emissions to exert their 
influence to reduce emissions, and also provides a more morally robust standard from 
which to attribute responsibility since it covers all actors who are linked to the 
emissions. In response to the first objection, then, I argue that the RBPP is likely to 
provide a more effective response to climate change within a fairer system of shared 
responsibilities.  
4.2.3 Objection 2 to the RBPP: A Reworking of the Principle 
A second objection claims that the RBPP is not a new principle, but simply a reworking 
of the PPP, due to the modulating factor which considers ability to exert influence on 
emissions to be morally relevant. If causal action is considered to be important within 
the RBPP, a critic might argue that in the end, the principle does not look that different 
to an expanded polluter pays principle. This objection suggests that our RBPP assigns 
responsibility to the same actors as the polluter pays principle. For example, in the case 
of emissions embodied in goods, it might be argued that consumers could be considered 
to be polluters, since they are stimulating the demand for the good that they are 
consuming.  
As a first response to this objection, I will consider the polluter pays principle as it is 
used within international texts, thereby showing how it is implemented and understood 
in real world situations, followed by its interpretation within philosophical literature. I 
will then provide a second response that will highlight the key difference between the 
RBPP and PPP, which is the moral relevance of benefit.  
The polluter pays principle is probably the most well known moral principle which 
relates to environmental responsibilities. Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development states:  
‘National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public 
interest and without distorting international trade and investment.’333 
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Within the UNFCCC, the principle forms part of the ethical basis of the principle of 
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities. The interpretation of this can be seen in 
Article 3 of the UNFCCC, which states: 
‘Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of future and present 
generations of human kind on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities. Accordingly, developed 
countries should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof.’334 
The ethical thrust of the polluter pays principle is embodied in this idea that developed 
states should bear more responsibility since they have greater total emissions. They 
contribute more to the problem, so as the polluters, they should bear responsibility. 
Within international texts and negotiations, the idea of the polluter is quite simply 
understood as the one who is causally responsible for the emissions. The discussion of 
the territorial accounting system is evidence of this, showing that those who commit the 
polluting actions are considered to be the polluters who bear responsibility. This is 
evidenced in the way the principle accounts for emissions based upon the territory in 
which they occur.  
It would seem to be stretching the dominant understanding of the PPP to extend the idea 
of who the polluter is to include actors who are not causally responsible for the 
pollution. It would seem better to advocate a different principle, which can quite 
straightforwardly cover all of the relevant actors, rather than trying to stretch and 
reshape the existing principle to include all of the actors we think should bear climate 
duties. In this sense, it would seem far fetched to claim that the polluter pays principle, 
as it is used in international texts, would target the same actors as the RBPP, and 
therefore the RBPP cannot be said to be a simple extension of the polluter pays 
principle.  
Within philosophical discussions, the definition of the polluter pays principle is not as 
straightforward. The idea of the polluter pays principle may be interpreted in some 
situations in such a way as to include some agents that have not physically caused the 
pollution themselves. For example, referring back to the case of the person dumping the 
toxic waste into the river, the PPP might assign responsibility for the emissions to the 
third party who is compelling the causal agent to commit the polluting act. In this way, 
the third party is causing the pollution, and so he can be considered to be the polluter. 
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However, it is not clear that this example can be plausibly applied to the cases that we 
have considered in the previous sections. For example, whilst a consumer can exert 
influence over the products companies produce, a consumer cannot be said to be 
controlling the actions of the producers in the same way as in our simplified example. 
The consumer provides an incentive for the polluters to continue their production of 
goods by buying those goods, but cannot straightforwardly be said to be the polluter 
under a PPP, since the producer of the good producing the emissions is still free to act 
in the way he wishes. In that way, he is still the polluter, though his choices of how 
much to pollute might be influenced by the choices of consumers. The RBPP can assign 
responsibility to both parties, while the PPP cannot easily be stretched to consider the 
consumer to be causing the emissions. The further we get away from simple examples 
of cause and action, the harder it becomes to define the different actors covered by the 
RBPP as polluters under the PPP, and therefore the less similar the two principles look 
in terms of the actors they cover. 
Second, the key response to the objection that the RBPP is simply a reworking of the 
PPP is that the moral basis of the two principles is very different. The RBPP tracks 
benefit, whereas the PPP tracks causal effect. For example, a simplified PPP might 
assign responsibility to the factory worker in China, who, as we have seen gains very 
little from his causal actions and is not acting with a high degree of voluntariness. The 
RBPP allows us to attribute responsibility to other actors who bear a more morally 
relevant link to the emissions than simple causal responsibility. Therefore, even if an 
extended PPP might in some cases assign responsibility to the same actors as the RBPP, 
the moral basis upon which this responsibility is based is very different. The RBPP does 
not claim that causal effect is irrelevant, as it assigns greater responsibility to those who 
are able to exert influence over the action that produces the emissions, but the idea of 
causal responsibility is a condition within the RBPP rather than the basis of the 
principle. So, the RBPP can both cover the relevant agents in a much more 
straightforward way than a PPP could, and is also able to differentiate between the 
different moral relevance of different agents rather than just focusing on their causal 
link to the emissions. In these two ways it is different to a PPP, and cannot be 
considered to be an extension of it.  
4.3 Implications of the RBPP for China 
I have defended the Revised Beneficiary Pays Principle as the relevant principle that we 
should use to allocate responsibility for emissions. I will now consider the further 
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implications of the RBPP for the responsibility China should bear for the emissions 
embodied in the goods it produces for export, in response to China’s claim that these 
should be borne by consumers. I will then make the claim that the RBPP supports 
China’s claim that consumers should bear some responsibility for the emissions 
embodied in the goods they consume, but that this responsibility is not limited to 
consumers in the developed world. 
As we saw in the first section of this chapter, it is China’s claim that instigated the 
discussions in this chapter. This was based on the argument that consumers should bear 
responsibility for the emissions embodied in the goods they consume that are produced 
in China. The discussion has led to the development of the RBPP. As such, the 
implication for China is that while consumers are likely to be considered morally 
relevant beneficiaries by the RBPP, the state of China might also be considered to share 
in the responsibility for the emissions embodied in export goods. The state of China 
actively encouraged the export-led growth it has experienced by welcoming foreign 
investors. China sought to benefit both economically and also in terms of research and 
development intelligence, through imported technologies, which arrived with the 
investors. In terms of the RBPP, the first condition of receiving non-subsistence benefits 
is likely to be fulfilled for a part of the emissions, though some of the benefit gained is 
likely to be fulfilling subsistence needs. For the share of the benefit that is conferring 
non-subsistence benefit, the development factor is likely to be moderately fulfilled for 
the state of China. Different actors within China will have different levels of 
development. The share of the benefits the Chinese state receives that are not fulfilling 
development needs are therefore fulfilling the development factor to a higher degree.  
I shall now consider the implications of the second and third modulating factor on 
China’s responsibility for emissions embodied in export trade. First, the benefits China 
receives from these emissions are accepted with a relatively high degree of 
voluntariness, since China has developed policies specifically to encourage export-led 
growth. Several studies support this claim. Zhang argues ‘China has not only adopted 
the common pro-trade policies, such as the depressed exchange rate and export tax 
rebates, but has long used access to its unique giant customer base as bargaining chips 
to persuade foreign companies to open factories within its borders.’335 Lo and Chan 
show that China’s growth is not simply a result of its comparative advantage and 
instead that China has purposefully developed a competitive advantage in industries 
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such as electronics that are usually located in developed countries in order to boost its 
world exports and thus its growth.336 China’s export industry for electronics became the 
largest in the world in 2010.337 Lo and Chan also argue that China’s exceptional growth 
in this industry is due to policy choices and not a result of market forces. They argue: 
‘The transformation owes much to state promotion, through its industrial policy. One 
measure of the policy is the state-enforced unified negotiation with transnational 
corporations for technology transfer. A second measure, aimed at curbing duplication 
and miniaturization, is the centralized bargaining among local authorities on the 
number, scale and spatial distribution of projects. Both of these have fostered the 
development of linked upstream industries that are capable of substituting for imported 
industrial inputs and machinery.’338 
China has voluntarily benefited from its exports, with growth in GDP and job creation, 
as well as increased know-how learned from foreign companies, and these benefits have 
been gained intentionally by encouraging the relocation to China of foreign companies 
that have been expected to share their technological know-how with Chinese companies 
and also bring economic benefit to China.  
Further evidence of the high degree of voluntariness of China’s actions comes from the 
‘Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-capital Enterprises’, which states 
that foreign companies are welcomed to China, ‘with a view to expanding economic 
cooperation and technological exchange with foreign countries and promoting the 
development of China's national economy’, and that ‘the state encourages the 
establishment of foreign-funded enterprises that export their products or have advanced 
technologies.‘339 Articles 3 and 9 state that ‘enterprises with foreign capital shall be 
established in such a manner as to help the development of China's national economy’, 
and ‘enterprise[s] with foreign capital shall make investments in China within the 
period approved by the authorities in charge of examination and approval’.340 So China 
would be considered to be one of the relevant actors responsible for the costs of the 
emissions it has produced, to the extent that this benefit has been used to fulfil non-
subsistence needs. 
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I have considered the implications of the RBPP for the responsibilities of the Chinese 
state for emissions embodied in trade, showing that the RBPP would allocate some 
degree of responsibility to the state of China for these emissions, though this would be 
limited according to the level of development benefit gained. Returning to China’s 
original claim, the RBPP would support the claim that consumers should share in the 
responsibility for the emissions produced by the goods they consume. However, the 
claim does not only apply to consumers in developed countries. It is interesting to note 
that the EU’s inclusion of aviation emissions in the ETS originally included all flights 
coming to or from European destinations, even if the ultimate starting or ending point of 
the flight was outside of Europe. Amongst other countries, China argued that this was 
unfair and ordered its carriers to ignore the regulations put in place related to the ETS. 
Chinese carriers were liable for fines of 2.4 million euros due to their failure to comply 
with the regulations.341 However, in response to international pressure, the European 
Union decided to make the regulations apply only to flights which begin and end within 
the European Economic Area.342 Figures show that whilst ten per cent of world tourists 
are now Chinese, only 5% of China’s population hold passports.343 Airline flights 
between Europe and China clearly fall into the category of ‘luxury emissions’, and 
given that at most five per cent of China’s population can take such flights, China must 
accept that its affluent citizens are also among the actors who should bear responsibility 
for the benefits they gain from carbon emissions. 
4.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have defended the Revised Beneficiary Pays Principle as the relevant 
principle with which to account for responsibility for emissions. I have built upon the 
arguments from the first two chapters in defending a principle that is consistent with the 
requirements of a fair account of climate justice, in targeting multiple actors and 
respecting the right to development. The principle I have developed is also capable of 
responding to China’s claim that consumers should bear responsibility for the emissions 
embodied in goods produced in China. 
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In response to China’s claim, I first considered consumption accounting as an 
alternative to the current system of territorial emissions accounting. I argued that this 
system would be more effective in accounting for global emissions and would provide a 
fairer accounting system. Emissions that are produced in one area of the world can bring 
benefit to those in other areas of the world. I argued that the place of emission 
constituted less of a morally relevant link to the emissions than gaining benefit from the 
emissions. In developing the moral argument for consumption accounting, I claimed 
that it was the benefit that consumers gained from emissions processes that generates 
responsibilities for the costs. This led me to the objection that if benefit is the morally 
relevant link between emissions and responsible actor, then consumption accounting 
can not fully respond to this claim.  From this point, I defended the Revised Beneficiary 
Pays Principle, arguing that beneficiaries should bear responsibility for the emissions 
when they receive non-subsistence benefits as a result of the emissions processes. I 
defended the RBPP, defining three qualifications of the principle that modify the level 
of responsibility a beneficiary should bear. As a result, responsibility is shared between 
beneficiaries according to their level of fulfilment of the three modulating factors, 
which are: (1) level of development, (2) degree of voluntariness with which benefits are 
accepted, (3) ability to exert influence over emissions.  
The principle defended in this chapter has provided the next step in the development of 
my account of global climate justice, continuing from the development of the multi-
actor, development sensitive approach I defended in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. 
This chapter has provided a response to the question of how to account for emissions. 
The next chapter will further develop the implications of the principle of accounting for 
responsibility for emissions developed in this chapter, in determining how we should 
consider responsibility for historic emissions. 
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Chapter 5 
Responsibility for Historic Emissions 
The previous chapter discussed responsibility for current and future emissions. I 
concluded that benefiting from the emitting process was the morally relevant criterion 
for generating duties for the harms caused by the emissions, and from this position 
suggested that a revised beneficiary pays principle (RBPP) would be the ideal way of 
accounting for emissions. However, climate change will not only be caused by current 
and future emissions since greenhouse gases can remain in the atmosphere for several 
hundred years. The problem we face today is thus in part caused by emissions that were 
produced in the past. This chapter will consider their importance and whether a 
principle of historic responsibility should be used to allocate responsibility for these 
past emissions. The discussion will primarily focus on the implications of historic 
responsibility at the state-level, since states are the key moral actors that have existed 
over the relevant time period. 
5.1 The Context and Implications of Historic Responsibility 
China has on several occasions made the claim that developed states should bear 
responsibility for their historic emissions, since they have contributed more to climate 
change through their large cumulative emissions, than the developing countries have. 
The 2007 Chinese government document ‘China’s National Climate Change 
Programme’ states:  
‘The largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has 
originated from developed countries, while per capita emissions in developing countries 
are still relatively low […] in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, and accordingly, the developed country 
Parties shall take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof.’344 
Elsewhere, a Chinese government release from 2009 states: 
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‘Developed countries shall take responsibility for their historical cumulative emissions 
and current high per capita emissions to change their unsustainable way of life and to 
substantially reduce their emissions and, at the same time, to provide financial support 
and transfer technology to developing countries.’345 
The inclusion of historical responsibility in a burden sharing agreement between states 
is seen as being of great importance not only by China, but also other developing states. 
This is evidenced by the support the principle has received in statements from several 
developing countries individually, but also from assembled groups of countries such as 
the ‘G77 and China’. For example, in a 2010 speech at the United Nations, Bolivian 
President Evo Morales stated: 
‘In the G77 and China … we all agree that the Annex 1 countries that are historically 
responsible for causing greenhouse gas emissions should honour their commitments 
and obligations under international treaties on climate change.’346 
The ‘BASIC’ group of countries, comprising Brazil, South Africa, India and China, 
have made similar joint statements, with their latest Ministerial output document stating 
that ‘the developed countries should take the lead in addressing climate change in 
accordance with their historical responsibilities’.347 Individually, the Brazilian 
delegation to the UNFCCC has been a vocal supporter of historic responsibility, 
producing the well-known ‘Brazilian Proposal’ in the negotiations that led to the 
development of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Brazilian proposal suggested basing 
state level responsibilities entirely upon historical responsibility, by estimating the 
temperature increase each state is responsible for as a result of its historic emissions. 
Whilst the proposal did not receive enough support to be accepted into the protocol, it 
continues to be debated and analysed by a special committee today. 
The principle of historic responsibility is present in international texts, albeit in a less 
explicit manner than that called for by the Brazilian Proposal. Instead, it can be found as 
a part of the responsibility called for by the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’. This was first referenced in the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, which states: 
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‘States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore 
the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions 
to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear 
in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial 
resources they command.’348 
Whilst mentions of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in 
international texts do not explicitly make note of the backwards-looking aspect of the 
principle, it is widely assumed that historic emissions form part of the basis of the 
‘different contributions’ of different actors to climate change.  
The principle of historic responsibility has also been discussed within the philosophical 
literature on climate change. For example, Baer et al argue that ‘the notion of national 
“responsibility for greenhouse gas pollution” is intuitively – and correctly – understood 
in terms of the greenhouse gases that nations have emitted. As such, the baseline 
definition of responsibility must be in terms of cumulative emissions, though there are 
obviously complications in defining and measuring it unambiguously.’349 Caney 
highlights the importance of adequately addressing the issues at stake, stating that 
‘some countries, including the USA and those in Western Europe, have contributed 
disproportionately to the cumulative level of greenhouse gases because they have been 
emitting ever-increasing amounts since the Industrial Revolution … it thus seems quite 
implausible to ignore th[e] historical record’.350 
Practically, the issue of whether we assign a principle of historic responsibility for past 
emissions or not has significant implications for both the United States and China’s 
resulting state level responsibilities, as well as for other developed and developing 
countries. For example, if we include historic emissions in our calculations, and 
consider emissions from 1890-2005, China’s share of cumulative global emissions is 
6.4%.351 Alternatively, if we exclude historic emissions prior to 1990, China’s share 
almost doubles to 12.3%.352 The opposite is true for developed states, whose share of 
total cumulative emissions is greater if historic emissions prior to 1990 are included, 
due to the processes of industrialisation that have taken place in the developed countries 
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over the past 200 years. As Bell states, ‘If pre-1990 emissions should not be counted, 
historic responsibility only extends twenty years into the past. Therefore, the states that 
developed earliest, such as the UK, will be required to pay significantly less toward the 
costs of climate change than they would under an unrestricted principle of historic 
responsibility.’353 The practical importance of the issue of historic responsibility for a 
future burden sharing agreement merits a thorough philosophical investigation.  
This chapter will first consider an argument for historic responsibility based upon a ‘fair 
shares’ approach to historic emissions. First, I will assess the dominant version of this 
argument, which is based upon a principle of equal per capita rights to emissions. This 
approach considers that developed states have used more than their fair share of the 
emissions that they were entitled to based upon the size of their populations. I will 
contest the theoretical basis of equal rights to emissions before showing that we do not 
need to rely on the egalitarian approach in order to make the claim that historic 
emissions of developed states represent an unfair share. Instead, I will appeal to the 
notion that a fair share is defined as the share of the benefits from carbon emissions 
needed to meet subsistence and development rights. I will then consider how the 
objection of excusable ignorance affects responsibility for emissions that took place 
before 1990. I will consider two responses that might be given, neither of which can 
ultimately undermine the excusable ignorance objection. I will then consider a third 
response based upon Bell’s time-relative/time-neutral distinction. I will defend this 
approach and will then use the RBPP to show the implications of this approach for the 
historic responsibility of states, as well as corporations and individuals. I will then 
defend my argument against the non-identity objection. First, I will show that states are 
not subject to the criticism raised. Second, I will contest the importance of the notion of 
diachronic benefit, which is not the only, nor the most morally relevant type of benefit. 
The definition of benefit embodied in the RBPP relies on a threshold notion, which is 
not undermined by the non-identity objection. Finally, I will consider the implications 
of my findings for China. 
5.2 A Fair Shares Approach to Historic Responsibility 
A commonly given argument for historic responsibility claims that we should base our 
division of responsibility between states on the cumulative emissions of each state 
based on the principle of causal responsibility. In line with the polluter pays principle, 
                                                
353 Derek Bell, ‘Global Climate Justice, Historic Emissions, and Excusable Ignorance’, The Monist, 94:3 
(2011): 393.  
 138 
this argument claims that we must track historic emissions in order to give a true picture 
of the causal responsibility of each state for climate change. A state that has contributed 
more to climate change in terms of having higher historic emissions should bear more 
responsibility than a state that has lower cumulative emissions. Space prevents a full 
discussion of this argument here, but as we saw in Chapter Four, there are good reasons 
to claim that causality alone is not enough to determine moral responsibility. If the PPP 
is not suitable for current and future moral responsibility for emissions, then it seems 
doubtful that an argument based upon causality alone can be used to justify greater 
responsibility for states with greater historic emissions. Instead, my analysis in this 
chapter of the detailed level of accountability of an actor will be informed by the RBPP 
developed in Chapter Four. 
Aside from arguments based upon pure causal responsibility, the key argument for 
historic responsibility is based upon the idea that some have used more than their fair 
share of a finite good.354 I will discuss the argument in its most commonly given form 
which relies on the notion of an equal per capita right to emit, before defending a 
version based upon the idea that some have taken more than their fair share of the 
benefits of the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases. I will then use the 
RBPP to assess the degree of responsibility different actors should bear.  
The fair shares argument claims that the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb emissions 
is a finite ‘good’ to which each human being has an equal right. Nobody should use 
more than their fair share in order to stay within the safety boundary and avoid tipping 
the climate over into a state of dangerous change. The argument claims that historic 
emissions count as part of the ‘share’ that developed states have used, and are therefore 
important in determining their responsibility for climate costs. This may take its 
philosophical basis from the widely known ‘Lockean Proviso’ whereby one is entitled 
to make use of natural resources as long as one leaves ‘enough, and as good, for 
others.’355  The situation we face today with the threat of dangerous climate change 
shows us that this is not the case. Some actors, in particular developed states, have used 
too much. The key question the fair shares argument must answer, however, is how to 
define what a ‘fair’ share would be. Several theorists who support the fair shares 
argument have endorsed the idea of equal per capita rights to emit, thereby assessing 
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historic responsibility of states by their per capita emissions. I will discuss the equal per 
capita emissions approach before arguing that it fails to give a satisfactory defence of 
historic responsibility on two counts: (1) There is no reason to think that there should be 
a right to emit; and (2) If we are committed to an equal fulfilment of human rights, then 
we must concede that an egalitarian definition of a ‘fair share’ is likely to be less 
successful than a non-egalitarian approach to emissions. Following this discussion, I 
will defend an approach to historic responsibility based upon a fair shares argument in 
which a fair share is defined in terms of benefits received that are fulfilling development 
needs. 
5.2.1 Egalitarian Fair Shares 
The equal per capita emissions approach to determining historic responsibility using a 
fair shares argument is based upon an intuitive notion that a fair share must be 
calculated using an egalitarian principle. For proponents of this approach, the equal 
moral worth of individuals entails that they each have a claim to an equal share of 
greenhouse gas emissions. As Vanderheiden states, ‘egalitarian principles […] maintain 
that no person is entitled to emit a larger share of a finite good than any other, for this 
would be to ascribe greater value to the lives of those allowed to emit more GHGs 
[greenhouse gases] than those required to emit fewer.’356 Neumayer also defends 
historic responsibility in this way, arguing that ‘countries which have in the past emitted 
in excess of an equal per capita allocation should have less than their equal per capita 
allocation of emission rights in the future, and vice versa for countries which have in the 
past emitted less than their equal per capita allocation.’357 Jamieson has also supported 
the egalitarian principle, arguing that ‘the most plausible distributive principle is the one 
that simply asserts that every person has a right to the same level of GHG emissions as 
every other person’, since, ‘it is hard to see why being American or Australian gives 
someone more right to more emissions, or why being Brazilian or Chinese gives 
someone less of a right.’358  
According to the equal per capita fair shares argument, we can calculate the historic 
responsibility of states in terms of the share of total emissions used, which should be 
correlated to population size if each have had their fair (i.e., equal) share of emissions 
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that were owed to them. Those that have historically used more than this fair share 
should bear greater responsibility for climate costs. 
Let us consider some actual figures in order to situate the claim that some have used 
more than they were entitled to use. In 2002, the historic emissions of developed states 
accounted for 76% of total global cumulative emissions.359 The United States alone 
accounted for 29.3%. China’s total emissions were 7.6% of the total global 
emissions.360 Between 1900 and 2002, China’s population grew from approximately 
400 million to 1.3 billion.361 The population of the United States increased from 76 
million to 282 million during the same period.362 As this shows, the cumulative 
emissions of the United States are almost four times China’s cumulative emissions, yet 
China’s average population over the period is almost five times as large as the United 
States’ population.363 The approximation we can make from the average population 
sizes and percentage of emissions shares tells us that the United States has used almost 
20 times as many emissions per inhabitant as China. In addition, other studies have 
attempted to estimate the exact levels of per capita emissions over historic periods for 
different states. For example, Ding et al find China’s per capita emissions between the 
years 1900 and 2005 to be 24.14 tC, compared to the United States’ 467.88 tC over the 
same period.364 This is consistent with the percentage estimates, as it shows the United 
States per capita emissions to be just over 19 times the per capita emissions of China 
over the same period. Using a slightly differently methodology and analysing date over 
a longer time period, Guoquan et al estimate China’s per capita emissions between 1850 
and 2004 to be 22.89 tC, which is less than half the amount of their calculation of global 
average cumulative emissions per capita of 50 tC.  
The studies show that developed states such as the United States have used a much 
larger relative ‘share’ of the atmospheric capacity to absorb greenhouse gases than 
developing countries such as China. According to an equal per capita approach to 
historic emissions, the United States have therefore used a lot more emissions than they 
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were entitled to, since there is not enough atmospheric space for all inhabitants to be 
able to use the same amount without tipping the climate over into dangerous changes. 
But it is not clear how much more than their ‘fair share’ they have used, since this 
requires an estimation of the total carbon budget. Using the equal per capita approach, 
this total budget should be divided by global population over time in order to calculate a 
fair share in which each country has the same per capita right to emit. Khor has 
attempted to quantify the fair shares argument by estimating the amount of emissions 
that would constitute a fair share. He states: 
‘Science tells us that the world has a limited budget of around 600GtC (or less) of 
carbon emissions to budget between 1800 and 2050 (equivalent to around 2200GtC of 
CO2). Given population ratio between Annex I and non-Annex I countries, the equitable 
share for Annex I countries is 125GtC of the total 600. Non-Annex I should be allocated 
around 475GtC in an equitable system. Annex I countries, however, have already 
consumed 240GtC between 1800 and 2008, which is 115GtC above its fair share of 
125GtC. And, given the scenario of a 50% global cut and an 85% Annex I cut by 2050, 
they will consume another 85GtC between 2009 and 2050. Thus, the total Annex I 
consumption is 325GtC in all from 1800 to 2050. Since its fair share is 125Gt, there is a 
carbon debt of 200GtC.’365 
Khor has estimated the developed states’ historic responsibility in terms of their ‘carbon 
debt’, which is the amount of emissions they have used above their ‘fair share’. By this 
calculation, developed states have used far more than their fair share  and therefore must 
repay their historic carbon debt in terms of greater climate duties today.  
This egalitarian view of the right to emit greenhouse gases provides a response to the 
question of how to define a fair share, and in turn supports the argument for holding 
developed countries responsible for their historic emissions. The have used more than 
the amount they were entitled to, given the assertion that each individual has the right to 
emit the same amount of greenhouse gases. Given the finite nature of the planet’s 
capacity to absorb these greenhouse gases, those who have used more than others have 
acted unjustly since they have taken more than they were entitled to, meaning others 
cannot now take as much. Neumayer summarises this argument, stating: 
 ‘The developed countries have exploited this capacity in excess of what an equal per 
capita allocation would have granted them. Now they must be held accountable for 
it.’366 
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The normative argument is based upon empirical data estimations that show that 
developed states have used more than developing states. They should therefore bear 
greater climate duties to compensate for this injustice. However, there are several 
reasons why we should be sceptical about such an approach, which I will now discuss. 
5.2.2 Problems with ‘Equal Per Capita’ 
Whilst the figures show that indeed developed states have used a much greater share of 
total emissions, it is not clear why this is an unfair share. The equal per capita approach 
claims that emissions rights should simply be divided up by an egalitarian principle. As 
such, this version of the historic responsibility argument only holds if we affirm the idea 
that justice requires each individual to be entitled to use the same amount of carbon 
emissions. I will now discuss several reasons to doubt that this approach can provide a 
defensible account of the requirements of justice.  
Following an interest-based approach to rights, a right is something that a human being 
has an essential interest in. As defined by Raz, ‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have 
rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a 
sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.’367 The benefits 
from engaging with greenhouse gases may enable people to fulfil their vital human 
interests such as keeping warm or cooking food. However, strictly speaking, it does not 
follow that the actual act of emitting greenhouse gases is something that human beings 
have an unqualified, universal interest in, in the form of a right. As we saw in Chapter 
Three, the right to development may permit some to engage in subsistence or 
development emissions, as a matter of rights-fulfilment. However, this is in the context 
of needing to engage in emission-causing actions in order to fulfil the human right to 
development. The interest in emitting greenhouse gases is a contingent interest, 
dependent on the right to development and not linked to a universal right to emit 
greenhouse gases. Following a ‘capabilities’ or goal-based approach to human rights, 
emitting greenhouse gases can help to bring about the achievement of certain goals. As 
Caney argues, the ability to emit greenhouse gases is not the most important factor here. 
He states, ‘what matters is people’s ability to pursue various goals and to enjoy certain 
capabilities. Emissions have value only insofar as they serve these goals’.368 The key 
point is that whilst some have real human interests in being permitted to engage in 
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subsistence or development emissions, the interest is contingent upon a specific set of 
circumstances and is not an interest shared by all human beings. It does not, therefore, 
make sense to view emissions in themselves as a good to which all humans have a right 
to an equal share. The claim that all individuals have the same equal right to emit 
greenhouse gases is unsubstantiated. Let us consider briefly two further points that 
strengthen this conclusion. 
First, there are great differences in availability of efficient energy systems between 
different regions of the world, so even individuals in the same level of poverty or stage 
of development may have differing needs for emissions depending on where they live. 
As Bell argues, ‘different persons may need different resources to achieve the same 
levels of welfare or realise the same capabilities.’369 This may be due to varying energy 
mixes between different countries due to differing availability of resources or technical 
capabilities. For example, technologies are likely to be more advanced and efficient in 
developed countries than in developing countries. Technological advancement, or lack 
of it, may mean that producing the same amount of energy in a developing country 
requires more of a resource than within a developed country with access to more 
efficient technology or less-polluting resources. For example, China’s energy mix is 
dominated by coal to a level of 70%, whilst a country such as France produces 75% of 
its energy generation from nuclear power.370A person living in a country with such a 
developed system generating nuclear power will produce far fewer greenhouse gas 
emissions to heat his or her house than a person living in a country with access only to 
fossil fuel dependent sources of energy. So it is not only the development level of an 
individual that dictates his or her need to emit greenhouse gases, but also the local 
access to and availability of clean resources. 
Second, there is another relevant dimension of inequality related to geography and 
climate rather than availability of clean energy production methods. A person living in a 
cold climate will need to heat themselves more in order to fulfil their human need to 
maintain an adequate body temperature than a person living in a temperate climate, 
simply because their environment is naturally less hospitable. The amount of resources, 
be these greenhouse gas-based or not, needed to keep the person living in the temperate 
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climate will therefore be lower than those needed by the person living in the cold 
climate to fulfil the same needs.                                                                     
The emission of greenhouse gases is a means to an important end, but different amounts 
of resources are needed by different people to fulfil their needs. Indeed, enabling the 
fulfilment of important interests is more likely to be achieved on a wider scale with 
unequal per capita shares, since individuals have different needs for emissions to fulfil 
the same ends.  Equal per capita divisions of greenhouse gas emissions rights would not 
result in an equitable distribution of the correct ‘good’, which is having essential needs 
fulfilled. Since there is no reason to think that there should be equal per capita rights to 
emit greenhouse gases, the fair shares argument in its current form fails to show us that 
the greater emissions by developed states are wrongful. The equal per capita argument 
cannot tell us what a ‘fair share’ would be. It cannot, therefore, be used to defend 
historic responsibility on the basis that the developed states have used more than their 
fair share. 
5.2.3 A Non-Egalitarian Approach to Fair Shares 
In what follows I will defend a version of the fair shares argument in which those who 
have received benefits from emissions that have far surpassed their subsistence and 
development rights are considered to have taken more than their fair share of these 
benefits. The unfairness in the different levels of emissions does not come from the fact 
that some have emitted more than others based upon an egalitarian principle in which 
each individual simply has a right to emit. Instead, it is based upon the normative claim 
that those that have received benefits from luxury emissions have received more than 
their fair share of the benefits of the atmospheric capacity to absorb greenhouse gases. 
From this position, which assesses whether historic emissions were in themselves 
wrongful or not, I will refer to the RBPP to determine the extent of responsibility 
potential duty bearers should bear.  
As I argued in Chapter Three, we might usefully refer to three different classes of 
emissions. Subsistence and development emissions are fulfilling human rights, whereas 
luxury emissions are fulfilling desires rather than needs, and as such, are less morally 
important. Historic emissions can therefore be assessed in terms of the benefits that 
have been gained from them. Developed states have high levels of human development 
and have benefited from their historic emissions to an extent that goes far beyond what 
was needed to satisfy the right to development. In comparison to developing countries, 
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developed states can be said to have taken more than their ‘fair share’ of the benefits of 
engaging in emitting actions since they have gained high levels of luxury benefits far 
beyond that needed for the fulfilment of the development of their citizens. Instead, as in 
Chapter Three, we might argue actors become more and more responsible for emissions 
as they move along the development path. In defining a fair share of historic emissions, 
we might say this is the share that is required to fulfil the right to development, since 
past that point, the benefit gained is no longer fulfilling true needs. Whilst this cannot 
be quantified in an exact manner, some theorists have attempted to ascertain the level of 
emissions needed to fulfil such development needs. Smil, who has estimated the 
minimum amount of emissions required for subsistence, states: 
‘Annual per capita energy consumption of between 50–70 GJ [gigajoules] thus appears 
to be the minimum for any society where a general satisfaction of essential physical 
needs is combined with fairly widespread opportunities for intellectual advancement 
and with the respect for basic individual rights.’371 
At the time of the study, per capita energy use in the United States was 340GJ, which is 
between 6.8 and 4.9 times the 50-70GJ needed for the fulfilment of essential interests as 
estimated by Smil’s findings.372 As we have seen, development is a process which goes 
beyond the fulfilment of essential subsistence needs, so the per capita energy use 
required to fulfil development needs is likely to be above 50-70 GJ. Smil estimates that 
above 110GJ per capita, there are ‘no additional gains’ to issues of moral relevance such 
as infant mortality rates, HDI score or life expectancy, which all reach levels expected 
of highly developed societies at this amount of emissions per capita.373 According to 
Smil’s estimates, therefore, a figure somewhere between 70 and 110GJ is the amount of 
emissions needed to bring the recipient benefits that fulfil development needs. Baer et al 
have suggested that those over a certain level of income, which they define as the 
‘development threshold’, should bear responsibility for their emissions.374 As we saw in 
Chapter Three, the fulfilment of the right to development is not easy to calculate and 
cannot be readily translated into a statistic or numerical threshold. These indicators can 
be useful in suggesting potential ways that development might be measured, but the 
exact methodology is not within the scope of this research. The moral principle I am 
defending considers development to be a scale, along which responsibility for emissions 
is gradually accrued as human development takes place, until benefit from emissions is 
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considered to be fulfilling luxury desires for which actors bear full responsibility. 
Historic responsibility is therefore limited for emissions that were fulfilling 
development needs, as development emissions are considered to form part of an actor’s 
fair share of the benefits of burning greenhouse gases. An unfair share is the share that 
goes beyond fulfilling this need, and the degree of unfairness increases with increasing 
shares of luxury benefits. 
5.2.4 Defending Historic Responsibility as an Unfair Share of Benefits 
I have defended the principle of historic responsibility based upon the claim that 
developed states have taken more than their fair share of the benefits from the global 
commons that is the atmospheric capacity to absorb greenhouse gases. I have rejected 
approaches based on an equal per capita right to emit, which would define a fair share 
as an equal per capita division of the global carbon budget. Instead, I have defined a fair 
share in terms of the benefits accrued from emissions-processes, in which it is 
permissible to benefit from emissions whilst these are serving human development. As 
the developed states have continued their development far beyond that which was 
needed for the fulfilment of the right to development, they have used more than their 
fair share of the atmospheric commons. In defending a non-egalitarian principle I 
appealed to the notion of subsistence and development emissions to show that certain 
states have overused what was necessary for the right to development of their citizens. I 
will now defend this argument against the objection of excusable ignorance, using the 
RBPP to determine the implications of this objection for the historic responsibilities of 
different actors. 
5.3. The Excusable Ignorance Objection 
The excusable ignorance objection claims that at the time many of the historic 
emissions took place the potential harms were unforeseeable, meaning that past actors 
were ignorant of the impact of the actions from which they were benefiting. Their 
ignorance is considered to be ‘excusable’, since they could not possibly have known 
about these harms. 375 Since actors could not have been expected to know about the 
atmosphere’s finite capacity to absorb greenhouse gases within a safe limit, they should 
not be held historically responsible for these emissions. As Beckerman and Pasek 
explain, the ‘notion of moral responsibility is closely linked to the notion of being a free 
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agent, voluntarily carrying out any act, in knowledge of its consequences’.376 The 
‘excusable ignorance’ of historic actors means that they did not know that they were 
taking far more than their fair share of the benefits of the atmosphere’s finite capacity to 
absorb greenhouse gases and so were not acting in a morally wrongful way. 
5.3.1 A Cut-off Date for Excusable Ignorance 
A first response to the excusable ignorance objection is that it is only relevant for a 
certain part of the past. If historic emissions are considered to be cumulative emissions 
up to the current day, then this definition includes a reasonable period of time during 
which the objection is not valid. After a certain moment in time, ignorance about 
climate change became inexcusable, as the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on the 
climate came to be known. Beyond this time, actors were no longer ‘excusably’ 
ignorant of the potential for harm caused by actions that released greenhouse gases from 
which they were benefiting. While it might be arbitrary to choose a single cut-off date 
when ignorance suddenly became inexcusable, it is possible to highlight the timeframe 
in which realisation of the effects of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere 
became known in the international arena. Many theorists set this date in the mid to late 
1980s or early 1990s.  For Neumayer this occurred in the 1980s. He states: 
‘While the first warning of global warming dates back to the last century … it is 
presumably fair to say that it was not before the mid-1980s that the public and decision-
makers became aware of the greenhouse effect.’377  
Bell and Singer have separately suggested that we might use 1990 as our cut-off point, 
both citing the first publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as 
the reason for this choice of date.378The year 1990 seems like a reasonable choice, since 
it is around this date that no further excuse can be made, with the creation of two 
intergovernmental bodies specifically related to climate change. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change was set up in 1988 at the request of members of the United 
Nations. Following this, the ‘Earth Summit’ took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 
launching the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration states: 
‘States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore 
the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions 
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to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear 
in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their 
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial 
resources they command.’379 
From around 1990, therefore, there is evidence that the effects of greenhouse gases on 
the climate were known, since it is around this point that states agreed to work together 
to mitigate climate change. So the objection of excusable ignorance cannot apply to 
responsibility for emissions after around 1990. The first response to the objection 
therefore disputes the objection’s relevance to historic emissions as a whole, claiming 
that it does not apply to historic responsibility for emissions from the recent past.  
However, in relation to historic responsibility, as we saw earlier, the inclusion of 
responsibility for emissions before around 1990 has significant implications for China’s 
share of the climate burden. For the world’s two biggest state-level emitters, a more 
recent cut-off point for historic responsibility means China is responsible for a larger 
share of the cumulative global emissions, whilst the United States’ global share 
decreases. China’s share of global emissions between 1990 and 2005 is 13%, which is 
more than double the 6.4% that China is responsible for if emissions are considered 
between 1890 and 2005.380  
So, even if we accepted that excusable ignorance was only relevant pre-1990, it would 
still have important implications for who should bear responsibility for the costs of 
climate change. Therefore, it matters whether the excusable ignorance objection 
undermines historic responsibility for pre-1990 emissions. I will now consider some 
possible responses to this objection before defending a version of limited historic 
responsibility based upon Bell’s ‘dual-standpoint’ distinction.381 I will then discuss the 
implications of this for historic actors by applying the RBPP. 
5.3.2 Outcome Responsibility 
The appeal to ‘outcome responsibility’ provides a first counter-argument to respond to 
the excusable ignorance argument for pre-1990 emissions. It accepts the claim that 
actors were excusably ignorant, but would still assign a form of limited responsibility 
for these historic emissions. For example, Shue claims:  
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‘Th[e] objection rests upon a confusion between punishment and responsibility. It is not 
fair to punish someone for producing effects that could not have been avoided, but it is 
common to hold people responsible for effects that were unforeseen and 
unavoidable.’382 
Shue claims there is a difference between holding someone morally responsible – in 
which they are guilty and should be punished – and simply holding someone liable for 
costs. He states: 
‘If there were an inequality between two groups of people such that members of the first 
group could create problems and then expect members of the second group to deal with 
the problems, that inequality would be incompatible with equal respect and equal 
dignity […] Once such an inequality has been created unilaterally by someone’s 
imposing costs upon other people, we are justified in reversing the inequality by 
imposing extra burdens upon the producer of the inequality.’383  
By using more than their fair share of atmospheric space, the historic emitters are 
jeopardising the rights of current and future people due to the atmosphere’s finite 
capacity to absorb greenhouse gases without causing dangerous climate change. Those 
that have created the inequality should be required to correct this imbalance by reducing 
their emissions back to the level of their fair share in order to allow space for 
development emissions of those whose development will otherwise be restricted.  
Miller makes a similar claim in suggesting that we can hold persons responsible for 
their actions in the absence of moral responsibility. He states: 
‘[Nations] cannot be held morally responsible, or blamable, for these emissions—moral 
responsibility and blame require that the agent in question either knew or was in a 
position where he or she should have known that the action in question was harmful. 
But these nations might nonetheless be held responsible in a wider sense that carries 
with it responsibilities to counteract the damage caused.’384  
Miller calls this ‘outcome responsibility’ in which it is the responsibility of the actor to 
provide remedial assistance where the outcomes of his or her actions result in costs. For 
Miller, such ‘outcome responsibility’ ‘may be enough to trigger remedial responsibility 
in certain cases, [since] the causal relationship suffices to pick [the causally responsible 
agent] out from the universe of others who might also [provide] aid.’385 Miller argues 
that several different types of responsibility may translate to a duty to pay for costs, 
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including, but not limited to, moral responsibility. What is key for Miller is that 
someone does pay for the costs. He states:  
‘The point to bear in mind is that the weight of justification is borne by the pressing 
need to relieve  [the victims of the harm], and the necessity of identifying a particular 
agent as having the obligation to provide the relief.’386 
Miller’s justification, therefore, seems to apply in situations where the imperative is that 
the rights of the victims are fulfilled, and where we should find the most appropriate 
person to bear this duty. It is justifiable in this case to require the actor to bear the costs, 
even if their actions were not morally blameworthy. The non-violation of rights is seen 
as being the most important consideration, overriding concerns we might have about 
being unfair to excusably ignorant actors. In legal terms, allocating duties to those who 
are outcome responsible but not morally responsible is known as ‘strict liability’. 
Gardiner defines strict liability as the situation ‘where a party causing harm is liable for 
damages even when not guilty of negligence’, and states that this ‘has been successfully 
upheld in several environmental cases and employed in environmental legislation.’387 
However, a critic might respond that rights are being prioritised to an extent that places 
unfair costs upon the duty bearers.388 As Caney argues: 
‘To make (excusably) ignorant harmers pay is to prioritize the interests of the 
beneficiaries over those of the ascribed duty-bearers. It is not sensitive to the fact that 
the alleged duty-bearers could not have been expected to know. Its emphasis is wholly 
on the interests of the rights-bearers and, as such, does not adequately accommodate 
the duty-bearer perspective.’389  
Let us consider an example. Imagine two persons, Mr. Green and Mr. Blue. Both are 
poor, and each has only one piece of bread to eat, which is the minimum needed in 
order to avoid starvation. In going about his business in a normal way, Mr. Green is 
responsible for bringing about a situation in which Mr. Blue’s piece of bread disappears. 
He did not act in a morally blameworthy way, and could not have possibly known the 
impacts of his actions on Mr. Blue’s livelihood. However, the situation is very serious 
as Mr. Blue now has no bread. Approaching the situation purely from the point of view 
of the rights-holder without considering the weight of the costs being placed on the duty 
bearer might lead us to conclude that Mr. Green should give his piece of bread to Mr. 
Blue. However, this would be imposing an unreasonable cost upon Mr. Green as he 
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only has one piece of bread, and we might therefore claim that this is unfair since his 
actions were not wrongful and he could not have known the consequence of his action.  
Following Caney’s claim, this highly simplified example gives us cause to reconsider 
the claim that actors can be held liable for the costs despite being excusably ignorant, 
since this may be unreasonably demanding on actors who have not acted in a morally 
wrongful way. In the fictional example, we might well feel that it is unfair to demand so 
much of Mr. Green. Our intuition is consistent with the moral conclusion we have 
drawn separately, that it would be unfair to expect excusably ignorant Mr. Green to 
impoverish himself by bearing liability for the unforeseeable costs he has imposed on 
Mr. Blue. However, the same is not true of historic responsibility for emissions, in 
which the argument that developed states should bear responsibility for their historic 
emissions is intuitively plausible and does not seem to ask too much of the duty bearers. 
This intuition is helpful in furthering and testing any theory of justice. As Kymlicka 
states, ‘we have an intuitive sense of right and wrong, and it is natural, indeed 
unavoidable, that we try to work out its implications.’390 However, as Miller states, ‘we 
should be looking for principles of fairness that are independently valid, not just ones 
that give us the answers we were hoping to get in the first place.’391  
We might consider that in the case of historic responsibility for climate change, what is 
doing the work here is that being held liable for the resulting costs would not be likely 
to impoverish those responsible for historic emissions. One might simply suggest 
adding a clause specifying that the costs must not be overly demanding on the duty 
bearers. Indeed, Gardiner appeals to the ease with which developed countries could pay 
the costs in his argument defending historic responsibility.392 In this case, historic 
responsibility might only hold when duty bearers can afford to pay the costs. However, 
as Bell argues: 
‘If it is unfair to hold excusably ignorant emitters strictly liable because their ignorance 
prevented them from making an informed choice not to engage in emissions-generating 
activities, it is not clear that the unfairness ‘disappears’ just because excusably 
ignorant emitters can easily afford to pay the costs. In general, we do not assume that if 
I can easily afford to pay costs that have been unfairly imposed on me, it was not unfair 
to impose those costs on me.’393 
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On the basis of historic responsibility, it does not seem fair to assign costs to one 
excusably ignorant emitter because he can afford to pay if we excuse another actor who 
has acted in the same way but is less wealthy. What seems to be important in this 
account is ability to pay rather than historic responsibility. So, the first response to the 
objection of excusable ignorance for pre-1990 emissions fails as it must rely on a 
principle of ability to pay in order to not be overly demanding on duty bearers. As such, 
it does not provide a counter-argument to the excusable ignorance objection in support 
of historic responsibility, but instead must abandon historic responsibility since its 
ultimate moral assessment of who should bear costs is instead based upon an ability to 
pay principle. 
5.3.3 Liability Limited to Amount of Benefits Received  
However, an alternative way of limiting costs placed upon duty bearers has been 
suggested by Caney, which does not require an appeal to an ability to pay principle. 
Caney suggests that we might limit the liability of excusably ignorant actors to the 
amount of benefit they have received from the emissions for which they are being held 
responsible. This principle is sensitive to the weight of demands being placed on duty 
bearers, but it is also consistent with the principle of historic responsibility since the 
limiting factor is in direct correlation to the actor’s relationship with the historic 
emissions by way of benefits received. This received benefit is the relevant factor in 
Caney’s approach. He states: 
‘We should adopt a modified strict liability principle where this holds that if people 
engage in activities which jeopardize other people’s fundamental interests by emitting 
excessive amounts of greenhouse gases then (i) they should bear the costs of their 
actions even if they were excusably ignorant of the effects of their actions if they have 
benefited from those harmful activities and (ii) their costs should correspond to the 
benefits they have derived.’394 
In recognising the moral relevance of the benefit received, Caney’s modified strict 
liability approach moves closer towards the RBPP, in which the benefit received from 
emissions is morally relevant. Caney states: 
‘In particular, the complaint that it is unfair to make them pay for effects they could not 
have anticipated loses its force here because, and to the extent that, they have also 
benefited from this harmful behaviour.’395 
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This argument would therefore assign ‘limited’ liability to the excusably ignorant actor, 
limited in terms of costs not exceeding the value of benefit received from the action. 
The actor is not being punished, as he is only returning the value of the benefit gained 
by the action that caused the harms, and therefore incurring no net costs to himself. The 
limited liability response to excusable ignorance would require those who had used 
more than their fair share to reduce their own emissions to make room for those who 
would experience harms as a result of not being able to use their fair share of the 
atmospheric space. 
However, though Caney’s principle is ‘intuitively plausible’, as Bell argues, it is not 
‘adequately justified’ in making excusably ignorant actors liable for costs, even if these 
are strictly limited.396 He states: 
‘Neither Caney nor Gardiner provides a convincing theoretical justification of this 
account of liability.  More specifically, they do not explain why causal responsibility is 
morally significant when the causally responsible agent is excusably ignorant and, 
therefore, not morally responsible (i.e., liable for blame) for their actions.’397 
Accordingly, Bell provides an alternative approach, which is capable of providing an 
adequate justification of limited liability for excusably ignorant actors. Bell makes the 
distinction between a ‘time-relative’ position, from which we can make judgements 
about moral responsibility, and a ‘time-neutral’ position, from which we can judge right 
and wrong.398 As Bell explains: 
‘Judgements about the moral responsibility (i.e., blameworthiness) of an agent for her 
acts should be based on the information that the agent could have been expected to have 
at the time of her acts. If she was excusably ignorant of the consequences of her acts, 
she should not be liable for blame or punishment. We might say that the informational 
base for judgements about moral responsibility is ‘time-relative’ or ‘time-bound’ 
because it is limited to the information that the agent should have acquired at the time 
of her act. In contrast, the informational base for judgements about right and wrong is 
‘time-neutral’ or ‘timeless’ because there are no limits on when we acquire the 
information on which we make such judgements. So, we might judge now – on the basis 
of our best current information – that the acts of previous generations were wrong 
while also judging – on the basis of the information that they could have been expected 
to have at the time – that they should not be blamed for their acts. Moreover, if new 
information comes to light in the future, we may revise our current judgements about 
whether the acts of previous generations were right or wrong. In other words, our 
judgements about right and wrong will always remain provisional because they can 
only be confirmed when we have perfect information.’399  
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Bell’s distinction allows us to simultaneously hold that in the ‘time-relative’ sense an 
actor did not act in a morally blameworthy way due to being excusably ignorant, yet in 
a ‘time-neutral’ sense, the actor should bear limited liability for these acts that we now 
know were wrong. It can therefore justify the position of limited liability for the costs of 
an act that occurred at a time when the actor was excusably ignorant. However, Bell 
adds a further clarificatory point, which aims to counter critics of strict-liability. Such 
critics might claim that it is only the time-relative information that is relevant, since it is 
only by the knowledge that existed at the time of the action that the actor should be 
assessed, and not by what has been learned afterwards. As such, we might limit our 
approach to actors that are capable of taking on a ‘dual standpoint’ position, in which 
they are still in existence once the time-neutral truth about the wrongfulness of the 
historic emissions from which they benefited has been discovered. In line with the 
multi-actor approach, states, and to a lesser extent, corporations, may fulfil this role, 
having existences that continue over time. Some older individuals might also be 
included. But the exact implications for the extent to which each actor is historically 
responsible will depend on the wider approach to climate justice we take. As Bell states, 
‘we can only judge which historic emissions-generating acts were wrongful once we 
have an account of justice (based on our best current account of the circumstances of 
justice), which tells us which emissions-generating acts were just and which were 
unjust.’400 As a starting point in responding to this need, I will now consider the 
implications of the principles of the RBPP for historic responsibility based upon the 
unfair share of benefit developed states have gained, building upon Bell’s time-
relative/time-neutral distinction as justification against the excusable ignorance 
objection. 
5.3.4 Historic Responsibility According to the RBPP 
As the main negotiating actors in a future climate burden sharing agreement, historic 
responsibility is of most relevance to the duties of states. States are moral agents that 
exist over long periods of time. Many developed states existed at the time of the 
industrial revolution and are still in existence today. States are therefore capable of the 
‘dual standpoint’ position, which, as we will see, allows us to hold them responsible for 
pre-1990 emissions despite their excusable ignorance of the effects of their actions. 
They can review their past actions with a time-neutral view and bear limited liability, 
the extent of the limitation coming from the implications of the RBPP.  
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According to the RBPP, accountability for emissions is conditional upon having 
received non-subsistence benefits from greenhouse gas emissions. Developed states 
clearly meet this necessary condition. However, in contrast to current accountability, a 
smaller amount of emissions should be considered since benefits from the very first 
emissions at the beginning of the path to development are likely to have involved more 
subsistence emissions. Furthermore, unlike current emissions, a proportion of the 
historic emissions of developed states have contributed to development benefits. As I 
argued in earlier chapters, as actors move along the development scale, they become 
more responsible for the benefits they receive from emissions that are no longer serving 
subsistence needs. At some point along their histories, developed states began to acquire 
responsibility for the benefits they were gaining from their emissions at the top end of 
development, moving into the category of luxury emissions. So, unlike current 
emissions, the historic emissions of developed states might have mainly produced 
benefits that met subsistence or development needs. As development level is a 
modulating factor for responsibility, this means that responsibility for total historic 
emissions should be reduced, compared to responsibility for current emissions from 
which they benefit. These current benefits meet the necessary condition of being non-
subsistence benefits, as well as generating greater responsibilities due to the high level 
of fulfilment of the development factor in the nature of luxury benefits. However, the 
benefit from past emissions is an integral part of developed states ability to receive high 
levels of luxury benefits today, since the high levels of industrial and economic growth 
that are responsible for the historic emissions are also largely responsible for the 
standard of living and affluence of developed states today. As Baer et al assert, 
developed states have ‘benefited permanently (as by increased wealth and 
infrastructure)’ from these historic emissions.401  
So, whilst the development modulating factor limits responsibility for early emissions, 
the extent of luxury emissions since that point and up to today means that there is a 
large quantity of historic emissions that satisfy the development factor to a high degree. 
The level of responsibility for historic emissions by states that industrialised early on 
therefore should not be severely limited by the development factor of the RBPP. States 
that are still developing should bear less responsibility for their historic emissions. This 
raises an interesting point for developing states such as China as it suggests that they 
should bear less responsibility for their historic emissions, since a large proportion of 
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these were for development benefits. As the level of development is still not very high 
in developing states, the benefits gained from these emissions in the past are likely to 
have been quite low down the development scale, and as such entail more limited 
responsibility. So, historic emissions of developed states before 1990 count as having 
fulfilled the development factor to a much higher degree than historic emissions of 
developing states. This is as well as historic emissions from developing states being 
much lower in an absolute sense. The development factor of the RBPP tells us that 
much greater historic responsibility should be borne by developed states, since they 
have received high levels of luxury benefits.  
The second modulating factor in the RBPP is an actor’s ability to exert influence over 
the generation of the emissions from which they benefit. Since the emissions for which 
we are allocated responsibility took place in the past, the actors bearing responsibility 
now cannot possibly exert influence on these emissions. However, as an actor that can 
take on the dual standpoint position, states were able to exert influence on the emissions, 
at the time they occurred. But the time-relative judgement of excusable ignorance limits 
the resulting responsibility since an actor cannot meaningfully exert influence over 
emissions if he is not aware of any reason to act in such a way as to bring about a 
reduction in emissions. As such, the second modulating factor would support a more 
limited degree of responsibility for excusably ignorant past emissions. The ability to 
exert influence factor is only weakly fulfilled, since states were theoretically capable of 
exerting influence over their historic emissions, but were unaware of the need to do so 
at the time they occurred. So, the extent of the states’ ability to exert influence on 
emissions limits the degree of responsibility from the RBPP since (1) beneficiaries with 
the dual-standpoint perspective can no longer exert influence over the actions that 
caused the emissions, and (2) even though states had the ability to exert influence over 
the emissions, they were excusably ignorant of the need to do so at the time when it was 
possible for them to exert this influence. 
The degree of voluntariness is the final modulating factor that can influence the extent 
of the duties the beneficiary should bear. At the time of the emissions, developed states 
were not receiving benefits with a high degree of voluntariness since they were not 
aware of the harm being caused by the emissions. They were not wilfully choosing to 
keep benefits because the (time-relative) information available to them did not suggest 
that acceptance of benefits from emissions was morally wrongful. However, the degree 
of voluntariness clause is particularly interesting in the case of historic responsibility for 
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emissions when we consider the time-relative/time-neutral distinction, since acceptance 
of benefits from past emissions continues today. In the current day, states are capable of 
seeing their historic emissions from the time-neutral perspective. As Bell argues: 
‘If [the actor] does learn that she has unknowingly acted wrongly in the past, she 
should, as a moral agent, who cares about right and wrong, regret her (excusably 
ignorant) wrongful act. She cannot change the past. However, if she sincerely regrets 
that she has acted wrongly, she should not want to have benefited from her wrongful act. 
Therefore, she should be willing to accept that she should not retain the benefits derived 
from her wrongful acts. Instead, these benefits may be transferred to the victims of her 
wrongful acts to rectify (or partially rectify) the wrong that she has done.’402 
If an actor is unwilling to transfer the gained benefits once the time-neutral perspective 
allows the wrongfulness of the actions that caused the benefits to become apparent, then 
the benefits have been accepted with some degree of voluntariness. Developed states 
can adopt both standpoints, and yet continue to benefit from high levels of luxury 
emissions, both domestically as well as those embedded in imported goods. The high 
standard of living in developed countries is a direct result of the benefits gained by 
industrialisation.  It seems quite unlikely that the benefits brought about from 
industrialisation would have been rejected, had the time-neutral truth been revealed to 
states at the time of historic emissions.  If there was a serious belief that benefits should 
not have been accepted, then, as Shue argues, ‘it would have been conceivable that as 
soon as evidence began to accumulate that industrial activity was having a dangerous 
environmental effect, the industrial states would have adopted a conservative or even 
cautious policy of cutting back greenhouse-gas emissions or at least slowing their rate 
of increase.’403 Baatz makes a similar point, suggesting that acceptance of the time-
neutral claim of the wrongness of past emissions is inconsistent with keeping the 
benefits gained from these emissions. He states, ‘if we consider undeserved suffering as 
something bad that should be mitigated, would it not be odd to simultaneously insist on 
retaining the (enormous) benefits resulting from the harmful action?’404 
Current benefits from historic emissions have been accepted with a high degree of 
voluntariness by developed states. Knowing that these benefits have been accepted so 
readily today by states in spite of their the dual-standpoint perspective, it seems 
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reasonable to assume that these benefits would also have been accepted voluntarily by 
the same actor at the time they were excusably ignorant.  
As we have seen, a large proportion of the historic emissions of developed states are 
associated with luxury benefits and so display a high level of fulfilment of the 
development factor of the RBPP. The degree of voluntariness is high for benefits 
received by states today, and their acceptance of these benefits implies tacit acceptance 
of past benefits. So, the first two factors are fulfilled to a high degree. However, the 
excusable ignorance of emissions prior to 1990 limits the degree of fulfilment of the 
ability to exert influence. This should limit responsibility for past emissions. As such, 
the findings of the RBPP support a limited principle of liability for historic emissions 
from which developed states have benefited. So, in line with the approaches suggested 
by Caney or Bell, the RBPP would also support limited liability for historic emissions, 
in which costs would be limited to the extent of the benefit received. 
To the extent that corporations are also capable of existing over a long period of time 
and therefore having the dual-standpoint perspective, they might also be expected to 
bear limited liability for the benefit they have gained from historic emissions prior to 
1990. However, it is likely that this responsibility will be limited since the identity of 
corporations that have existed over longer timeframes is likely to be complicated. For 
example, larger companies can buy smaller companies, they can be nationalised, 
privatised, or multinational mergers can result in corporations having different identities 
in different parts of the world. Importantly, in a different way to states, the benefits 
corporations gain from emissions are likely to primarily take the form of immediate 
financial gains that are passed directly to shareholders. Many of these individuals, in 
this case fulfilling the role of corporate shareholders, are no longer alive. Since 
corporate structures are different to states in the way of passing on profits directly to a 
few individuals, the existence over time of the whole body that encompasses ‘the 
corporation’ is not as clear as in the case of the state. Whilst the citizens of states have 
also changed over time, the state itself gained a large proportion of the benefits accrued 
from the past emissions in terms of technological advancement, infrastructure and 
wealth. State benefits, unlike corporate benefits, are not simply passed on as profit to 
past shareholders. 
A corporation is therefore not capable of taking on the dual-standpoint perspective in 
the same way, unless the full corporate body is still in place. As such, the excusable 
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ignorance argument is more troublesome for corporate duties, since in many cases the 
same actor does not exist over the relevant time period. This also affects the 
implications of the RBPP for corporate historic responsibilities, since the corporation, 
as it exists currently, may never have had the ability to exert influence over the past 
emissions. So, while we should expect corporations to bear climate duties for current 
and future emissions, corporate responsibility for historic emissions prior to 1990 is 
likely to be limited to a small handful of corporations with strong identities that have 
existed over time.  
Older individuals that have been benefiting from non-subsistence emissions since 
before 1990 will also be liable for limited historic responsibility in a similar way to 
states, since they are capable of the dual-standpoint perspective. Other individuals will 
bear costs associated with historic responsibility primarily due to their role as citizens. 
The benefits that individuals receive today from past emissions are largely through 
benefits they receive from the highly developed infrastructure of the states in which 
they live. The state is the actor that has been present over time, but current citizens at 
each moment in time benefit from these historic emissions that have created the state, as 
they know it. Current citizens therefore inherit the benefits the state has gained from 
historic emissions, and their level of responsibility is modulated to the extent that they 
individually fulfil the criteria of the RBPP. The fact that current individuals cannot exert 
influence on emissions that took place before they were born does limit the extent of 
their responsibility. Individual levels of responsibility for historic responsibility will 
therefore be modulated by the degree to which they voluntarily engage with the luxury 
benefits the state has gained from historic emissions. 
I will now consider a further objection to my account, which questions the idea that 
benefit can be transferred between generations. This is the non-identity objection. I will 
defend my account of limited historic responsibility against the non-identity objection 
by referring to a specific notion of benefit.  
5.4 The Non-Identity Objection 
As we have seen, climate change is a problem that spans generations. We have so far 
argued that developed countries should bear responsibility for their historic emissions 
due to the benefits that they have gained from these actions. The benefit received is the 
morally relevant relationship between states and their historic emissions. However, one 
argument claims that this is not possible due to the problem of ‘non-identity’. The 
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concepts of harm and benefit are philosophically complicated. How exactly do we 
define whether somebody has either been harmed by or has benefited from an action? In 
defining benefit, Caney suggests that ‘A benefits from X if A is better off with X than 
she would otherwise have been’.405 He calls this the ‘standard definition’, which he 
finds ‘a pretty plausible conception of “benefit.”’406 Pogge affirms this idea of a 
standard definition of harm or benefit as making somebody worse or better off than they 
were. He refers to this as a ‘diachronic’ notion of harm or benefit, and states, ‘someone 
is harmed when she is rendered worse off than she was at some earlier time.’407 So we 
can benefit someone if we make them better off than they would have been, compared 
with an earlier moment in time.  
The non-identity objection claims that future generations cannot be harmed or benefited 
by current generations, and likewise, we cannot say that current generations have been 
benefited by previous generations. This objection rests upon the fact that our conception 
as human beings is highly dependent on a number of different factors, each of which 
shares responsibility for our individual existence. If an event had happened in my 
mother’s past that had caused her to leave England and move to Australia, then ‘I’ in the 
very specific, individual nature of the word, would have not been born, as my individual 
existence is contingent on many different factors, some of which would not have been 
the same had this event happened. Parfit states, ‘if any particular person had not been 
conceived when he was in fact conceived, it is in fact true that he would never have 
existed.’408 The standard definition of benefit requires a person to have been made 
better off than he or she would otherwise have been. The non-identity objection states 
that each individual person is a result of decisions made by previous generations, and 
therefore cannot be said to have been harmed or benefited by them, for if different 
decisions had been made, a genetically different person would have come to be.  
In the case of historic emissions, the act of industrialisation had a major effect on the 
lives of past generations. Parfit states, ‘how many of us could truly claim, ‘Even if 
railways and motor cars had never been invented, I would still have been born’?’409 As 
Caney states, individuals ‘have not been made better off than they would have been by 
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industrialization because without industrialization they would not have been at all.’410 If 
we imagine ourselves in the place of the past emitters, had we stopped industrialising, 
we would have changed the individuals who would be born today. By this account, the 
current generation of people cannot be said to have been benefited or harmed by 
industrialization. Historic emissions cannot have brought any benefit to current 
generations by way of the permanent benefits of industrialisation, since without 
industrialisation they would not have been. I will first show that the non-identity 
objection does not apply to states, since they exist over time. Second, I will show that 
the non-identity objection only applies to one conception of the notion of benefit. I will 
argue that the threshold definition of benefit above the subsistence level that underpins 
the fair shares approach and the RBPP is not subject to the non-identity argument. 
5.4.1 Collective Identities Over Time 
The first response to the non-identity objection is that it does not apply to states, since 
states exist over time and are therefore not brought into existence as a result of the 
historic emissions. As Page states: 
‘Nation states are often recognised as being singular, ethical, as well as legal, entities – 
possessing a separate identity and the right of self-determination. It is this identity that 
gives rise to the demands of many nations to be seen as ethical subjects in their own 
right’.411 
The continuous nature of the identity of the state means that it is capable of benefiting 
from emissions that took place in the past. Its identity is not contingent upon these 
emissions since its identity was in existence before the emissions took place right up to 
the current day. As Caney explains: 
‘Whereas we cannot say that industrialization has bestowed (net) advantages on 
currently existing individuals that they would otherwise be without, we can say that 
industrialization has bestowed (net) advantages on currently existing countries (such as 
Britain) that they would otherwise be without.’412 
It follows, therefore that the non-identity objection is of little concern to the claim that 
states should bear responsibility for past emissions.  
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5.4.2 Defining Benefit  
Whilst the first response to the non-identity argument has claimed that it does not apply 
to states, which are the main duty bearers, of historic responsibilities, this response 
leaves open the question of whether the non-identity objection rules out responsibilities 
for actors that do not have the same existence over time, such as individuals and most 
corporations. I will now suggest a second response, which is applicable to the benefits 
of historic emissions gained by all actors. 
The non-identity objection applies to a specific definition of benefiting, which requires 
a previous reference point in which persons were less well off, or in which they would 
have been less well off. However, benefitting can be understood in other ways. As 
Pogge shows, the standard ‘diachronic’ definition of harm is ‘often not the morally 
relevant one’.413 He continues, ‘A man is not benefitting the members of his family if he 
beats them up less often than he used to. He is still harming them, albeit less severely 
than before.’414 This ‘standard definition’ of benefit leads to the perverse conclusion 
that an actor can be benefitting even if they are still being harmed, simply because the 
violent outbursts happen less frequently than before. Compared to being beaten up 3 
times a day, the family is benefited if this then only happens once a day. This definition 
of benefit is clearly misguiding, and even without the non-identity problem, there seem 
to be good reasons for not defining benefit in such a way. 
Instead, benefit and harm can be approached from the point of view of a threshold. 
Below the threshold, people are considered to be harmed, and above the threshold they 
are benefited as they receive goods that increase their level of welfare. Let us 
demonstrate this concept with the notion of harm in the previous example of the abusive 
relationship. The threshold notion of harm shows us that the wife is still being harmed 
by the less frequent beatings, as she has a right as a human being not to be violently 
attacked. By attacking her, albeit less often, the husband is harming her according to our 
threshold definition. This ‘subjunctive’ view of harm is sensitive to what human beings 
need rather than simply what they have or haven’t got when compared to a previous or 
hypothetical moment.  
The threshold definition of benefit is consistent with the necessary condition of the 
RBPP, which is to receive non-subsistence benefit. Above the threshold, the benefit 
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received is considered to be morally relevant. Benefitting is not relative to the same 
actor’s situation at an earlier point in time, but relative to the threshold above which 
benefits are non-subsistence. The degree of benefit considered to be gained increases 
with the level of development of the actor. Luxury benefits constitute another threshold, 
above which beneficiaries should bear full responsibility, subject to the modulating 
factors of the RBPP. The notion of benefit put forward by the RBPP, therefore, is what 
Pogge calls a ‘subjunctive’ notion, based upon a threshold. The threshold definition of 
benefit is consistent with the claim that current generations have benefited from historic 
emissions. For example, in the mid-1800s, life expectancy was 40 years in the United 
Kingdom.415 Today it is over 80 years.416 Much of the benefit received before full 
industrialisation is likely to have been subsistence. Medical advances, infrastructure and 
hospitals, energy to power homes for warmth, fridges for food storage are just some of 
the ‘permanent benefits’ that developed countries have received that have ensured 
benefits fulfil subsistence needs. Those that have received these benefits and have 
passed the level of subsistence are candidates for bearing responsibility for historic 
emissions, the degree of which is then modulated by the RBPP.   
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have defended an approach to historic responsibility based upon the 
wider principle that justice entitles actors to the share of the benefits of atmospheric 
capacity to absorb greenhouse gases needed to fulfil subsistence and important human 
development needs. My distinctive fair shares approach claims that historic 
responsibility for past emissions should be determined on the basis that those that have 
taken more than the benefits of historic emissions needed for their subsistence and 
development have taken an unfair share. Developed states are therefore considered to be 
the primary actors in bearing responsibility for historic emissions since they have taken 
far more than their fair share of the benefits of emissions from the past two hundred 
years. The objection of excusable ignorance led me to conclude that actors could not 
bear full moral responsibility for past emissions. However, this does not mean that they 
cannot be held liable for their past emissions. Developed states are now aware of the 
atmosphere’s limited capacity to absorb greenhouse gases, and as such, in realising that 
this means they have taken more than their fair share of the benefits, should be willing 
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to reduce their emissions to the level of a fair share. This conclusion is supported by the 
assessment of the level of responsibility allocated to historic emissions based upon the 
RBPP. Whilst the ability to exert influence is a limiting factor for historic responsibility, 
luxury benefits over time have been accepted with a high degree of voluntariness. 
Following this claim, I then considered the implications of the ‘non-identity’ objection. 
I responded to this objection by showing that it does not undermine the benefit received 
by states, since their identity is continuous over the time period. Furthermore, I argued 
that the notion of benefit defined by the RBPP is subject to the necessary condition of 
being above a threshold of subsistence, and as such is not undermined by the non-
identity objection. 
We started this chapter with China’s claim that developed states should bear greater 
responsibility due to their historic emissions. The argument in this chapter would go 
some way to supporting this claim. The argument has shown that since the ability to 
exert influence factor of the RBPP is not satisfied, responsibility for historic emissions 
should be limited. Several theorists have suggested some degree of limited liability, 
with Caney and Bell agreeing that this should be limited by not requiring costs to 
exceed benefits received. Developed states do have a duty to act to make up for using an 
unfair share of the atmosphere’s finite capacity to absorb greenhouse gases, though 
these duties are limited compared to responsibility for current emissions. However, it is 
not clear that limiting liability so that it does not exceed the value of benefits received is 
likely to result in greatly reduced duties in the case of historic emissions and the 
benefits developed states have gained from these. As Bell states: 
‘It may be reasonable to assume that the benefits derived from wrongful emissions-
generating acts by states that developed early were sufficiently large that the principle 
of limited liability may closely approximate to the unrestricted principle of historic 
responsibility.’417 
The argument in this chapter has shown that emissions that occurred before around 
1990 should not be ignored as a result of excusable ignorance. China is therefore 
justified in claiming that developed states should bear greater responsibility than 
developing states for their greater historic responsibility. Developing states have only 
recently begun to benefit from emissions further along the development scale, and so 
they should begin to bear more responsibility for current benefits, but a fair burden 
sharing agreement should take historic responsibility of developed states into account. 
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The defence provided in this chapter has further developed my theory of climate justice 
developed in Chapters Two, Three and Four, by considering the relevance of how we 
account for responsibility for historic emissions. The next chapter will consider the 
implications of the account I have developed in assessing whether China’s climate 
policy commitment to reduce emissions intensity is consistent with this theory of 
climate justice. 
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Chapter 6  
China’s Emissions Intensity Reduction Pledge 
At the 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, which took place in Copenhagen in 2009, China made a pledge to 
reduce its emissions intensity. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, China has 
stated on several occasions that its priority is poverty eradication and development, and 
that developed states should take the lead on climate change. As such, as opposed to a 
cap on absolute emissions, China’s target proposes that for each unit of GDP in 2020, 
there will be 40-45% fewer carbon emissions than in 2005. This reduction in intensity is 
not a cap on emissions, but instead aims to increase the efficiency of China’s energy 
system, whilst allowing for emissions growth linked to development. China’s pledge is 
consistent with the UNFCCC’s requirements for developing countries, whose ‘peak’ of 
emissions will take place later than developed countries. India has also committed to a 
target of reducing emissions intensity, pledging a lower figure of 20-25% reduction in 
emissions intensity by 2020 relative to 2005 levels. The Copenhagen Accord in 2009 
marked the first time that developing countries have committed to quantified climate 
change mitigation targets. Emissions intensity targets are said to be particularly 
appropriate for developing countries as they allow economic growth to continue whilst 
simultaneously ‘greening’ energy production systems, compared to absolute emissions 
caps or reduction targets which are often seen to be ‘synonymous with limits to 
development.’418 However, an increase in efficiency of emissions does not mean that 
absolute levels of emissions will decrease. In fact, China’s emissions are likely to 
increase due to high levels of economic growth. China is already the world’s biggest 
national emitter of carbon, and therefore the target of reducing emission intensity and 
not putting a cap on absolute emissions has proven to be controversial, with some 
commentators arguing that China must also have a binding emission reduction target.419  
In Chapers Two to Five, I have defended a multi-actor approach to climate justice that 
is sensitive to the right to development. Within my account, I have defended the 
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Revised Beneficiary Pays Principle as the relevant principle for accounting for 
emissions. This chapter will consider whether China’s pledge to reduce its emissions 
intensity is consistent with the theory of climate justice defended in the previous 
chapters. I will first present a defence of China’s position, informed by the account of 
climate justice developed within this thesis. I will then defend this position against five 
objections, before concluding that China’s pledge is consistent with the requirements of 
climate justice. This chapter will take a primarily statist approach to the issues, since the 
key issue is whether the state of China is justified in the pledge it has made within the 
international negotiations of the UNFCCC. 
6.1 A Prima Facie Defence of China’s Position 
China’s pledge to reduce its emissions intensity is its first quantitative climate change 
mitigation target. Zhang et al argue that this in itself is worthy of note, stating ‘this is 
the first time that a quantitative and binding target has been set for energy efficiency, 
and signals a shift in China’s strategic thinking about its long-term economic and 
energy development.’420 This chapter will argue that China’s pledge to reduce emissions 
intensity is consistent with a fair global agreement on climate change, and in this section 
I will provide a prima facie defence of China’s position. The first part of the defence is 
supported by a political argument showing coherence between China’s position 
internationally agreed principles, and the second part second by a moral argument, 
informed by my findings from the preceding chapters.  
The international political context of China’s mitigation pledge was the 15th UNFCCC 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP), in Copenhagen, in 2009. The 
Copenhagen Accord states: 
‘We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. We 
emphasise our strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance 
with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities […] We should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national 
emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be 
longer in developing countries and bearing in mind that social and economic 
development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of 
developing countries and that a low-emission development strategy is indispensable to 
sustainable development.421 
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The aim of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) is to 
enable the burden of climate change to be fairly shared between states based on their 
relative capacities and responsibility for climate change. The political context of this is 
within a multilateral agreement between states, meaning that the principle of CBDR 
relates to state-level capacities. As such, it is appropriate to consider state level 
comparisons of capacity between states in order to provide a political defence of 
China’s position relative to the other parties.  
In terms of state-level measures of development, China has an HDI score of 0.719.422 
This is the 91st highest in global terms, with Norway, Australia at first and second, 
respectively, and the United States in fifth place.423 The average amongst the developed 
OECD states is 0.888.424 China’s average level of development is therefore much lower 
than the developed states, with the level of development higher, the nearer the index is 
to 1. We can see a similar situation in terms of China’s economic status. China just falls 
within the World Bank’s ‘upper middle income’ classification of countries, which 
includes those with per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of $4,125 - $12,746.425 
China’s GNI per capita rose above $4,000 for the first time in 2010, and therefore can 
only recently be considered ‘upper middle income’. Currently, China’s GNI per capita 
is $6,560.426 To place this in context, Australia’s GNI per capita is $66,520, and the 
United States’ is $53,670, with the average GNI per capita within the countries of the 
OECD coming in at $43,864.427 China’s GNI per capita ranks in 109th place globally.428 
China has a much lower level of income per capita as well as a lower human 
development level than the developed states. China’s relative capacity to pay for 
mitigation measures is influenced by both of these factors since the costs of 
implementing development policies are funded by a GNI per capita that is seven times 
less than the average of the OECD countries. So, not only does China have less income 
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in the first place, but also there are other, morally important costs that must be met as a 
priority from within these limited finances. 
Accordingly, China is taking on a level of responsibility that appears to be consistent 
with its relative capacity, as required by the principle of CBDR. As a developing 
country, with an ‘upper medium income’ China should take on more responsibility than 
those with lower capacity, but is not required to commit to the same level as the 
developed states. As such, China has committed to develop in a more sustainable 
manner by reducing the amount of emissions needed to produce the same amount of 
GDP. This will result in a slowing down of emissions growth without restricting 
economic growth. China’s economy is growing quickly, meaning that emissions are 
likely to rise, but this will be by a relatively smaller amount if China achieves the 40-
45% emissions intensity reduction target. According to McKibbin et al, China’s pledge 
represents a 26% reduction in emissions per capita between 2005 and 2020, compared 
to the ‘business as usual’ emissions that would be expected in a normal trajectory of 
emissions progression and economic growth.429 This is compared to their estimation of 
a 33% reduction compared to the ‘business as usual’ calculation for the United States, if 
they achieve their 17% reduction of emissions by 2020 relative to the year 2005. 
China’s target represents a comparatively demanding reduction in energy intensity, 
whilst allowing for the peak of emissions to take place at a later date. China’s emissions 
intensity target is therefore in line with the UNFCCC requirements of a developing 
country, for which ‘social and economic development and poverty eradication are the 
first and overriding priorities’.430 
Having presented a political justification of China’s position, let us move on to a moral 
defence of China’s position. This will be supported by two key claims: (1) The right to 
development justifies an increase in Chinese emissions, and (2) China bears less moral 
responsibility for climate change.  First, as I argued in Chapter Three, there are a large 
number of individuals within China that rely on subsistence and development emissions. 
The Chinese state does not have the capacity to provide these individuals with the 
technology to be able to develop cleanly, meaning that an absolute cap on emissions 
would be likely to jeopardise the fulfilment of the right to development for hundreds of 
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millions of individuals. China is justified in prioritising these rights in its domestic 
budget and energy policies. As opposed to an absolute cap, an emissions intensity target 
represents a commitment to a longer-term goal of making China’s economy more 
efficient in a way that is consistent with the current needs of Chinese citizens and their 
right to development. As we saw in Chapter Three, there are 427 million people in 
China living on less than $2.50 per day, as well as those above the poverty line who 
have morally important needs for development emissions. China’s target is just in terms 
of a global effort sharing agreement since there are other actors in the world that are 
benefiting from luxury emissions (which, as I will argue in the following section, also 
include some of the emissions that occur within China) that are of no comparable moral 
relevance. The actors that make up this group have the responsibility to make choices to 
act in ways that will cause a reduction in the emissions they are currently benefiting 
from, in order to leave enough space for the development emissions of those in need.  
The second claim is based upon China’s comparatively low current and historic 
responsibility for climate change. China emits half as much CO2 per inhabitant as the 
average amount emitted by citizens in OECD countries, and only a quarter as much as 
the average American.431 As we saw in Chapter Five, based upon these per capita 
figures and the right of individuals to development, the benefit China has gained from 
its historic emissions cannot be considered to be an unfair benefit when shares are 
compared. The levels of per capita emissions of developed and developing states 
diverge further when we consider the movement of global trade in which developed 
countries import high levels of products that are manufactured in developing countries 
such as China. As I argued in Chapter Four, the responsibility for the resulting 
emissions from this global trade should be shared between the different beneficiaries. 
These beneficiaries include consumers of the goods everywhere, corporations that make 
increased profit due to cheaper costs of producing in China, upstream sellers that benefit 
from the sale of the natural resources used to produce the energy, as well as the Chinese 
state in terms of economic benefit it gains. However, as we saw in previous chapters, 
not all benefit can be considered morally equal, and the Chinese state should bear lower 
comparative responsibility, as it is the key duty bearer for the right to development of its 
citizens. This increases China’s emissions benefit ‘allowance’, since this includes 
benefit from development and subsistence emissions, for which the degree of 
voluntariness is very low. The right to development of Chinese individuals, who are 
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dependent upon the finances of the Chinese state, also decreases the level of moral 
responsibility China should bear for the benefits it gains from manufacturing emissions. 
This is because the benefits gained from this income must be used in part to fulfil 
morally important development needs. Viewed in this way, when we consider the per 
capita emissions calculated on a territorial basis, we can safely assume that the actual 
benefit that high-exporting developing countries such as China gain is: (1) less than the 
territorial per capita emissions imply since many of these emissions are benefiting other, 
non-Chinese actors, and (2) China is entitled to the development gains that are enabled 
by the benefit from emissions, so there is a smaller portion of the emissions it benefits 
from for which it should bear the moral responsibility. Developed states have received 
much greater benefits historically, which can be seen both in their high luxury 
emissions today as well as their advanced level of development, which is a result of the 
benefit they have gained from historic emissions. Overall, then, China bears less moral 
responsibility for climate change costs than developed states. 
Having presented two arguments in support of China’s position, the prima facie defence 
can be summarised in the following way. First, China’s target is politically justified, 
based upon the minimal requirements of developing countries as defined by the 
UNFCCC. Second, China is morally justified in committing to a target of reducing its 
emissions intensity rather than an absolute cap on emissions. This is supported firstly by 
China’s lower comparative capacity to take on emissions caps due to the need to allow 
subsistence and development emissions to enable the right to development of its citizens. 
Second, it is supported by China’s lower relative moral responsibility for climate 
change. 
The remainder of this chapter will defend China’s position against five key objections.  
The first part will discuss the ‘metrics objection’. This objection makes three key 
claims: (1) that energy intensity can be reduced by structural changes to an economy 
which are less desirable as they simply involve a move of emissions elsewhere rather 
than a technical improvement in energy generation methods; (2) that the measure of 
energy relative to GDP is an unreliable measure as GDP in itself is not a stable measure 
and can be influenced by factors such as inflation, meaning that a reduction in energy 
relative to GDP does not necessarily entail a real reduction in the efficiency of China’s 
energy systems; (3) that the use of GDP is unreliable since it involves relying upon a 
value of currency which makes international comparability difficult. I will respond to 
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the three claims made by the metrics objection, and show that none of them pose a 
serious problem to China’s position.  
Section 5.2.2 will discuss a second objection, namely, that China’s target is not 
consistent with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ as it 
requires no real action from China. Critics have claimed that China’s target represents 
nothing more than ‘business as usual’. In response, I will show that the definition of 
business as usual as used in the objections includes policies that are already in place, 
and so this should not be considered as equivalent to ‘no effort’ scenarios. I will support 
this claim further with reference to studies that have undertaken such ‘no-action’ 
scenario projections, and also consider the inherent uncertainty involved in committing 
to a target that is linked to GDP. 
I will then consider the objection that allowing an overall increase in emissions is likely 
to give China an unfair economic advantage and will also make global mitigation efforts 
difficult to achieve. I will respond to this claim using (1) a moral argument based upon 
the findings of Chapter Three and the right to development, and (2) a political claim 
referring to equivalent commitments pledged by other states with similar levels of per 
capita GDP, development and emissions. In doing so, I will show that China’s 
commitment is consistent with the expectations of the political landscape. 
Fourth, I will consider the objection that although the emissions intensity target may be 
justified for the state of China, the richest and most developed cities should have 
directly allocated emissions caps since they have similar per capita situations as some 
developed states. Drawing on my discussion of duty-bearing actors in Chapter Two, I 
will argue that cities have derivative duties and should not be given direct duties, as 
they are not independent in the way that states are, relying on a sovereign for both 
political power and finances.  
The final section will consider the ‘sustainability objection’, which claims that China’s 
emissions intensity target cannot be justified since an increase in emissions is likely to 
cause dangerous climate change, which will jeopardise the rights of future people. I will 
respond to this by making reference to the arguments considered in Chapter Three, 
which argued that the responsibility for reducing global emissions and providing the 
capacity for sustainable development should be borne by affluent actors, and not by 
developing states who currently do not have the capacity to provide the means for 
sustainable development. However, my response will also claim that the more affluent 
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actors do to fulfil their responsibility to provide the means for sustainable development, 
the more China’s mitigation duties should be demanding.  
Having summarised the structure of the chapter, I will now move on to the first 
objection. 
6.2. The Metrics Objection 
The first objection to China’s pledge to reduce emissions intensity relates to the metrics 
involved in the calculation of how the target is fulfilled. China’s aim is to reduce the 
amount of energy used for each unit of GDP produced by 40-45% by 2020. The only 
relevant figures needed to calculate this emissions intensity are GDP and territorial 
emissions, with the intensity figure being the direct ratio of emissions to unit of GDP. 
When there are fewer emissions released per unit of GDP, production is said to be more 
efficient, since fewer resources are required to produce the same amount of output. In 
China’s case, the target of emissions intensity is designed as part of China’s pledge to 
develop sustainably. However, as Patterson states, ‘energy: GDP ratio is the most 
commonly used aggregate measure of a nation’s ‘energy efficiency', although there has 
been widespread criticism of the use of this indicator for this purpose.’432 Whilst the 
terms energy intensity and energy efficiency are not identical in their meaning, they are 
often used interchangeably. Energy intensity is an indicator that can be used to show 
energy efficiency.433 In the following section I will review three key claims of the 
metrics objection. The first claim is that the emissions/GDP ratio is not an accurate 
measure of energy efficiency improvements. The second and third claims both relate to 
the measure of GDP itself, and the unreliability of it as a measure both due to 
fluctuations in its value and international comparability difficulties. 
6.2.1 Structural vs. Technical Changes 
The first claim made by the metrics objection is that China’s choice of metric will allow 
China to reduce intensity of emissions per GDP by way of ‘structural’ changes, which 
are seen as being less desirable than ‘technical’ changes. A ‘structural change in energy 
use’ is defined as a ‘shift in the share of total output between sectors which may be 
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more or less energy intensive.’434 Structural changes in the economy can stimulate a 
move away from activities that are in themselves energy intensive, such as heavy 
manufacturing industries, towards industries that are much less energy intensive simply 
because of the nature of the activities of that sector. As Ang explains: 
‘Changes in energy efficiency are often approximated by changes in energy intensity 
(energy per unit of monetary or physical activity), with or without adjustment for 
changes in factors unrelated to efficiency, such as end-use structure, fuel mix and 
weather. As such, structural changes can reduce the emissions used per unit of GDP, 
‘but [this] is not indicative of improvements in energy efficiency.’435 
A structural change can cause the state’s intensity of emissions relative to GDP to 
decrease in the absence of any improvements to the energy efficiency of the 
technologies being used.   
In contrast, a ‘technical change’ in energy intensity is ‘the change in the energy required 
to produce a particular product or the physical output of a particular sector.’436 As 
opposed to structural changes, technical changes represent real increases in the 
efficiency per unit of energy produced, rather than per unit of monetary output. The lack 
of differentiation between structural and technical changes means that ‘the simple 
[emissions to GDP] ratio measure of energy intensity overstates the extent to which 
energy efficiency improvements have occurred in the economy, because factors that 
affect intensity that are unrelated to the efficiency of energy use are included in the 
ratio.’437 This claim has also been made by Wilson, who argues: 
‘A well understood weakness of this method [of measuring intensity per GDP] is that it 
includes in 'energy efficiency' the influence of changes in the sectoral makeup of the 
economy. A change in the structure of the economy will influence the level of energy 
consumption, even in the absence of technical progress, as the more energy intensive 
sectors expand or decrease their relative shares of total output.’438  
Using figures from the United States, a study has shown the ambiguity of actual 
efficiency improvements that can be hidden behind a simple energy-GDP ratio of 
emissions intensity. Between 1985 and 2004, the energy intensity of the United States 
fell by 26%, though 16% of this decrease was due to factors ‘unrelated to efficiency 
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improvements’.439 These figures demonstrate the influence the unit of measure can have 
on the conclusions we draw about a country’s progress towards a more energy efficient 
system. 
In summary, the first claim of the metrics objection is that the measure of energy 
intensity that China’s target is based upon will not give an accurate portrayal of the 
improvements (or lack of improvements) in the efficiency of the sources that are 
emitting carbon. This is because the emissions to GDP measure of energy intensity is 
influenced by factors that are not linked to improved efficiency, and thus cannot reliably 
show a country’s progression towards a more efficient and thus ‘greener’ economy. 
According to the objection, the first claim matters for two reasons. First, because a 
structural change in which heavy industries are closed down may imply that the 
emissions from this sector are simply being displaced to other parts of the world. 
Second, because the energy to GDP measure of intensity does not imply any 
technological progress, and efficiency of energy production must improve if a 
developing state is to achieve long-term emissions reductions by developing sustainably. 
The implication of the criticism is that China’s emissions intensity target does not give 
an accurate picture of whether the actual efficiency of energy use is improving, and may 
promote the displacement of heavy industries to other countries.  
Before responding to the first claim of the metrics objection, I shall consider two further 
claims. These two claims both relate to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the economic 
term for the value of the market of all goods and services within a country. The value of 
GDP is subject to a level of interpretation when we consider it: (1) over a period of 
time; and (2) comparatively between countries. The implications of these two facts 
represent the basis of the second and third claims of the metrics objection. 
6.2.2 GDP and Fluctuation in Value 
The second claim of the metrics objection is that GDP is not a reliable measure as it can 
become inflated or deflated over time. For example, regardless of whether there is an 
increase or decrease in the actual output of production, the monetary value of China’s 
GDP might rise or fall between 2005 and 2020 due to inflation or deflation. If we are 
considering only the ratio of emissions to unit of GDP, then a larger GDP due to 
inflation would show a reduction in emissions intensity, simply because the GDP has 
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increased. For example, consider an example in which a car has a value of $10,000 in 
2005, and a value of $20,000 in 2020. If no improvements in the energy efficiency of 
car production take place in the time period being considered, then the same amount of 
emissions is needed to produce the same car. However, the car now has a higher price, 
so our calculations tell us that we are using the same amount of emissions to produce 
twice as much economic value, and we are therefore twice as efficient. In a simple 
example such as this, we can clearly see that the defining factor in the equation is the 
inflated value of GDP, which means that the same material output item (the car) is now 
worth twice the economic value. 
Economists use the term ‘nominal’ to describe GDP figures that use the current price of 
goods and services (as in the car example), and ‘real’ to describe GDP that expresses 
the selling price of the goods and services in a particular base year.  So, for example, the 
nominal price of our car in 2020 would be $20,000, and its real price, using 2005 as the 
base year, would be $10,000. As Muller argues, ‘using nominal GDP conflates price 
changes with legitimate improvements in intensity’.440 There is no environmental value 
in having a reduced energy intensity that is simply due to inflation, and therefore it is 
important that a mitigation policy takes this into account if it is intended to have 
genuine environmental implications. As McKibbin et al argue, ‘even without any other 
change in the economy or emissions, inflation reduces the emissions intensity measured 
in nominal terms.’441 An emissions intensity reduction in nominal terms is likely to be 
produced without any action since China is a developing country with a high level of 
inflation. I will respond to this, as well as the first claim, after considering the third 
claim of the metrics objection. 
6.2.3 Using Different Methods to Manipulate Currency Conversions 
The final claim of the metrics objection is that using GDP as the denominator for our 
emissions intensity ratio makes international comparability more difficult. In the 
international arena, it is common practice to convert national GDP figures into US 
dollars in order to provide a common currency so that they can be compared. In terms of 
internationally verifying China’s target, Chinese Yuan Renminbi (RMB) might 
therefore be converted into dollars. However, converting currencies is not a 
straightforward business. As such, the method of conversion chosen to convert the value 
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of GDP to the international standard can result in a manipulation of the equivalent value, 
intentionally or not, giving the impression of greater emissions intensity reductions than 
are actually occurring. 
In economic comparisons, currencies are generally converted into the international 
standard of US dollars using either the market exchange rate (MER) or purchasing 
power parity (PPP) conversion. There has been some controversy surrounding which of 
these methods is the most appropriate, as has been discussed by several authors.442 As 
Suehiro argues, ‘estimates [of energy intensity] largely differ between those based on 
MERs and PPP.’443 MER conversions give a direct measure of how much of the 
currency to be converted can be bought with one unit of the target currency, and this 
rate is decided by international market forces. Currencies conversions using PPP are 
intended to give a better indication of the real worth of a unit of currency within its 
domestic borders. PPP conversions are calculated using a specific exchange rate, which 
represents ‘the number of units of a country's currency required to buy the same amount 
of goods and services in the domestic market as a U.S. dollar would buy in the United 
States.’444 Let us look at examples of the difference between these two systems, using 
Gross National Income (GNI) as the relevant economic indicator. Using market 
exchange rate data, China’s 2011 GNI was $6.643 trillion.445 Using PPP figures, 
China’s 2011 GNI was $11.270 trillion.446 The PPP conversion gives a higher figure 
due to the fact that the cost of goods in China is less than the cost of goods in the 
conversion currency, meaning that the same amount of US dollars would buy more in 
China, using the current PPP exchange rate. For the purposes of this research, the 
impact of this is that a country’s energy intensity when converted to an international 
currency can appear higher or lower, depending on whether we use MER or PPP to 
convert the currency.  
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Several authors have acknowledged this issue.447 For example, Holtsmark and Alfsen 
have shown this in their research about the IPCC predictions for different emissions 
scenarios. According to them, using MER values to calculate the GDP of non-OECD 
countries gives us a value of 4.5 trillion US dollars.448  If we use the PPP method, the 
GDP of non-OECD countries is 11.4 trillion US dollars, which is more than double the 
value given by MER. Holtsmark and Alfsen’s argument is that the IPCC’s use of MER 
methodology to calculate comparable GDP values in US dollars means that emissions 
intensity changes can be greatly overstated. As Holtsmark and Alfsen’s work shows, 
emissions intensity seems much higher if we use MER methodology to convert GDP as 
opposed to PPP. For example, based on CO2 emissions of 3.2tC in the year 2000, and 
the GDP of 4.5 trillion US dollars for the non-OECD countries, the emissions intensity 
using MER is 706.2, and only 276.7 using PPP.449 According to the World Bank figures, 
in 2005, the difference between China’s emissions intensity calculated by MER 
compared with PPP was 1.7 kg per US dollar. GDP calculation using MER gave an 
intensity of 2.6 kg/US dollar, and the PPP calculation gave 0.9 kg/US dollar.450 China’s 
emissions intensity was therefore lower when assessed on a PPP basis compared to a 
MER basis. As such, this can have an effect on the extent of the emissions intensity 
calculated when converting Chinese RMB to US dollars. 
In summary, the metrics objection has made three key claims, all related to the 
unreliability of the emissions-GDP ratio. First, the emissions-GDP ratio can be affected 
by factors that do not relate to the actual energy production systems, and therefore may 
give us an inaccurate picture of whether the efficiency of China’s energy mix is actually 
improving as well as encouraging the diplacement of heavy industries to other parts of 
the world. Second, the GDP denominator in the emission intensity ratio can be affected 
by inflation, which can create the appearance of phantom improvements in emissions 
intensity. Third, the way in which GDP is converted into an internationally comparable 
currency can give greatly different pictures of the emissions intensity depending on the 
conversion factor used. 
                                                
447 See also: William Nordhaus, ‘Alternative measures of output in global economic-environmental 
models: Purchasing power parity or market exchange rates?’, Energy Economics, 29 (2007): 349–372. 
448 Holtsmark and Alfsen, ‘The use of PPP or MER in the construction of emission scenarios is more than 
a question of ‘metrics’’, 209.  
449 Holtsmark and Alfsen, ‘The use of PPP or MER in the construction of emission scenarios is more than 
a question of ‘metrics’’, 209. 
450 World Bank, ‘CO2 emissions (kg per 2005 US$ of GDP)’ (n.d.) [Online] 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KD.GD?page=1).  [Accessed 17 June 2014]; World 
Bank, ‘CO2 emissions (kg per PPP $ of GDP)’ (n.d.) [Online] 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PP.GD?order=wbapi_data_value_2005+wbapi_data
_value&sort=asc&page=1).  [Accessed 18 June 2014]. 
 179 
6.2.4 Technical Changes Form Part of China’s Policies 
Let us first consider part one of this objection which claims that China’s intensity target 
will give an inaccurate picture of improvements within China’s energy production, as it 
will be affected by ‘structural changes’ in energy use as well as ‘technical changes’, and 
is therefore inappropriate as it may overestimate the progress being made in energy 
efficiency.  
In the context of a pledge being made by one state in a multi-lateral agreement, it is not 
clear that this objection bears much weight. In the current political context, China only 
has direct control over the emissions that take place within its borders. As such, the aim 
of China’s target is to produce fewer emissions of carbon per unit of production 
measured in GDP, within Chinese borders. Since the measure being used will not 
distinguish between technical improvements and structural changes, some of China’s 
reduction may indeed take place due to structural changes in China’s economy, such as 
reducing the size of heavy industries such as steel. But, as Turner argues, ‘this in itself 
is not necessarily a bad thing. If an economy reduces its emissions by growing its less 
energy-intensive sectors, for example knowledge based industries, in place of high 
energy using industries, then it should be rewarded for doing so.’451 China is aiming to 
reduce its energy intensity in order to produce fewer carbon emissions per unit of 
economic output as a first step climate change mitigation pledge, and so whether part of 
this reduction happens due to structural changes or not does not change the fact that 
progress will have been made on the path to reducing China’s emissions. On a side note, 
much of the greater, global relevance of this point will depend on whether the territorial 
accounting system continues to be prevalent. If, on the other hand, we use the revised 
beneficiary pays principle, as discussed in Chapter Four, to allocate responsibility for 
emissions, then heavy industries will not be rewarded for moving to other areas of the 
world, since it is the beneficiaries that will pay the costs of the embedded emissions. 
But currently, China can only target reductions in its own territorial emissions.  
However, even in the context of territorial accounting, a review of China’s policy 
documents detailing the nature of China’s pledge shows that China is committed to 
technical changes as well as structural changes that will limit the kind of technology 
that can be used on new build energy plants. For example, in the policy document 
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entitled ‘China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change’, several of 
China’s policies relate to ‘upgrading’ heavy industries. China states that it has put 13.5 
billion RMB (2.2 billion US dollars) into ‘technological upgrading funds’ in order to 
improve the efficiency of these industries, whilst at the same time ‘rais[ing] the entry 
threshold for certain industries and strictly limited new projects in industries with high 
energy consumption, high pollutant emissions or excess capacity.’452 By improving the 
technology in existing plants, and reducing the number of new heavy industry plants 
that are developed, the share of emissions from the heavy industry sector will be 
decreased as the economy grows due to both technical and structural changes. In the 
context of China’s domestic commitment to reducing emissions, even structural 
changes should be encouraged. Combined with the commitment to also making 
technical changes, the first claim of the metrics objection does not give us reason to 
doubt the effectiveness of China’s pledge as a just contribution to a global burden 
sharing agreement. 
6.2.5 The Importance of Specifying Methodology 
The second and third ‘metrics’ objections relate to the calculation and conversion of 
GDP. The way in which GDP is measured is indeed very important. The objection is 
correct in highlighting the potential issues with the use of nominal GDP figures. 
However, as long as China is using ‘real’ figures, this objection raises an issue of 
transparency and the need for clear communication, rather than a problem with the 
actual commitment. So far, it does not appear that China has explicitly stated its 
position on this issue, leading to some confusion over whether the target will refer to 
real or nominal GDP. Ding Zhongli, an expert from the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
explains that this is currently ambiguous: 
‘Our government made to 2020 CO2 emissions per unit of GDP in 2005 to reduce by 
40% to 45% of the commitment. According to our understanding, this commitment first 
need to clear two things: First, this refers specifically to emissions from fossil emissions 
from energy use and cement production, excluding emissions from land use, nor does it 
include ecological construction (carbon sequestration) negative emissions; two 
Measurement of GDP must be 2005 constant prices, not nominal GDP (that is, to 
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exclude inflation), and can only be denominated in Renminbi, not in dollars (ie to 
exclude exchange rate movements factor).’453 
As such, the objection stands that the intensity must be measured against the real level 
of GDP, but as long as this is the case, the intensity target is satisfactory. Several 
sources have highlighted the difficulty in ascertaining the method used, and improving 
the communication about the methodology would make assessment of China’s target 
more straightforward.454 
The third part of the objection raised the issue of currency conversion. China’s target 
will be calculated domestically using the Chinese currency of Yuan Renminbi (RMB). 
For China’s own calculations, then, the objection about currency conversion is not 
relevant. However, this may very well be converted into dollars by international 
commentators or even by China itself in order to document its progress to the rest of the 
world using a comparable currency. The key response to this is that as long as the 2005 
and 2020 emissions intensity is calculated using the same type of conversion, whether 
this is PPP or MER, it does not matter which is chosen. The calculation of emissions 
intensity is designed to show progress from one moment in time to another. Therefore, 
as long as the same methods of calculation are used for the 2005 and 2020 emissions 
intensity calculations, both MER and PPP are capable of showing a percentage change 
in emissions per unit GDP. 
In this section, I have considered three objections relating to the metrics used to 
calculate energy intensity. I have acknowledged that they raise important issues that 
require clarification of China’s commitment but they need not undermine the credibility 
of China’s position. 
6.3 An ‘Easily Achievable’ Target? 
I will now move on to a second objection to China’s emissions intensity target, which 
argues that China’s pledge can be easily fulfilled without any real effort from China. In 
a country with a low level of growth, a large reduction in energy intensity can have a 
similar effect to an absolute cap on emissions, if reduction in emissions intensity 
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outpaces economic growth. However, the opposite is also true for a country with high 
levels of growth. Theoretically, this means that emissions intensity reductions are easier 
to achieve in times of economic growth and more difficult in times of slow or negative 
growth.  
This has led some critics to claim that China’s target will be easy to achieve and will not 
require any real effort, based upon calculations of projected ‘business as usual’ or 
‘reference’ emissions pathways. For example, in May 2009, prior to China’s pledge to 
reduce emissions intensity by 40-45%, the United States Energy Information 
Administration released its ‘International Energy Outlook’, in which it predicted a 
44.2% reduction in emissions intensity in China between 2006 and 2020, with a drop of 
443 metric tonnes from 1,001 mt/2005 US dollar (PPP) in 2006 to 558 mt/2005 US 
dollar (PPP) in 2020.455 The International Energy Agency predicted a similar trend in its 
World Energy Outlook 2009, with China’s emissions intensity projected to reduce by 
3% per year, meaning 45% in the 15 years between 2005 and 2020.456 As these figures 
were given before China’s target was released, it is argued that they represent China’s 
emissions intensity path during ‘business as usual’. The key point of this argument is 
that if the emissions intensity reduction pledged by China represents nothing more than 
what is likely to happen anyway, then it cannot be said to be a climate change 
mitigation target as no effort is required to achieve it. Mitigation requires a deviation 
from the business as usual pathway.  
For example, Michael A. Levi, director of the climate change program at the Council on 
Foreign Relations has labelled China’s target as ‘disappointing’, since ‘the Department 
of Energy estimates that existing Chinese policies will already cut carbon intensity by 
45 to 46 percent.’457 He continues, ‘the United States has put an ambitious path for 
emissions cuts through 2050 on the table. China needs to raise its level of ambition if it 
is going to match that.’458 Kenneth Liberhal, from the Brookings Institute has made a 
similar claim, stating, ‘basically, it's a continuation of the same trend line …  [which] 
does not reflect raising the bar [which] does need to be raised.’459 Malcolm Moore, in 
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the China Economic Review states that China ‘will reach the new target without 
breaking a sweat’.460  
The second objection therefore claims that China’s target is both environmentally 
neutral and is representative of a lack of effort from China, which is inconsistent with 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities which requires some effort 
from all parties. As such, it is not representative of a just contribution to a global 
agreement.  
6.3.1 Reviewing the Definition of Business as Usual 
To respond to this objection, we need to address what the business as usual scenario 
actually entails, and on what basis it is calculated. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) refers to a ‘reference’ scenario, which ‘provides a baseline vision of how global 
energy markets are likely to evolve if new government policies are not introduced 
during the projection period.’461 The reference scenario is simply the scenario that is 
likely to happen based on policies that exist already at the time of writing the report. 
Currently existing policies are included in the forecast, meaning that the business as 
usual pathway is based upon these and not upon doing nothing.  The key point is that 
the reference scenario is not a ‘no-climate policy’ pathway, and it is important that we 
do not confuse the two. In this sense, the ‘business as usual’, or ‘reference’ scenarios 
cannot tell us anything about the demandingness of a target, since they include existing 
policies in their baseline assessment.  
This does not mean that China’s target is not undemanding, but simply that we cannot 
know this by looking only at the business as usual proposals. As Cohen-Tanugi argues, 
‘reference Case scenarios should not be regarded as a “do nothing” situation, although 
they have been misinterpreted as so in numerous reports.’462 At the time of the creation 
of the IEA reference scenarios, China had already undertaken policies involving 
‘significant investments in low-carbon technologies’.463 Further evidence of this can be 
seen in China’s ‘Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy’ which set a 
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target for 15% of China’s energy mix to be provided by renewable fuels by 2020 
(including 100 gigawatts more energy from wind and nuclear power) amongst many 
other policies, including those which led to the 19% emissions intensity reduction that 
China achieved between 2006 and 2010.464 This in itself posed a challenge, as Cohen-
Tanugi explains: 
‘Many Chinese provinces have encountered substantial difficulties in reaching their 
energy intensity targets under the 11th Five-Year Plan, and it is difficult to imagine how 
they might be able to achieve these reduction targets again—not once but twice over—
by 2020.’465 
As we have seen previously, the Chinese government’s priority must be to enable the 
fulfilment of the right to development of its citizens. As such, the significant investment 
and policies relating to improving China’s energy efficiency cannot be said to be akin to 
‘doing nothing’ as some commentators have implied as a result of the ‘business as usual’ 
emission path scenarios.  
6.3.2 A More Demanding Target than Critics Claim 
The first response to the second objection has highlighted the need to avoid confusion 
between that which will take place as a result of current policies, and that which would 
require no effort at all. Existing effort should not be considered to be irrelevant simply 
because it forms part of policies that already exist. As such, business as usual scenarios 
which include existing policies cannot show that a target is easily achievable simply 
because there are policies already in place. The second response will make reference to 
several studies which argue that China’s target will require a much greater effort than 
that which would be expected to occur under a normal projection for a country of 
China’s level of development. As such, the target will only be achievable with targeted 
policies that are specifically aimed at reducing emissions intensity, requiring extra effort 
far above that which would occur otherwise. Finally, I will discuss the uncertainty 
involved in China’s target due to its link to economic growth. 
Several studies have estimated that achieving 40-45% reduction in emissions intensity 
by 2020 would not occur in ‘business as usual’ scenarios based upon standard growth 
patterns for a developing country. For example, McKibbin et al predict an emissions 
intensity reduction of 26% in their baseline scenario, which is described as a ‘best 
estimate of the likely evolution of [the] economy without concerted climate policy 
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measures.’466 The estimations for the ‘likely evolution’ are based upon historic data 
reflecting trends in the relationship between economic growth and emissions. Business 
as usual in this scenario is based on analysing historic data of trends in emissions and 
economic growth, and shows a predicted path for these two factors based on this 
information, and disregarding climate-specific policies that China has in place. Several 
other studies using similar ideas of ‘business as usual’ have given comparable results. 
Stern et Jotzo have predicted a 24% reduction in emissions intensity following a 
business as usual path for China, under a ‘normal rate of technological improvement 
and development’.467 They argue, ‘in no way is a 40–45% reduction in emissions 
intensity ‘‘business as usual’’, as has been claimed by some observers.’ Shi et al 
simulate a baseline scenario, which predicts an emissions intensity reduction of 22% 
between 2007 and 2020, stating that ‘simulation results indicate that it will be difficult 
for China to realize its mitigation target under the baseline scenario.’468 As such, studies 
that do not include current climate policies to be part of the business as usual scenario 
show that the reduction of 40-45% in emissions intensity will not happen without 
targeted policies.  
The discussion has shown that the definition of ‘business as usual’ is not standardised, 
and the meaning of the phrase can be very different depending on how it is interpreted. 
This should make us wary of the utility of business as usual scenarios as a sole means of 
assessing the demandingness of emissions pledges. If we consider typical rates of 
technological change and emissions growth based on historic data from other countries 
at China’s level of development, the target does not seem to be easily achievable, and 
will require specific, targeted policies. Several commentators support this claim. For 
example, Hohne has called China’s target ‘a major effort’.469 Stern and Jotzo have 
referred to it as ‘feasible but ambitious’.470 Cohen-Tanugi has it ‘challenging’.471 
Furthermore, some have noted the importance that changes in the ‘elasticity’ of 
emissions to GDP will have on the feasibility of achieving China’s target, highlighting 
                                                
466 McKibbin et al, ‘Comparing Climate Commitments: A Model-Based Analysis of the Copenhagen 
Accord’, 11. 
467 David I. Stern and Frank Jotzo, ‘How ambitious are China and India’s emissions intensity targets?’, 
Energy Policy, 38 (2010): 6780. 
468 Minjun Shi et al, ’Can China Realize CO2 Mitigation Target toward 2020?’, Journal of Resources and 
Ecology, 1:2 (2010): 152-153. 
469 Niklas Höhne et al, ‘China emission paradox: Cancun emissions intensity pledge to be surpassed but 
emissions higher’ Climate Action Tracker Update (4 October 2011) [Online] 
(http://www.climateactiontracker.org/press_briefing_panama.pdf). [Accessed 11 December 2011]. 
470 Stern and Jotzo, ‘How ambitious are China and India’s emissions intensity targets?’, 6782. 
471 Cohen-Tanugi, Putting it into Perspective: China’s Carbon Intensity Target’; Zhang 2010) 
 186 
the fact that many studies take this to be a stable figure. Carraro and Tavoni show that 
China’s elasticity has been around -0.5 for the past 20 years, which means that for every 
1% increase in per capita income, emissions intensity has reduced by 0.5%.472 The 
resulting emissions intensity reduction that would accompany this is in line with the 
references scenarios portrayed by the IEA and the US EIA. However, Carraro and 
Tavoni argue that China’s per capita income growth to emissions intensity is unlikely to 
stay at this ratio, as China’s per capita income rises. This is consistent with the IPCC’s 
findings in the Fourth Assessment Report, which states: 
‘All studies also find evidence that th[e] coefficient [of] elasticity of per capita CO2 
emissions relative to per capita GDP is not constant but decreases as per capita income 
rises.’473 
Carraro and Tavoni show that China’s elasticity has already decreased to -0.3. Taking 
this into account, they project an emissions intensity reduction of 27% between 2005 
and 2020, if elasticity remains at -0.3, and a reduction of only 23% if elasticity reduces 
further to -0.25, which is the elasticity South Korea’s economy had at a similar stage of 
development.474 
Many factors will affect the rate of growth of Chinese emissions and the rate at which 
China is able to reduce its emissions intensity, but this is true for all emissions targets. 
In times of economic downturn such as the recent economic crisis, absolute levels of 
emissions have decreased in many parts of the world. Economic recession makes 
achieving absolute emissions targets easier, whilst times of economic growth make 
emissions intensity reduction targets easier to achieve. Whilst China’s growth is 
predicted to continue increasing at a high rate, whether this growth occurs at 8% per 
year or 6% per year, for example, will have an impact on the demandingness of China’s 
policy. There is a risk of the target being much more difficult to achieve if growth is 
slightly slower than predicted. On top of this, as part of its emissions intensity reduction 
strategy China has given itself the target of increasing the share of renewable energy in 
its energy mix to 15%, which is more than double the share in 2005. This will require a 
large investment. Combined with the level of risk involved in China’s target due to its 
close link to economic growth, it cannot be reasonably argued that the target is 
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undemanding, and as such, the objection that it is easily achievable does not hold up to 
closer scrutiny. 
6.4 An Absolute Increase in Emissions 
I will now consider a third objection that contests the fairness of a climate target which 
is consistent with an absolute increase in emissions, despite emissions intensity 
reduction, due to China’s high rate of economic growth.  As the world’s biggest single 
emitter of carbon dioxide, critics argue that China’s emissions must now peak and then 
go down, both for environmental reasons, but also for the sake of agreeing on a global 
burden sharing agreement. In the context of global mitigation policies, some have 
argued that increasing absolute emissions will give China an unfair economic advantage 
compared to developed states, many of which view China as a competitor despite its 
developing status, due to the size of its economy. This has led to several states making 
their mitigation pledges conditional upon the involvement of China in a legally binding 
burden sharing agreement, stating both environmental and competition based reasons.  
For example, Julie Bishop, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs has stated: 
‘Even if the Chinese government met its stated targets of cutting carbon emissions "per 
unit of GDP", there will in fact be a massive increase in emissions from China for the 
foreseeable future.’475 
This represents the position of several developed states, which have been unwilling to 
sign up to significant post-Kyoto emissions reduction pledges which they view as 
risking their own economic competitiveness, unless China also undertakes such 
measures. Bishop continues: 
‘Indeed, analysis shows the increase in China's emissions will be in the order of 74 to 
90 per cent in absolute terms by 2020, based on projected GDP growth. Yet Prime 
Minister Gillard, Treasurer Swan and Climate Change Minister Combet have all made 
recent statements to the effect that if Australia doesn't introduce a carbon tax now, 
China will leave us behind, labelling as a “myth” any suggestion that Australia's 
economy will be harmed if we act ahead of the major global emitters including 
China.’476 
In the Copenhagen Accord, Australia committed to three targets, two of which are 
conditional upon ‘major developing economies commit[ting] to substantially restrain 
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emissions’, along side a minor, unconditional target of a 5% reduction in emissions by 
2020 compared to 2000 levels.477  
The position of the United States has been similar, and to date they have refused to 
agree to any global agreement that did not ‘cover all the major Parties in a full way, so it 
would bind with equal legal force … [so that] everybody who made commitments 
would be bound fully, unconditionally, no kind of escape hatches in the text’.478 This is 
therefore a political argument made by some developed states, based upon a claim that 
it is unfair for large developed states, like China, which are seen to be key economic 
competitors, to be allowed to increase their emissions.  
This leads to a second argument which claims that it will be difficult to achieve global 
climate change mitigation if China’s emissions are not capped for two reasons, first 
because of China’s high emissions and large population, and second because a global 
agreement is unlikely if the developed states’ demands are not taken into account. 
Posner and Weisbach are key protagonists of this approach, claiming that ‘If 
[developing states] demand too much from the rich world, the rich world will drag its 
feet’.479 
6.4.1 Not an Unfair Advantage 
The third objection claims that China will have an unfair economic advantage if it is not 
required to reduce emissions and so politically, a climate agreement will be difficult to 
achieve if China is allowed to increase its emissions. I will argue that China as a state 
may be advantaged by not being required to cap its emissions, but that contrary to the 
claims made by some, this is not an unfair advantage. I will first defend this by making 
reference to the current, internationally-accepted principles of territorial accounting that 
form part of previous climate agreements, and secondly with reference to the moral 
arguments I have defended in the preceding chapters, relating to the right to 
development and the revised beneficiary pays principle.  
First, let us consider this argument in a political light, based on the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities. This an internationally accepted principle of fairness 
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that is used in the UNFCCC negotiations, which considers capacity to pay for climate 
costs as well as territorial emissions to be the key factors in determining levels of 
responsibility. By this measure of accountability, a state is responsible for the emissions 
that take place within its borders, and GDP is taken into account for capacity to pay 
climate costs. States have different population sizes, so per-capita levels are the most 
useful measure for comparing emissions. As such, a state such as China, which has 1.4 
billion inhabitants, is surely justified in using more carbon emissions, territorially, than 
a state such as Australia which has 22 million inhabitants. Recent data shows that 
Australia’s per capita emissions have been growing and now represent the highest per 
capita emissions of the developed countries. By the standard territorial accounting 
method that is currently favoured in political negotiations, it is therefore not unjust to 
expect Australia to bear greater responsibility for climate change costs due to greater 
contribution to the problem. China’s per capita emissions are low compared to the 
levels of most developed nations. In 2010, which is the most recent year for which 
global statistics are available, the Annex I average of CO2 emissions was 10,412 kg per 
capita, with the United States and Australia both emitting over 17 metric tonnes of CO2 
per inhabitant. China’s per capita emissions were 5.4 metric tonnes.480 China also has 
lower relative capacity, with a GDP per capita, calculated using PPP of $10,924 in 2012, 
compared to the OECD average of $36,427.481  
Based upon the current political agreements, therefore, it seems clear that China should 
not be required to bear the same level of duties as the developed states that have much 
higher emissions and incomes when considered on a per capita level. China’s enormous 
size compared to other states means that by comparing state-level statistics, we are not 
comparing “like for like”. The per capita figures, on the other hand, highlight the 
differences between each state’s emissions and income relative to its population. The 
argument that China would have an unfair economic advantage should be considered in 
the context of different countries’ different responsibilities in recent climate agreements, 
relative to their GDP per capita. I will now show some examples of states with similar 
or higher GDP levels per capita that are not required to cap their emissions. As such, 
politically, based on the current agreements, it is not unfair that China should be 
allowed to increase emissions whilst there are other states in similar positions that are 
not required to do so.  
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Let us consider comparisons with several countries within the European Union that are 
permitted to increase their emissions over the period 2005-2020. Within the EU, an 
overall emissions reduction target has been agreed, covering the whole EU zone. 
However, as a matter of fairness based upon not limiting the economic growth of 
countries with low per capita GDP, responsibilities are differentiated within the EU. 
The official policy document states: 
‘The national emission targets for 2020 have been agreed unanimously. They have been 
set on the basis of Member States’ relative wealth (measured by Gross Domestic 
Product per capita). They range from a 20% emissions reduction by 2020 (from 2005 
levels) for the richest Member States to a 20% increase for the least wealthy one, 
Bulgaria … Less wealthy countries are allowed emission increases in these sectors 
because their relatively higher economic growth is likely to be accompanied by higher 
emissions. Nevertheless their targets represent a limit on their emissions compared with 
projected business as usual growth rates. A reduction effort is thus required by all 
Member States.’482 
Bulgaria, the least wealthy country in the European Union, has an estimated GDP per 
capita of $14,400.483 Between 2005 and 2020, Bulgaria is allowed to increase its 
emissions by 20% according to the EU’s ‘effort sharing’ national targets.484  
Twelve other EU countries, each with per capita GDP levels higher than $14,500, are 
also allowed to increase their absolute emissions in the Copenhagen Agreement time 
period of 2005 to 2020. China’s GDP per capita of $10,924 is only two thirds the size of 
Bulgaria’s, which is the smallest of the thirteen EU states that are allowed to increase 
their emissions over the period. As stated in the EU text, ‘less wealthy countries are 
allowed emission increases … because their relatively higher economic growth is likely 
to be accompanied by higher emissions’.485 Therefore, if we think that it is justified for 
these countries to increase their absolute emissions, the least wealthy of which has a 
GDP per capita that is 150% the size of China’s, and if this is based on their level of 
development and need for economic growth, then this same logic must surely apply to 
China. The fact that China’s absolute levels are high is due to the fact that the 
geographical area that we consider to be the state of China is very large, housing almost 
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20% of the world’s population.486 The focus and importance assigned to the notion of 
state emissions, due to the statist system of international politics, can lead to 
conclusions that are unfounded when we look more closely at comparable statistics at 
the per capita level. If the state of China was divided up into several separate countries, 
it is unlikely that we would think that these countries in the “continent of China” were 
gaining an unfair economic advantage. An absolute increase in emissions for China is 
therefore not inconsistent with the existing political principles of fairness that have been 
agreed to at the international level, and as such, emissions increases do not give China 
an unfair economic advantage.  
The conclusion of the political argument is supported by the moral arguments we have 
seen in the preceding chapters. As we saw in Chapter Three, the right to development of 
Chinese individuals entitles the state to defend subsistence and development emissions 
where these are needed to fulfil the rights of individuals within its borders. As such, the 
Chinese state is justified in increasing emissions, where these are fulfilling subsistence 
and development needs, and where clean energy alternatives are not available. This is 
not a consideration that developed states need to take into account, as they have the 
resources to provide their poorest citizens with more efficient means of sourcing their 
energy, and the average development level of their populations means that a large 
percentage of emissions in developed states are luxury emissions. As we saw in 
Chapters Three and Four, benefiting from luxury emissions confers responsibility for 
the climate costs, and as such it is these emissions that should be reduced. To refer back 
to the previous example of Australia, this is an industrialised state that has benefited not 
only from historical processes of industrialisation, but, as we saw in Chapter Four, 
continues to benefit greatly from the sale of fossil fuels due to vast natural resources. 
The Australian coal industry alone is worth approximately 60 billion Australia dollars, 
or 4.5% of Australia’s GDP, including 38.6 billion dollars from exports of coal.487 
Australia’s economy is doing very well and it has a very high level of development, 
with the second highest HDI out of the 187 countries assessed by the UNDP in the most 
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recent human development report.488 As a state, Australia is clearly benefiting from its 
fossil fuels, whether the emissions are released within Australia or exported to be 
released elsewhere. States that are linked to the emissions that take place within China, 
either through upstream natural resource sales or downstream consumption of goods, 
share in the responsibility for these emissions. As such, not all of the emissions that take 
place within Chinese borders are the moral responsibility of China. This point further 
supports the claim that being permitted to increase emissions does not give China an 
unfair advantage compared to the developed states. 
6.5 Differentiated Duties for Chinese Cities 
I shall now move on to the fourth objection to China’s position, which claims that 
whilst the state of China, when taken as a whole, may be justified in following a plan of 
emissions intensity reduction, there are some cities within China that should cap their 
emissions. This argument is based upon the claim that there are several cities and 
provinces within China that have populations that are the same size or larger than some 
developed countries, similar per capita income and carbon emissions, and reasonably 
high HDI levels. If these areas of China are causing just as much damage to the 
environment as some countries in the developed world, and they have similar sized 
economies and levels of development, the argument claims that they should have targets 
to cap their emissions. Let us look at some figures. Beijing has a population of 20 
million, and emits 10.8 tonnes of CO2 per inhabitant, which is slightly above the OECD 
average of 10.1 tonnes.489 Shanghai has a population of 23 million people with per 
capita emissions of 12.9 tonnes of CO2.490 Tianjin emits 12.2 tonnes of CO2 per capita 
and has a population of 13 million.491 Some of these places also rank highly in terms of 
their HDI. For example, a report from the UNDP states that if urban Shanghai was 
included in the rank of countries’ HDI figures it would come in 24th place, just higher 
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than Greece.492 As such, the objection claims that they should have carbon emission 
caps. 
6.5.1 Important Differences between Cities and States 
In response to this objection, which would assign emissions caps to Chinese cities, I 
will appeal to an argument about the difference between cities and states. The important 
point is the difference in relative power these two actors hold over their actions as well 
as the interconnected nature of the actions of different cities. Cities are not sovereign 
actors that can be directly compared with states, and viewing them as such endows them 
with a false level of independence and power. Cities play a key role in the economy of a 
larger entity of the state, unlike a state which is the highest sovereign body. As I 
mentioned in Chapter One, the duties of sub-state entities, such as cities or regions, are 
derivative duties that are delegated to them by the state.  Cities are not independent, 
relying on sovereign bodies both financially and politically. In a state such as China, in 
which much of the population is living in poverty, there is a responsibility to divide up 
the national burden fairly, in line with the holistic approach to human rights and the 
right to development, as seen in Chapter Three. In order to prioritise subsistence and 
development emissions, and the rights these emissions are fulfilling, the government 
should ensure that areas of China that are benefiting from emissions that far exceed 
development needs should be required to take on a greater share of the national 
responsibility. But this responsibility should not be allocated directly to cities, since 
they do not have the relevant characteristics of independence required for direct duties. 
Let us consider in greater detail the actual policies that are in place in China in relation 
to these large cities, to see whether Chinese policy does differentiate between different 
types of cities. The most affluent regional areas in China, which are Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chongqing, each have a special status and are known as  
‘National Central Cities’.493 These are leading cities, whose positive influence is 
intended to ‘radiate’ outwards into their surrounding areas.494 They are governed 
directly by China’s central government, and the main functions of these cities within 
their wider regions include organising and coordinating regional economic activity, to 
oversee tax and financial systems and to provide training in order to promote 
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development in each of their local regions.495 For example, Chongqing is the capital city 
and leader of the ‘Great Western China Development Strategy’. The cities play a key 
role in China’s development strategy, both in terms of income generation and job 
creation, but also as key role models and centres of economic, political and cultural 
leadership. China’s ‘tax-sharing system’ entails taxes being collected locally and 
centrally, and shared within different regions.496  
With regards to climate policies, Chinese policy appears to recognise the fact that the 
higher level of benefit being gained from luxury emissions within these cities confers 
greater moral responsibility for climate costs, compared to other areas of China. As such, 
the 40-45% emissions intensity reduction targets are differentiated, with ‘specific 
carbon intensity reduction targets [for] all provinces’. For example, Guangdong 
Province, one of the richest provinces, has the target of reducing emissions intensity by 
more than 45%.497 Furthermore, in 2013, China began a pilot emissions trading scheme 
in seven of the most developed areas, including the five National Central Cities, and is 
undertaking research based on these pilot schemes with a view to develop a national 
emissions trading scheme in the 2016-2020 five year plan.498 As we saw in Chapter 
Two, it is important that the relevant actors of states, corporations and individuals work 
together in order to encourage the other actors to fulfil their climate duties. By 
developing an emissions trading scheme, companies that do not comply with lower 
emissions requirements will face financial punishments, creating a system in which all 
will be encouraged to comply, free from the worry of losing a competitive advantage 
against free-riders in the market who are not working to reduce their emissions. 
The discussion has shown that China’s richer cities and provinces are contributing both 
economically and politically to development of other areas of China. Capping emissions 
of the richest cities could have a negative impact on the development of the poorest 
areas within China, which would risk jeopardising the fulfilment of the right to 
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development. The interlinked nature of cities and their lack of true independence is a 
key reason why it does not make sense to apply duties directly at the city level. 
Regional policies should be guided by the sovereign state and not imposed from outside, 
since cities are not independent actors.  A review of Chinese policy has shown that 
China does appear to be distributing the costs of its emissions intensity reduction target 
in a differentiated manner, with much more responsibility and weightier duties being 
borne by the richer areas that have greater capacity to make such changes. As such, 
China is dividing its domestic burden up in a way that is consistent with respect for the 
right to development of the poorest citizens as well as creating an infrastructure in 
which corporations will be rewarded for improving their emissions efficiency in the 
pilot emissions trading areas. 
6.6 The Sustainability Objection 
I shall now consider a final objection. Up to this point, the chapter has considered 
whether China’s pledge to reduce emissions intensity is justified in the context of a 
global burden sharing agreement. The justification is largely dependent on the moral 
claim that there are many other actors that should bear weightier duties than China, and 
therefore can bear most of the burden. The right to development allows Chinese 
emissions to peak at a later date, and this is justified internationally due to China’s 
lower relative capacity to pay and lesser historic responsibility. The idea of relative 
responsibility is important as it reflects the fact that a global response is needed, 
meaning that different states will be expected to take on different levels of responsibility. 
However, if we take a long-term view of the proposal being made by China, and 
consider what justice requires of today’s world in order to protect future generations, we 
might think that continuing emissions growth is not justified. Even if China’s target is 
justified in terms of current international distributive justice vis-a-vis the relative 
responsibilities of states, it may not be consistent with intergenerational justice, as 
increasing global emissions will cause dangerous climate change that will jeopardise the 
rights of future people. So, the objection claims that China’s target is not consistent with 
sustainable development, as it will allow an absolute increase in emissions. 
6.6.1 Responsibilities of Affluent Actors 
In response to this target, let us refer back to a similar argument made in Chapter Three. 
I concluded that individuals have a right to subsistence and development emissions, as 
these are fulfilling human rights. The large proportion of individuals with an unfulfilled 
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right to development in China justifies these emissions, which, by their definition, are 
the only energy option individuals have to fulfil their development needs. Where other, 
cleaner options are available, there is a responsibility to use these instead. But most 
energy within China is coal-based, and although the government is investing in clean 
technologies, it does not have the capacity to currently provide these for the hundreds of 
millions of Chinese citizens that have subsistence and development energy needs. As I 
concluded in Chapter Three, the weight of the responsibility falls on affluent actors such 
as developed states and corporations to allow the transfer of technology and know-how 
to enable clean development to take place. As Shue has argued: 
‘All human beings potentially share some responsibility generally for dealing with 
climate change and, specifically, for preventing unjustifiable delays in the date of 
technological transition, that is, for avoiding the creation of unnecessary dangers for 
people in the future. Plainly, these specific responsibilities need to be assigned in 
accord with some allocative principles, like the ability to contribute to the solution or 
past contribution to the problem.’499 
China’s target is justified from the point of view of what it is reasonable for China to 
contribute to a global burden sharing agreement. This is largely because there are many 
other potential duty bearers who have both contributed more to the problem and have 
much greater capacity to contribute to the solution. However, in the context of what 
justice requires us to do in relation to the rights of future generations, it is not justifiable 
for global carbon emissions to keep on increasing at such a rate as will be the case if a 
country the size of China becomes locked into coal-based energy production due to the 
fact that it cannot currently afford to invest in clean technologies to the extent that 
would be required. But the intergenerational aspect of justice can also be responded to 
by a current account of distributive justice, which would require more from the 
responsible actors not only relative to other states, but also relative to future people. So 
justice requires stronger action, but the responsibility to go further than China’s current 
target, which we have established is already reasonably demanding given China’s 
situation, should fall on the shoulders of the affluent actors with the power to act on 
climate change. 
6.6.2 Conditional Duties 
Before concluding this section, it is worth considering a further point. If the affluent 
duty bearers do provide China with the means to develop cleanly, China’s 
                                                
499 Henry Shue, ‘Responsibility to Future Generations and the Technological Transition’, in Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Richard B. Howarth, eds., Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, 
Politics, Ethics (San Diego: Elsevier, 2005): 279. 
 197 
responsibilities would be increased. If subsistence and development emissions are no 
longer needed in order to enable human rights fulfilment, the state would no longer be 
justified in increasing emissions to fulfil these needs. As such, some countries have 
pledged emissions targets that are dependent on action from affluent actors to enable 
sustainable development, representing a willingness to develop sustainably if help to do 
this is forthcoming. South Africa has proposed a target along these lines, stating that 
‘the extent to which this action will be implemented depends on the provision of 
financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity building support by 
developed countries.’500 South Africa, a country with a GDP per capita of $12,144, has 
pledged an emissions reduction of 34% compared to ‘business as usual’ between 2005 
and 2020.501 If the technology and know-how required to develop cleanly was 
forthcoming, then it might be justifiable to require China to make a similar pledge. As 
such, China’s emissions intensity commitment is consistent with a global burden 
sharing agreement in the current circumstances. However, to the extent that the capacity 
to develop cleanly is provided by technology transfer from developed states, China’s 
justification for increasing its emissions to meet the subsistence and development needs 
of its citizens is weakened and China’s climate responsibilities should increase. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the political and moral issues surrounding China’s 
commitment to reduce emissions intensity by 40-45% by 2020. I have defended China’s 
position as a justifiable practical response to the account of climate justice I have 
defended in this thesis. I have argued that an account of climate justice requires some 
action from China, but that the policy pledged to reduce emissions intensity, alongside 
domestic emissions policies and investment in sustainable technology is consistent with 
the justice-based requirements of the Chinese state. There are other actors that should 
bear the duty of reducing emissions in an absolute sense. China’s position is consistent 
with an approach of sustainable development, aimed at reducing the emissions intensity 
of a state without restricting the growth it requires to fulfil the rights of its citizens to 
development. China’s target is politically justified, and in line with the UNFCCC 
requirements of developing countries and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities. 
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I have defended China’s position against five objections. First, I reviewed the claim that 
the metrics used to calculate emissions intensity were unreliable and capable of giving a 
false image of the actual progress China is making due to the manipulability of the 
figure of GDP and the inclusion of structural changes in the calculation of emissions 
intensity. I responded by arguing that a reduction in emissions intensity brought about 
by structural changes represents a move towards a less carbon intensive economy, 
which should be encouraged in a country such as China with a large, emissions 
intensive, manufacturing industry. The requirement to reduce global emissions should 
be brought about by international rules requiring those that benefit from emissions to 
bear responsibility for the costs. In the current situation, China is only in direct control 
of the emissions that take place within its borders, and cannot be responsible for 
industries that move elsewhere as a result of its policies. As such, emissions intensity 
reductions brought about by technical and structural changes are both worthwhile, and 
China’s target is justified.  
The second objection claimed that China’s target was not in line with the requirements 
of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The objection claims that 
it represents the emissions intensity change that would take place as part of ‘business as 
usual’, and therefore does not require any effort from China. I first questioned the use of 
the term ‘business as usual’ due to the fact that it included existing policies in its 
estimation. China has already put in place demanding climate policy actions, and as 
such the claim of ‘business as usual’ is not equivalent to a ‘no action’ policy, as implied 
by the objection. Comparisons of China’s emissions based upon real ‘no-action’ 
projections showed that China’s 40-45% emissions intensity reduction target would 
require a deviation of more than 20%, which represents a ‘major effort’.502  
The third objection claimed that China would have an unfair economic advantage 
compared to the developed states if it was allowed to increase its emissions. I appealed 
to a political argument to show that the claim of ‘unfairness’ was not consistent with the 
requirements of other states with similar levels of capacity on a per capita basis. I 
reviewed examples of several states within the EU that have greater per capita capacity 
than China, and which are permitted to continue increasing their emissions as a matter 
of fairness due to their lower economic capacities. The claim that China would gain an 
unfair advantage is therefore not consistent with the requirements of other states that 
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have similar capacities. This argument was also supported by the moral claim that 
China was justified in increasing emissions due to the right to development.  
Fourth, I considered the objection that Chinese cities or provinces should bear 
responsibilities due to their great size and similar capacity to some states. I argued that 
cities should not be the target of direct climate duties as they are not independent actors. 
Finally, the fifth objection claimed that China’s emissions should be capped as a matter 
of intergenerational justice. Referring back to the discussion in Chapter Three, which 
related to the responsibility to provide the means to develop sustainably, I argued that 
the government of China’s first priority was the right to development of its citizens and 
that where this could not be achieved sustainably it was the international community’s 
responsibility to provide the means to do so. China is investing in clean technologies, 
but it does not currently have the capacity to enable the right to development to be 
fulfilled without the use of fossil fuels. As such, the responsibility falls to the affluent 
actors that benefit from high levels of luxury emissions to reduce global emissions to 
allow for the fulfilment of the right to development where this can only happen using 
carbon emissions. I concluded that China’s responsibilities were dependent on the help 
it is given to develop sustainably, and where it is provided with the means to do this, its 
climate responsibilities increase. 
The discussion has shown that China’s emissions intensity reduction target is consistent 
with a fair global agreement, and I have responded to five key objections. Of course, as 
the multi-actor approach has shown, it is not only the Chinese state that has duties, and 
affluent Chinese individuals and corporations are required to take action independently 
of the requirements of the Chinese state. However, due to the focus of China’s 
international commitment to the UNFCCC, it has been appropriate to focus on the 
duties of the Chinese state in this chapter.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
This final chapter will provide an overview of the distinctive account of climate justice I 
have developed. I will first present a short account of my theory before recapping the 
five research questions I set out to examine initially. I will then review the substantive 
chapters and provide a summary of the responses I have provided to the research 
questions. In the process of doing this I will outline my theory of climate justice and the 
implications of this theory for China. Finally, I will identify areas for further research 
that would build on my thesis. 
Within this thesis I have defended an original account of global climate justice, and 
discussed the implications of this theory for China’s climate responsibilities. I have 
defended a multi-actor approach, which I have argued is essential for a just and 
effective global response to the dangers posed by climate change. In doing so, I have 
contributed to the existing literature by challenging standard approaches that have not 
adequately addressed the issue of which actors should bear duties. I have defended the 
importance of the right to development, differentiating not only between the moral 
importance of the widely referenced categories of ‘luxury’ and ‘subsistence’ emissions, 
but also a third category I have termed ‘development’ emissions. The importance of the 
arguments of Chapter Two and Chapter Three informed the boundaries of my account. I 
then developed a novel approach to allocating responsibility for emissions. This is the 
‘Revised Beneficiary Pays Principle’ (RBPP), which takes into account causal 
contribution, is capable of targeting all the relevant actors and is also sensitive to 
subsistence and the right to development. I have defended the claim that the RBPP 
should be the preferable method of accounting for emissions as it covers all of the 
morally relevant actors, whilst being sensitive to several key factors that influence the 
level of moral responsibility an actor should be expected to bear. I have defended a 
variant of this principle to assign responsibility for historic emissions, though this is 
limited in comparison with current day responsibility. Finally, the implications of the 
approach I have developed have been played out in a moral defence of the political 
pledge China has made to reduce its emissions intensity, which I have argued is a just 
representation of the duties of the Chinese state. 
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The distinctive account of climate justice I have developed and defended in this thesis 
provides an original contribution to the debates around climate justice. It does this in 
four key ways: (1) It is a multi-actor approach defending an account in which 
individuals, corporations, and states are all relevant climate duty bearers; (2) It 
recognises the importance of the individual right to development and allows for 
‘development emissions’; (3) Causal contribution is considered to be an important but 
not determining factor for responsibility allocation – it is benefiting from emissions-
causing actions that is the key moral indicator of responsibility; (4) It considers the 
implications of this distinctive interpretation of climate justice for China, a key global 
actor. 
Over the course of the thesis I have responded to five key research questions, through 
which I have developed a distinctive account of climate justice. Initially, I developed 
the framework upon which to base the account. First, asking a question of scope: ‘Who 
are the relevant actors to bear climate duties?’ Secondly, asking a question of the wider 
distributive justice assumptions of the account: ‘Does the right to development justify 
increasing emissions?’ The responses to these questions formed the basis of a human 
rights based, multi-actor framework for the account. I then considered how we might 
allocate responsibility for current and historic emissions between actors within this 
framework, asking: ‘How should we allocate responsibility for emissions?’, and ‘How 
should we consider historic emissions?’ Finally, having developed a distinctive account 
of climate justice through engagement with the first four questions, I applied this to 
China’s existing policy commitment, asking: ‘Is China’s emissions intensity target 
consistent with principles of global climate justice?’ Together, engagement with these 
questions forms a distinctive account of who should bear climate duties and on what 
basis these duties should be allocated. I will now summarise the discussions of the 
substantive chapters. 
Chapter Two was the first substantive chapter, which began to set the framework for the 
account, in identifying the actors that should be candidates for climate duties. Whilst 
most existing climate change literature assumes that states are the relevant moral actors 
for climate duties, I have defended a multi-actor approach, in which individuals and 
corporations are also considered to be relevant actors to bear climate duties. I have 
argued that climate change is a global problem that cannot be regulated by state-level 
duties alone. An approach that deals uniquely with state-level duties must rely solely 
upon national laws as the tools with which to regulate the behaviour of the other actors 
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that can causally contribute to climate change. However, simply requiring these actors 
to obey the laws of the state in which they are located is not likely to result in an 
effective response to climate change for several reasons.  
First, the current international climate regime differentiates very simply between duties 
of developed states and duties of developing states. The latter are not required to 
commit to capping their emissions due to the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities which considers the developed states to bear greater responsibility as a 
result of greater historic contributions and economic capacity. However, this exemption 
of developing states fails to recognise the practical imperative that requires action from 
all actors that are contributing causally to climate change, and that have the capacity to 
bear duties. As Harris argues, ‘if the behaviours of [affluent consumers in developing 
states] are not constrained in some way, GHG pollution from developing countries will 
increase markedly, and there will be no hope of averting climate catastrophe—even if 
developed states were to live up to their legal and moral obligations to reduce their 
emissions.’503It is a practical necessity that the growing numbers of affluent individuals 
all over the world are required to bear responsibilities for the emissions from which they 
benefit, and at the same time a matter of fairness, since they are at least as well off and 
contributing as much to climate change as those in developed countries that are 
expected to contribute.  
Corporations are also contributing in a significant way to global emissions. Due to the 
multinational nature of many of the biggest contributors, they are not bound by national 
laws. As such, factories that are located in developing countries such as China are not 
expected to limit their emissions, since responsibility is defined solely at the state level. 
Corporations are able to move factories in order to avoid national regulations. But this 
is not the extent of their power against national laws. They are also capable of 
influencing the creation of such regulations and laws. As such, they can abuse their 
power by lobbying against any regulation that would reduce their profit margins, despite 
the environmental costs. Whilst corporations do not hold the same level of moral 
personhood as individuals, there are certain moral and political requirements that should 
limit what corporations can do in the pursuit of profit. The potential for climate change 
to cause serious human rights violations places a responsibility on corporations to 
respect these rights. They must respect the need to reduce global emissions by not using 
their lobbying powers to influence regulatory bodies that may wish to control energy 
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standards. They also have a duty to control their emissions by updating old technologies 
and investing in the development of more environmentally friendly methods of 
manufacturing and product delivery.  
An important reason for the need for a multi-actor approach is the inter-linked nature of 
the relationships between the different actors. For example, individuals can influence 
the actions of corporations by favouring products that are produced in energy-efficient 
ways. Individuals can influence the behaviour of states. Indeed, in democratic states, we 
would hope that individuals can strongly influence the behaviour of their governments. 
Corporations can influence the behaviour of individuals through use of marketing. 
States can influence the behaviour of both individuals and corporations by incentivising 
the production and buying of climate-neutral products. As such, if all are required to 
bear responsibility for their actions, they might be expected to exert whatever influence 
they have on the other actors to make the fulfilment of their duties as easy as possible. 
There are three key stages of this claim: (1) actors are interconnected; (2) this 
interconnectivity means that each actor can influence the behaviour of other actors; (3) 
actors are likely to encourage each other to make climate-friendly choices if they all 
share in the responsibility. For example, if corporations are taxed for the level of 
emissions they use to produce a product, they will want to encourage consumers to opt 
for goods with low carbon footprints. Individuals in turn will want to encourage 
corporations to produce goods in efficient ways, in order to minimise their climate 
duties arising from responsibility for the emissions embedded in products they consume. 
Individual voters will be more likely to vote for parties that will enable individuals to 
fulfil their climate duties more easily – for example by reducing taxes on green choices. 
On the other hand, if it is only states that bear responsibility for climate duties, then 
neither corporations nor individuals have an incentive to encourage states to fulfil their 
climate duties. This is because corporations and individuals only receive passed on costs 
of climate duties if the state acts on its climate duties. If the state does not fulfil its 
responsibility to cap emissions, for example, carbon will not become more expensive. 
So, by influencing the state to reduce regulation or voting for parties that are not likely 
to act on their climate responsibilities, individuals and corporations might benefit in a 
situation where only states are required to bear climate duties. Where all actors are 
considered to bear climate duties, they are all incentivised to make greener choices, and 
influence the other actors to do the same. 
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The conclusion of Chapter Two is that the moral responsibility to protect the rights of 
those that will suffer the consequences of dangerous climate change is shared by all 
actors that are responsible for contributing to climate change and that have the capacity 
to implement changes to reduce their emissions. The multi-actor approach provides the 
initial framework defining the scope of my account of climate justice. 
The key implications for China that have come from Chapter Two are that both 
individuals and corporations within China are relevant actors to bear climate duties, 
even if on a state-level China is not required to do so. Affluent Chinese individuals are 
relevant actors to bear climate duties, since they are contributing causally to climate 
change and they have a level of affluence that will allow them to deal with the costs 
involved. Individuals may therefore have the duty to limit their own engagement with 
actions that are emission-intensive, as well as supporting policies that would 
differentiate duties to actors depending on affluence and capacity to influence change. 
Corporations with factories located in China should reduce their own emissions and 
support legislation that would institutionalise corporate climate responsibilities, in order 
to ensure that all are made to comply. Corporations that are based in China should not 
be exempt from climate duties simply because of the state in which they are located.  
Chapter Three further developed the framework of the account, in asking: ‘Does the 
right to development justify the exemption of developing states from taking on 
emissions caps?’ The basis of this research question was China’s claim that 
development was the ‘overriding priority’ of developing countries. As such, it forms an 
important part of setting the boundaries of my account of climate justice, in considering 
how an important issue of wider global justice fits with climate responsibilities. The 
discussion in the chapter highlighted the importance of the right to development, and as 
such, integrated this right into the framework of my account of climate justice. 
Within Chapter Three, I first defended the right to development as a right of individuals 
and not a right of states. This means that states are not justified in pursuing economic 
development that causes emissions increases where this is not meeting the right to 
development of the citizens within the states. However, where states are acting on 
behalf of their citizens as key duty bearers of the right to development, emissions 
increases that are needed to fulfil this right are justifiable. I defended this claim based 
upon the moral importance of the rights embodied in the right to development.  
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When the global situation of emissions involves high-levels of emissions that are being 
used for luxury preferences, emissions that are needed to fulfil human rights must surely 
take precedence. The existing literature makes reference to ‘subsistence’ and ‘luxury’ 
emissions to describe the emissions produced in the fulfilment of these two ends.504 
However, this two-category distinction may lead to the odd conclusion that all 
emissions that are not being used for subsistence needs must thereby be luxury 
emissions. Clearly, emissions that are required to fulfil needs that are embodied in the 
right to development should not be considered to bear the same moral weight as luxury 
emissions, such as the emissions that are produced by a car, for example, when out for a 
leisurely Sunday drive.505 I therefore defended the use of a third category of emissions 
to fill this gap between subsistence and luxury emissions, termed ‘development 
emissions’. It follows, that states are justified in increasing their absolute emissions 
where this is due to a need for increased subsistence and development emissions. In line 
with the multi-actor approach, it is the responsibility of other actors to reduce their 
luxury emissions enough to make room for subsistence and development emissions.  
However, I have argued that a further qualification for the justification of a state-level 
increase may be required, based upon a holistic approach to rights. The holistic 
approach argues that a coherent approach to one right requires a commitment to certain 
other rights, where ‘the rationale grounding one right also grounds another distinct 
right’.506 If the connected rights are not respected, then the approach is not consistent 
with the right being defended. The relevance of this to China’s claim of being permitted 
to increase emissions is as follows. In order to keep global levels of greenhouse gases 
within a safe level, an emissions increase by the state of China creates the requirement 
for a greater reduction in emissions than would otherwise be required from other actors. 
The increase by China must therefore be consistent with the requirements of the 
principle from which its justification comes, which in this case is the moral importance 
of the right to development.  The right to development entails a commitment to civil and 
political rights as well as socio-economic rights, meaning that the holistic approach 
requires China to display a commitment to these rights. If this commitment is not given, 
the state is acting unjustly with regards to both the right to development as well as 
towards the other climate actors who are required to bear more responsibility as a result. 
My response to the second research question therefore confirms the right to 
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development as a justification for increasing emissions, but requires the state acting on 
behalf of this right to display a commitment to the fulfilment of the rights that are 
connected to the right to development. 
The discussion in Chapter Two and Chapter Three led to the identification of two key 
requirements of my account of climate justice: (1) It should embody a multi-actor 
approach to climate duties; and (2) it should be sensitive to the right to development. 
Having ascertained the scope of the account, in terms of who should bear climate duties, 
and a general assumption of how the account should respond to the wider justice claim 
of the right to development, I was then able to move on to developing the applied 
aspects of the account, in determining how to allocate responsibility for carbon 
emissions.  
Chapters Four and Five built on the theoretical basis by responding to the third and 
fourth research questions, which asked: ‘How should we account for responsibility for 
emissions?’, and ‘How should we consider responsibility for historic emissions?’ These 
are key questions of how a theory of climate justice should account for emissions. Many 
existing principles have been proposed in the literature, but I argued that these existing 
principles are not capable of responding adequately to issues that are raised by China’s 
position. Chapter Four discussed accountability for current and future emissions, whilst 
Chapter Five considered how accountability should be applied in designating 
responsibility for historic emissions. 
The basis of the research in Chapter Four came in response to the claim from key 
figures in China that foreign consumers should bear responsibility for a share of 
Chinese emissions when they consume goods that have been produced in China. The 
claim that consumers should bear responsibility for emissions embedded in the products 
they consume has intuitive plausibility. Currently, emissions are accounted for on a 
territorial basis, in which geographic location of production is the only factor considered 
in determining who has the responsibility for emissions, based upon the idea of the 
‘polluter pays principle’ (PPP).507 Each state is considered to bear responsibility for the 
emissions that take place within its borders.  
In order to consider the implications of the intuitive claim, I investigated an existing, 
alternative accounting system, in which emissions are accounted for on a consumption 
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rather than territorial basis. This is consistent with the multi-actor approach, in 
considering responsibility for emissions at different points along the consumption chain, 
at the level of individual consumers as well as corporations and states. I argued that 
consumption accounting would indeed be preferable to territorial accounting both 
morally and practically. Practically, consumption accounting would reduce leakage, in 
which emissions-producing activities move from an area covered by territorial 
accounting caps, to an area that is not.508 In practice, this tends to be the movement of 
industries from developed countries to developing countries, like China, that are not 
expected to cap their emissions.509 As such, leakage can mean that a developed country 
is seen to be reducing emissions, yet the global impact of this reduction is not a decrease 
in emissions, since the industries simply move to another part of the 
world.510Consumption accounting can provide a more carbon efficient system by which 
to account for emissions, since the emissions that leak to other countries would still be 
accounted for at the point at which the product in which they are embedded is consumed. 
However, in developing an initial moral defence of consumption accounting, I came to 
the conclusion that the key moral consideration is that consumers are benefiting from 
the emissions. In investigating this point, I examined claims that consumers are not the 
only beneficiaries. Indeed, the state of China has also benefited from its export-led 
growth.511 Other actors may also benefit from the emissions produced in manufacturing 
goods. If the benefit consumers get from the emissions is the morally relevant link, then 
this implies that responsibility should not be borne solely by consumers but shared by 
the different actors that also benefit from the action that produces the emissions. From 
this key finding, I developed a novel principle that is capable of dealing with the wide 
range of actors that may be linked to the emissions in a morally relevant way. This is 
the ‘revised beneficiary pays principle’ (RBPP). The RBPP links the morally relevant 
actors to the emissions based upon the benefit they receive as a result of the emission-
causing action. As a result, the principle is capable of responding to the first 
requirement of my account of climate justice, in being capable of allocating 
responsibilities within a multi-actor approach. The RBPP includes individuals, 
corporations and states in its assessment of benefit. The relevant beneficiaries might 
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include an individual that buys a good produced in China, for example, or a corporation 
that is making profits due to its Chinese factories that have low operational costs. The 
RBPP is also sensitive to upstream beneficiaries including the sellers of raw materials 
that enable the processes that cause the resulting emissions.  
The RBPP is also sensitive to the right to development, and therefore fulfils the second 
requirement of my account of climate justice. Receiving non-subsistence benefit is a 
necessary condition for generating responsibilities. Beyond this, there are three 
qualifications that aggravate the degree of responsibility an actor bears. The first 
modulating factor considers development level, and allocates greatest responsibility to 
those receiving high levels of luxury benefits. The level of responsibility gradually 
increases as benefits received by the actor move along the development scale. 
The second modulating factor of the RBPP recognises the relevance of the moral 
intuition that forms the basis of the polluter pays principle (PPP). However, the RBPP 
differs fundamentally, since the relevant moral link between duty bearer and emissions 
is benefiting, rather than causal action. Once the necessary condition of receiving non-
subsistence benefit is achieved, responsibility is modulated by the second qualification, 
which is the ability of an actor to exert influence over emissions. 
Beneficiaries that have no ability to influence the emissions for which they are being 
held responsible are considered to bear a smaller degree of responsibility for the 
emissions from which they receive non-subsistence benefit. The more an actor can 
influence the emissions, the greater the level of responsibility is considered to be. 
The third modulating factor differentiates levels of responsibility between different 
actors based upon the degree of voluntariness with which that actor has accepted benefit. 
For example, actors with the possibility of making greener choices that have chosen to 
accept the benefit from the emissions process are considered to have acted with a 
greater degree of voluntariness and therefore bear greater responsibility.  
A key contribution of this thesis is to present a new way of accounting for emissions, 
that can respond to different claims of fairness. In most cases, polluters engage in 
polluting actions in order to benefit from them, meaning that in most cases they are 
likely to bear a degree of responsibility under the RBPP. So, the RBPP holds many of 
the same actors responsible as the polluter pays principle, yet would exempt those that 
are causally responsible but do not benefit in a way that is considered to be morally 
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relevant. This is an important difference that has implications for the types of actors we 
believe bear climate duties. The impact of global trade on climate change has caused a 
situation where emissions that take place in China are in many cases benefiting actors 
that are removed from the emissions. Examples of such beneficiaries include consumers, 
corporations in charge of factories, and actors that benefit financially from the sale of 
the energy resources, such as coal or oil. The RBPP suggests that while the Chinese 
state bears some responsibility, this is shared with the other actors.  
The RBPP provides the moral basis for an ideal accounting system that is capable of 
responding to different claims of justice-based arguments within one single principle. It 
is consistent with the multi-actor approach, targeting all of the relevant actors under the 
same assessment scheme, and is sensitive to the right to development. As the outcome 
of Chapter Four, the RBPP provides one of the major contributions of the thesis. Having 
developed an account of climate justice that can ascertain which actors should bear 
responsibility for current and future emissions, I then developed the theory further by 
considering the implications for historic responsibility. 
Chapter Five considered the question: ‘How should we consider responsibility for 
historic emissions?’ I first considered some existing arguments in favour of historic 
responsibility. In particular, I considered the ‘fair shares’ argument in which developed 
states are considered to have taken more than their fair share of the atmosphere’s 
capacity to absorb greenhouse gases within the safe limit. This argument relies on the 
claim that there is an equal per capita right to emit greenhouse gases. In using more than 
the amount that would be allocated to them on an egalitarian, per capita approach, 
developed states have used more than their fair share, and therefore should repay this 
‘debt’ by bearing historic responsibility.512 Instead, I defended a version of the fair 
shares argument based upon the share of the benefit actors have received from the 
atmosphere’s finite capacity to absorb greenhouse gases. In this account, actors are 
considered to have taken more than their fair share when they have received more 
benefit than was needed for their subsistence and development needs. This principle 
provided an expansion to the account of climate justice that was consistent with the 
arguments of the preceding chapters, in being applicable to different actors, sensitive to 
the right to development, and considering beneficiaries to be morally relevant. 
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Having ascertained that the excess luxury benefits received from historic emissions 
were what made them wrongful, I then considered the implications of the objection of 
excusable ignorance for historic responsibility. If actors were unaware of the 
wrongfulness of the benefit they were receiving, they could not be held morally 
accountable. As a result of this, I defended a principle of limited responsibility for 
emissions that took place before around 1990, based upon Bell’s time-relative/time-
neutral distinction.513 Actors that were excusably ignorant due to the time-relative 
information available to them at the time emissions occurred should be willing to pay 
back the benefit they received when the time-neutral information about the 
wrongfulness of the past emissions becomes known. This ‘dual-standpoint’ perspective 
enables them to discover the wrongful nature of the benefits gained from historic 
emissions.514 The excusable ignorance objection therefore does not excuse actors 
entirely from bearing responsibility if new information comes about that makes the 
wrongfulness of past actions clear.   
I considered the implications of this position for different actors, using the RBPP to 
determine their different historic responsibilities. States and corporations are both 
capable of existing over long periods of time, though this may not be as clear cut for 
corporations as for states, due to the nature of financial benefits passed on to 
shareholders. I concluded that states were the main actors to bear limited historic 
responsibility due to the non-subsistence benefit gained which conferred many luxury 
benefits that were accepted with some degree of voluntariness. The limited fulfilment of 
the ability to exert influence factor, in which actors were excusably ignorant at the time 
they could have exerted influence is the key limiting factor for historic responsibilities. I 
therefore supported a principle of limited liability for historic emissions This liability is 
greater for developed states than developing states, since a much larger share of 
developed states’ emissions have conferred luxury benefits. 
The previous discussion has shown that over the course of the first five chapters I 
developed and defended an account of climate justice capable of responding to key 
issues highlighted by China’s position. I defined the scope of my account to consider 
states, individuals and corporations as the relevant duty bearers. I defended the need for 
the account to be sensitive to the right to development. I then defended the principles on 
the basis of which responsibilities should be allocated. This led to the development of 
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the RBPP, a principle that can respond to the issues of fairness raised by global trade. 
This principle is consistent with the multi-actor approach and sensitive to the right to 
development. It can be used to determine responsibility for current, future and past 
emissions. The work of the first five chapters thus builds a distinctive account of 
climate justice. Chapter Six applied this account of climate justice by assessing the 
policy commitment made by the Chinese state. 
Chapter Six therefore responded to the fifth research question, which asked: ‘Is China’s 
emissions intensity target consistent with a fair global climate agreement?’ The focus of 
the question is primarily statist, in considering what it is fair to ask of the Chinese state 
in a burden-sharing agreement between states. The implications of the account of 
climate justice I have proposed lead to the conclusion that the Chinese state does have a 
responsibility to act on climate change, but not to the same extent as the developed 
states.  
I first presented a defence of China’s position, arguing that an emissions intensity 
reduction target was consistent with the implications of my account of global climate 
justice. I then responded to five objections to China’s emissions intensity reduction 
target. I first defended China’s position against an objection that critiqued the choice of 
emissions per unit of GDP as a measure for intensity, showing that this would be 
representative of China’s progress as long as this was measured in terms of real GDP, as 
opposed to nominal GDP. Second, I responded to claims that fulfilling China’s target 
would require nothing more than ‘business as usual’, and therefore would not require 
any effort from China. I responded to this by showing that ‘business as usual’ 
estimations often include existing policies, and therefore are not ‘no action’ estimations. 
I supported this by referencing several existing studies that show that fulfilling China’s 
target will require effort, and cannot be considered to be an easy target to fulfil. I then 
considered the claim that China would have an economic advantage over developed 
countries as a result of not being required to cap emissions. I responded to this by 
claiming that while China’s target might be consistent with economic development, this 
would not amount to an unfair advantage over the developed countries according to the 
theory of climate justice developed in the thesis. Fourth, I considered an objection that 
claimed that whilst the Chinese state might not be required to cap emissions, certain 
cities or regions within China should be, due to their large size and contribution to 
global emissions. In response to this I argued that cities are not comparable to states as 
they lack the political and financial autonomy to be able to implement direct climate 
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responsibilities. Finally, I responded to the objection that China’s target might be 
consistent with global distributive justice of climate burdens between current actors, but 
it was not consistent with intergenerational justice and the requirements of sustainability. 
I responded to this objection by making reference to the argument from Chapter Three 
in which the responsibility for global sustainability lies primarily with the affluent 
actors. I developed the implications of this argument by arguing that if the capabilities 
for sustainable development were forthcoming from the affluent actors, China would be 
expected to take on more challenging climate duties since subsistence and development 
needs could then be fulfilled without fossil fuels. 
Chapter Six therefore provided a defence of China’s position as a justifiable practical 
response to the requirements of the account of global climate justice defended within 
the thesis. This claim was strengthened through the consideration and rejection of five 
potential objections. I showed that these objections could not justify challenging the 
consistency of China’s energy intensity target with the requirements of global climate 
justice. 
7.1 Further research 
The proposed theory of climate justice I have developed provides a starting point for 
many further avenues of research. Further research of this kind could strengthen the 
defence of the arguments presented in the thesis. In what follows, I will note three 
potential avenues for future research. 
First, the theory developed in this thesis could be used to evaluate the climate policies 
of other states. For example, it could be used to assess other key climate actors such as 
the United States. This would be particularly useful in assessing the moral relevance of 
competing claims of “fairness” that have been put forward by different states. It would 
provide the basis of a framework from which to assess the moral justification of the 
often misaligned negotiating positions that different states have so far taken within the 
international climate negotiations. 
A second important avenue of investigation is to further develop the implications for the 
duties of non-state actors. A key question is whether any direct duties of corporations 
and individuals should be institutionalised. Perhaps some duties could be worked into 
existing institutions. Corporate duties, for example might conceivably be operated under 
an institution such as the World Trade Organisation. Individual duties might be 
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developed from a United Nations body. However, these bodies are currently controlled 
by states, and it is necessary to develop further research on the multi-actor approach in 
developing the nature of duties for non-state actors as well as whether their enforcement 
will require the creation of a new global institution. 
A third avenue of research could further consider the implications of the RBPP for 
carbon accounting and the design of climate institutions. The RBPP has provided a 
theoretical response to the question of how we should account for emissions. But it is 
not within the scope of this thesis to consider practical methods for putting it into 
practice. The work undertaken in developing the RBPP in this thesis provides a starting 
point from which further work could be done to determine the practical implications. 
This may take the form of economic analyses in the case where benefit is considered to 
be primarily financial. It might therefore involve the implementation of something 
similar to a financial transaction tax, including all actions that are linked to emissions. 
There are likely to be a number of practical difficulties in measuring benefits and in 
working out how the three qualifying clauses might be operationalised. For example, it 
is not likely to be straightforward to assess an actor’s ability to exert influence on the 
quantity of emissions generated. However, the RBPP might set a framework for 
assessing the legitimacy of arguments for more or less demanding climate 
responsibilities, rather than simply providing an accounting system. Further 
development of this avenue of research would encourage the development of alternative 
accounting systems that are neither simply territorial nor simply consumption-based. 
In this thesis, I have engaged with key issues of climate justice and developed a 
distinctive theory which has been used to interpret the moral responsibilities of China. 
In the current political context, a fair agreement only considers the responsibilities of 
states. This thesis has argued that a truly fair global agreement on climate change would 
require action from individuals and corporations, both within China and the rest of the 
world. The relevant actors are those that receive non-subsistence benefit from emissions. 
The RBPP can provide a framework from which to assess the legitimacy of competing 
arguments from different actors, as well as the moral basis for an accounting system for 
carbon emissions. There are individuals and corporations in the world that are 
benefiting from emissions in a morally relevant way, and exerting an influence on the 
level of global carbon emissions. Many of these actors are currently not required to take 
any action, in some cases due to their geographical location. In as far as these actors are 
causing emissions increases within the borders of China, I have argued that the response 
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is not to conclude that China, as a state, should be required to take on the same level of 
responsibility as developed states. The right to development of the hundreds of millions 
of Chinese is morally important, and the state of China has an obligation to enable the 
fulfilment of this right. Furthermore, many of the emissions coming from China are 
produced for the benefit of actors outside of China. The account of global climate 
justice I have proposed would require the actors that benefit to bear responsibility for 
these emissions. Within this multi-actor approach, differentiation within states is 
possible, as well as between states. Subsistence and development emissions are justified 
in a world where many more emissions are fulfilling luxury ‘needs’, and it is those that 
benefit from these luxury emissions that should bear the greatest climate duties. This 
targets the actors for which the emissions are not fulfilling needs of comparable moral 
importance, and also those that are most likely to be able to make a difference to global 
emissions due to their ability to exert influence on the emissions processes. The account 
I have developed in this research provides the basis for a new moral framework, in 
which actors can equitably share the burden of climate change, responding to different 
claims of justice and providing a meaningful basis for a fair global system of 
implementing climate duties. The account has responded to issues of climate justice 
raised by China, and provided a set of principles from which these issues can be fairly 
assessed in a way that is applicable to determining the implications for different actors. 
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